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For this study, I am investigating the “decline and fall” of Rome, as represented in 
British and American culture and thought, from the late nineteenth through the 
early twenty-first centuries. It is my argument that the “decline and fall” of Rome is 
no straightforward historical fact, but a “myth” in the academic sense coined by 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, meaning not a “falsehood” but a complex social and ideological 
construct. It represents the fears of European and American thinkers as they 
confront the perceived instability and pitfalls of the civilization to which they 
belonged. The material I have gathered illustrates the value of the decline and fall 
as a spatiotemporal concept, rather than a historical event - even when most of its 
popular and intellectual representations characterises it as such. I am therefore 
inquiring into the ways in which writers, filmmakers and the media have 
conceptualized this “decline”; and the parallels they have drawn, deliberately or 
unconsciously, with their contemporary world. My work fits into a broader 
collection of studies examining the continuing impact of the Greco-Roman heritage 
on our cultural and ideological horizons. However, though the representation of 
antiquity is a fast-growing field of scholarly inquiry, the theme of this project has 
been little examined. I am critical of the standard model of the “sociology of 
representation” in history, which holds that such media is almost exclusively a 
vehicle to articulate contemporary concerns, and which omits the recurring role of 
deeper, underlying historical and cultural narratives. When I consider the “decline 
and fall,” it instead becomes apparent how the present is adapted to fit the 
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Representation and Myth 
For this thesis, I am investigating the “decline and fall” of Rome, as perceived and 
imagined in aspects of British and American culture and thought, from the late 
nineteenth through the early twenty-first centuries. It is an interdisciplinary study 
of these representations and their cultural functions. I am inquiring into the ways in 
which writers,1 filmmakers and the media have conceptualized this “decline”; and 
the parallels they have drawn, deliberately or unconsciously, to their contemporary 
world. My work fits within a broader collection of studies examining the continuing 
impact of the Greco-Roman heritage on our present cultural and ideological 
horizons. However, though the representation of various areas of antiquity is a fast-
growing field of scholarly inquiry, the theme of this project has been little examined 
in this context. 
By “representation” I refer to the ways in which material has been 
transmitted, rewritten, adapted and reimagined. The re-presentation of past eras in 
new cultural forms is a complex activity, one that is bound up in a much broader set 
of social and historical processes. The reception of classical and medieval culture 
has a rich and meaningful history of its own. These successive interpretations of the 
past can prove to be far removed from the events or ideas they describe. And yet 
one can never fully understand the history of the post-classical world without some 
                                                          
1
 “Writers” referring to those of both popular and intellectual inclinations in their work, or agents of 
 “high” and “low” culture as they might otherwise be described. 
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measure of direct reference to the ancient cultures against which it has never 
ceased to define itself, by varying methods and means.   
By looking through the prism of the sociology of representation, however, I 
can emphasise the subject’s value in a rather different light: as “illuminating textual 
manifestations of the mentalities of the societies from which they arose.”2 The 
standard model of the cultural “representation” of history theorises that these 
media are primarily a vehicle to articulate contemporary concerns. While this 
approach is at least partly correct, it sometimes misses out the recurring constancy 
in the value of older historical and cultural narratives, of which our topic in question 
is a prominent one. Expanding on this approach by incorporating such narratives 
and traditions helps us understand that the “decline and fall of Rome” is no simple 
unfiltered “fact”, but a “myth” in the academic sense coined by Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
meaning not a falsehood but a complex social and ideological construct.3 This is a 
predominantly secular mythology; though it incorporates a moral and 
eschatological dimension, one which is partly borne of its theological roots. It 
represents the fears of European and American thinkers as they confront the 
perceived instability and pitfalls of the civilization to which they belong. It is a 
paradigm with a currency stretching back hundreds of years, but which still finds a 
powerful and influential presence in its mediation through the era of celluloid and 
mass media. 
The material I will gather in this study illustrates the value of the decline and 
fall as a spatiotemporal concept, rather than a historical event - even when most of 
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 Richard Howells, The Myth of the Titanic (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), p. 21. 
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its popular and intellectual representations characterises and classify it as such. 
Divisions such as the “Middle Ages,” “Renaissance” and “Modernity” create value-
laden demarcation lines out of the past; imposed epochs of time that can overlook 
the existence of “modern” characteristics in the Middle Ages, and “Medieval” 
characteristics in more modern times. The invocation of such categories and 
processes provides powerful conceptual markers for other social and political 
narratives, and a cultural presence that continues to wield influence in 
contemporary times. In this light, the theme of the decline and fall of Rome 
functions as a conceptual invention, layered with the additional beliefs and 
purposes of successive generations. Indeed, contemporary historiography on Late 
Antiquity and the fall of the Western Roman Empire has challenged the strict 
historical veracity of this idea itself; namely the notion that, in any meaningful 
historical sense, we can talk seriously about a “fall” in the fifth century AD, much 
less the notion of a gradual decline in the centuries before that. The whole concept 
has little remaining value in strict historical, academic analysis of the fourth and 
fifth centuries. However, it functions as a meaningful narrative and myth that has 
been appropriated and reinvented by authors, knowingly or unconsciously, with a 
significance rendered particular and personal to their own time.  
Using well-established theories of the sociology of representation, 
metahistory, and Straussian myth, I can illustrate the value of the decline and fall as 
a spatiotemporal concept, or historicising paradigm. It has featured substantially, in 
overt or latent ways, in the popular culture of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. In particular, it serves as a metaphor for the concerns cultural authors in 
Britain, Europe and the US have with the possibility of a similar “decline” in present 
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times, and therefore functions as a vehicle for contemporary concerns and 
critiques. Despite a long-standing interest in the influence of ancient culture on the 
modern world, the archetype of the decline and fall of Rome in western culture and 
thought has received little direct consideration. While there are many areas of 
academic writing that touch on the subject - for instance, a large body of literature 
analysing the representation of the classical world on film - very few have as their 
primary frame the specific thematic conception of the decline and fall.4 Much of 
this omission can be explained by the fact that most scholarship on antiquity and its 
reception has been taken up by traditional classicists, whose academic background 
and consequent area of focus is on the depiction of what falls more strictly within 
the realm of “Classics” - outside of which exists the subject of the decline and fall of 
Rome.5 This study is partly, therefore, a revision of existing attitudes - especially 
with respect to prominently discussed media, such as notable texts and films - and 
partly a focus on new material that is little studied.6 
The approach here contradicts somewhat the contention of the ancient 
historian Glen Bowersock, who in The Vanishing Paradigm of the Fall of Rome 
(1996) writes that, “The fall of Rome is no longer needed, and like the writing on a 
                                                          
4
 One specific study that is centred on this theme, focusing almost exclusively on a positive critical 
appraisal of Anthony Mann’s The Fall of the Roman Empire (Paramount Pictures, 1964), is Martin M. 
Winkler, “Cinema and the Fall of Rome,” Transactions of the American Philological Association, CXXI 
(1995), pp. 135-154.  
5
 The most definitive influential texts in this regard is Jon Solomon, The Ancient World and the 
Cinema (New York: Yale University Press (ori. pub. 1978), 2001). See also Derek Elley, The Epic Film: 
Myth in History (London: Routledge Kegan and Paul, 1984), Martin M. Winkler (ed.), Classics and 
Cinema (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1991), and Maria Wyke, “Ancient Rome and the 
Traditions of Film History,” Screening the Past, VI (1999), published online at 
http://tlweb.latrobe.edu.au/humanities/screeningthepast/firstrelease/fr0499/mwfr6b.htm   
6
 Alexander Demandt, Der Fall Roms: Die Auflösung des römischen Reiches im Urteil der Nachwelt 
(Munich: Beck, 1984), is the most exhaustive study of the impact of the decline and fall of Rome on 
Western intellectual history, and produces a famous list of “201” reasons that have been cited for 
the downfall of the empire, including more comical and absurdist notions - everything from 
“gluttony” to “lead poisoning” and “lack of seriousness.”   
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faded papyrus, it no longer speaks to us,” and that the purpose of the obsession 
with this fall has become to “deny its existence altogether.”7 Instead, I can contend 
that not only has the decline and fall of Rome survived and persisted as a cultural 
and intellectual paradigm, but that it has acquired a prominent and particular 
relevance in the tradition of British and American political, cultural and historical 
thought that compares the rise of Rome with Britain and/or America as the 
respective superpowers of their age. This role as a regular component of discourse 
survives to the present day - enhanced, if anything, by the geopolitical 
developments since the turn of the twenty-first century. I am dealing here with a 
myth that is as much about the present day, as it is the ancient world; for an 
essential property of the decline and fall is that it possesses a universal significance, 
namely that it can be related to the modern world as a moral tale. 
A critical analysis of the forms, and the reception, of the decline and fall 
addresses a key notion; that myths, and their formulation in popular beliefs, act as 
an essential mediator in the making and remaking of historical consciousness. 
Following on from that idea, this thesis will demonstrate how these examples help 
challenge the still oft-held notion that, when it comes to the transmission of ideas 
about the classical past, popular culture exists in a largely distinct, even inferior, 
realm to the literary and intellectual world. Access to the classical or medieval 
imaginary is provided not only through academic histories, and canonical literature, 
but through the popular literature, cinema, and other media examined here. They 
exist within the same continuum of iconographic representation. I am outlining the  
form the decline and fall of Rome takes as a mythology, not only as a technical 
                                                          
7
 Glen W. Bowersock, “The Vanishing Paradigm of the Fall of Rome,” Bulletin of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences,” LXIX (1996), pp. 29-43.  
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description of its structure, but because it can pervade all levels of public 
consciousness; from the scholarly and intellectual, to popular culture and the mass 
media. Myth should be recognized as myth, whether it comes from mass media or 
from their intellectual critics. Different media can carry the same message, encoded 
and translated using different tools. Representations of the decline and fall of Rome 
embrace a wide spectrum of cultural output, and possess common underlying 
themes. Uncovering them helps us to reconceptualise the relationship between 
mythic, historical, and fictional narratives. Through this approach, I can build on the 
ideas of Hayden White, particularly his Metahistory, to demonstrate the union of 
popular and elite texts as a broader expression of historical consciousness.8 One 
can treat these different media as expressions of a singular myth.  
 
 
Hermeneutics and Historical Consciousness 
In this thesis I seek to answer the question: What, within our time-frame of 
the late nineteenth century to the present day, does the representation of the 
decline and fall of Rome tell us about the societies that produced these cultural 
texts? I intend to tackle this question through a hermeneutic approach: an 
interpretative, textual analysis of a collection of films, books, and works of 
professional “history”, and some appropriate examples from the media. This 
combination of the vernacular and intellectual will demonstrate that, rather than 
being opposed to each other, they combine as components of a wider cultural 
discourse with that past that frames our relationship to it. A cross-comparative 
                                                          
8
 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins, 1973). 
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approach demonstrates that these texts betray intimate connections with one 
another; some overt and deliberate, and others wholly unintended, yet clear and 
evident upon close analysis.  
A second, and somewhat deeper question I am attempting to answer is: Are 
these representations of decline transient and unique to their specific period, or do 
they possess universal, archetypal qualities? Here a discussion of the theories of 
myth found, in particular, in the writings of Lévi-Strauss and Clifford Geertz, 
becomes very appropriate.9 This thesis represents a historical study in which the 
object of historical inquiry here is shifted towards the historiography itself, or 
rather a cultural historiography, where academic or intellectual authorship interacts 
with a wider popular and cultural consciousness. Arguably it is this form of 
“historiography”, to slightly refashion the word, that plays a much greater role in 
the formation of common human thinking and learning, and more specifically for 
us, the mediation of historical ideas such as the “decline and fall” of Rome. This is 
precisely because it inhabits this whole array of widely experienced cultural 
artefacts - literature, art, film, scholarship, journalism, propaganda, stretching 
across what might traditionally be constituted as both “higher” and “lower” cultural 
forms. Artists and dramatists map out the mental structure and moral character of 
an age. Culture can get co-opted into political discourse. And, inevitably, these 
diverse representations constitute a blend of both the real and the imaginary. Just 
as popular re-presentations of events contain a value “truth” of their own, so 
historical writing is framed by its own subjectivities. Looking into this range of 
historical representation opens up not one but two avenues of inquiry - the study of 
                                                          
9
 Clifford Geertz, “Notes on a Balinese Cockfight,” in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures 
(Basic Books: New York (ori. pub. 1973), 1993), pp. 412-453. See also Strauss (1968). 
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contemporary society through the representation of the past, and, less overtly, the 
study of the modern transmission of historical consciousness; much or most of 
which occurs outside of strict academic fields. 
Although there have been changes in the cinematic, as well as other popular 
and academic, conceptions of this period over the past century  - and previous to 
that - our focus is on those continuities which bind together these texts. The 
chronological range is therefore necessarily broad. Academic work on the reception 
of this period, or history in general, often articulates its own special place, and its 
relevance to contemporary debates, by proclaiming a “current wave” of films, 
literature, and other writing; and proffers explanations for the renewed, or 
growing, relevance of the subject under discussion by focusing on recent historical 
examples, with some classical examples thrown in for wider context. A prime 
example of this has been the renewed attention on America as an “empire”, and an 
empire seen as potentially threatened with decline, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. 
Yet the focus of this kind of study is not on a specific set of material, but on picking 
up persistent patterns. A strong case can be made for a recent surge of interest in 
questions concerning the “fall of empires” - particularly the comparison with 
Ancient Rome and the perceived ills of contemporary America - but this, while 
important, is not the primary focus of this thesis, nor will it be a justification for its 
value.   
This project must necessarily include an examination of relevant historical 
writing. Much of this can be easily considered to fall within the subjective criteria 
described above. Historiography is itself intimately connected to a wider set of 
discourses. Supposed “historical” descriptions of the past are, to varying degrees, a 
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recursive narrative about the present, and can easily fall victim to anachronism and 
ideology. All history is informed by what Walter Benjamin calls the “presence of the 
now,”10 meaning that any interpretation of a past culture is refracted through the 
prism of our own thought worlds.11 When we unravel the layers of preconceptions 
associated with a historical archetype, we can see that it can be understood not just 
as the factual descriptor of a period of time, nor even as an “arbitrary” 
historiographical construct. Rather it is a whole ideological framework for 
comprehending the past, and a discourse manifest across the cultural spectrum.  
Consequently, I am exploring territory where history dilutes into this cultural 
historiography; and, at a deeper level, the more anthropological realm of myth. The 
latter term will be used often and needs to be carefully defined for our purposes. A 
myth in this sense denotes neither a fact nor a falsehood, but a cultural and societal 
narrative. Myths are tools that codify abstract ideas into concrete form (Bible 
stories such as those of Genesis being a good example).12 They are complex social 
and cultural creations, rather than accurate representations of historical truth: they 
take mutable forms, and embody shifting meanings over time. 
Whether the “myth” is accurate or not in any strict factual sense is in some 
ways just a coincidence. Such accuracy is not the reason for its emergence, but 
rather that it provides a source of narrative and meaning. This does not mean that 
they have little or nothing to do with the historical record, as is pertinent to my 
considerations here. Myths and traditions use distorted and invented history, but 
                                                          
10
 Walter Benjamin, On the concept of history, trans. Dennis Redmond (Frankfurt: Gesammelten 
Schriften, 1974), XIV. 
11
 Norman F. Cantor, Inventing the Middle Ages: The Lives, Works, and Ideas of the Great 
Medievalists of the Twentieth Century (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1991), p. 37. 
12
 Howells (1999), p. 2, p. 11. 
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this does not mean they have nothing to do with historical fact. They inhabit a 
world built on both fact and fictions.13   
If myths help define our thinking, then they can be as important as any 
“factual” truth.14 At the heart of our perception of the world are the stories we 
weave into it. Much of what is commonly considered “truth” is the narrative 
product of human need. When it comes to the treatment of the past, beliefs, 
intentions, and human imagination, are as much a part of history as actual “History” 
in the more formal sense is.15 The significance of historical events, in this context, 
are approached from the position of society’s views on them, not the events 
themselves - value is instead generated from the impression of what occurred, and 
why, and the forms in which that impression survives as a cultural imprint. Within 
the push and pull of social and cultural forces, the meaning and accorded value of 
any historical event becomes contingent and liable to change. Siegfried Kracauer 
contended that “society is full of events that defy control…. it swallows up ideas fed 
into it and, in adapting them to its inarticulate needs, often completely distorts 
their original meanings.”16 Farfetched ideas or interpretations that seem to have a 
limited initial bearing on “reality” can acquire a powerful significance of their own, 
forming their own presence in the “real”. Hence the assertion by Richard Howells 
that the “unsinkable” nature of the Titanic has become one of the most important, 
and discussed, ingredients of the story, from history classes to popular 
representations - despite it being demonstrably factually inaccurate, and an 
                                                          
13
 Op. cit., p. 11.  
14
 Op. cit., p. 48.   
15
 Marc Ferro, Cinema and History, trans. Naomi Greene (Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 
1988), p. 29. 
16
 Siegfried Kracauer, History: The Last Things Before the Last (New York: Marcus Weiner (ori. pub. 
1969), 1995) pp. 24-25. 
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invention after the event.17 Much the same can be said about the idea of a Roman 
decline and fall. One could infer that there is a disjunction between the “truth” and 
“falsehood” surrounding a past event - whatever their respective importance to its 
representation - but the line cannot be so easily drawn. Truth is a consequence not 
so much of data, but of narrative and the search for meaning. While the story of the 
decline and downfall of the Roman Empire purports to be truth, it takes the form of 
something more akin to a myth or moral tale, one that stays broadly constant and 
yet is appropriated for different purposes by its authors. In this way, these creative, 
artistic, and what might otherwise be deemed “unhistorical” qualities can directly 
lead to the formation of a historical consciousness, a paradigm that embraces the 
popular as much as it does academic or intellectual domains. The close association 
of history and art provides a means by which myth can permeate, in the 
conjunction between the two. This is certainly evident in the ideal of the decline 
and fall - a historicising paradigm with a currency stretching back hundreds of years, 
but which still finds a powerful and influential presence in its mediation through the 
era of celluloid and mass culture. 
 
 
Antiquity, Past and Present 
My focus on the theme of the decline and fall of Rome requires a clear 
awareness of the overall historical background to this period. “Late Antiquity” 
(c.300-600 AD) is a term used by historians to describe the transitional centuries in 
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 Howells (1999), p. 2. He also cites here Robert Darnton’s “Great Cat Massacre” as an example of 




Europe and the Mediterranean from “Classical” Antiquity to the Middle Ages. It is 
normally treated as beginning with the reorganisation of the Empire under 
Diocletian, at the end of the third century, and ending with the upheavals of the 
Islamic conquests in the seventh. In this time, the Roman Empire underwent a 
wholesale political, cultural and social transformation, starting with the reforms of 
Diocletian and the adoption of Christianity as the official - and eventually exclusive - 
religion of the Empire, and culminating in Western Europe with the destruction of 
Roman rule by a wave of Germanic migrations. Late Antiquity was consequently a 
period of enormous and far-reaching change. In particular, the fusion of Greco-
Roman, Christian and Germanic traditions after Rome’s “fall” - meaning, in strict 
historical terms, the end of the Western Roman Empire as a political unit from 476 
AD - laid the cultural, political and ideological foundations of what we have since 
defined as “Western Europe.”  
In contrast with the long-cherished field of classical scholarship, Late Antiquity 
has only comparatively recently been the beneficiary of a thriving body of research. 
This movement was largely initiated by Peter Brown, whose seminal survey The 
World of Late Antiquity (1971) challenged the “Gibbonian” contention that the 
Christianised Roman world was sapped of its vitality and wallowing in decadence, 
weakening to the point that it withered under the onslaught of the Germanic 
hordes. Brown and later scholars have instead emphasised the vigour and vitality of 
the later Roman world, especially in its capacity for cultural creativity and 
innovation. Consequently, the collapse of the empire in the West is more attributed 
to contingent and external factors than morally clouded concepts of creeping 
enervation and decay. As Glen Bowersock argues, “a new generation of historians 
17 
 
of antiquity would rewrite the decline of the classical world as the rise of late 
antiquity.”18 More precise detail on this historiographical tradition is provided in 
chapter one of this thesis.   
The significance of the questions I am seeking to answer in this thesis is borne 
from the fact that “antiquity” has such a powerful latent presence on our cultural 
horizons. The Greco-Roman heritage is a cornerstone of our cultural traditions: the 
decline in classical studies is not mirrored by falling interest in the ancient world. 
With a boundless opportunity for interpretation, Rome has been remade and 
refashioned countless times, and embodied most conceivable archetypes of 
triumph and tragedy. Its rooted presence in our heritage makes it an extraordinarily 
fertile paradigm for generating and subverting meaning.  
The consequence of this substantive cultural record is that, over the 
centuries, questions about history and culture and society have both been brought 
to and derived from ancient history and texts; often involving subjects far removed 
from the Hellenic and Roman world, but which still owe some origin to the ancient 
world and its literature.19 Americans and Europeans have long used Rome to define 
themselves and their place in human history, and to measure their political, cultural 
and spiritual achievements.  The legacy of the ancient world has been both grounds 
of assurance and optimism, and a testament to decline and decay. Attitudes to the 
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 For a broad summary of these ideas see Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity: from Marcus 
Aurelius to Muhammad (AD 150-750), (London: Thames and Hudson (ori. pub. 1971), 1989), 
emphasising the continuity of Roman culture and civilization beyond the end of the Western Roman 
Empire in 476, and also Peter Brown, The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity 200-
1000 AD (London: Blackwell, 2003), Averil Cameron, The Later Roman Empire: AD 284-430, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), and Stephen Mitchell, A History of the Later Roman 
Empire. AD 284-641 (London: Blackwell, 2006). For the quote, see Bowersock (1996), p. 64.  
19
 An example would be the comparison between modern mass culture and the oft-cited “bread and 
circuses” maxim of Juvenal, found in Juvenal, The Sixteen Satires, trans. Peter Green (London: 
Penguin Classics, 1998), IV, 10.81.   
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empire have varied from anything from the guiding light of civilization to the whore 
of Babylon.20 It could be a potent symbol of oppressive power or a revolutionary 
alternative to the existing order. The French Revolution viewed itself as Rome 
incarnate - and with some modifications, the same principles are found in the 
political rhetoric of the Founding Fathers.21 For the theologically-inclined writers of 
Medieval and Renaissance times, the later Roman Empire, and especially the city of 
Rome, could represent the union and concord of humanity under an undivided 
Christian faith - or a cautionary tale of decadence and corruption. Similarly, 
America’s quest for identity drew itself to this repository of historical suggestion.  
Classical Antiquity endowed America with the legitimacy of a cultural, moral and 
intellectual tradition linking the New World to Athenian Democracy. Consequently 
the Roman past has for a long time served as a precedent, an ideal and a warning to 
American political and cultural commentators. It has been used to tackle questions 
of history, politics, society and identity.22   
A somewhat overlooked aspect of this tradition, the idea of a “decline and 
fall” has deep-rooted origins in the cultural milieu of medieval and modern times. 
The adjective “Roman” evokes the idea of “ruin” as easily as it does that of 
“empire.”23 A post-Enlightenment idea of the decline and decay of Imperial Roman 
                                                          
20
 Kevin J. Pratt, “Rome as Eternal,” Journal of the History of Ideas, XXVI (1965), p. 32. 
21
 Benjamin (1974), XIV. 
22
 On these examples see, William L. Vance, America’s Rome (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989), Cullen Murphy, Are We Rome? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2007), Duncan Kennedy, 
“A sense of place: Rome, history and empire revisited,” in Catherine Edwards (ed.), Roman 
presences: receptions of Rome in European culture, 1789-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), pp. 19-34, Peter Bondanella, The eternal city: Roman images in the modern world 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987). Several books published or republished since 
2001 on contemporary American politics and history discuss the idea of “imperial presidency”; see 
for instance Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin (ori. pub. 
1973), 2004). 
23
 Edwards (1999), p. 247. 
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power, culture, and civilization, was immortalised by Edward Gibbon’s six-volume 
The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-89),24 but it had 
much earlier precedents. Ideas about decline are embodied in a tradition of 
thought as old as any cultural record. The medieval preoccupation with Rome was 
endless: Bede, Dante and the like were captivated by its tales. The very ruins of the 
city provoked awe and admiration - “the old myth of Rome’s eternity,” a veneration 
for the past that also transformed it.25 Fascinated and appalled by the Roman 
example, writers, commentators, and later filmmakers have constructed narratives 
of decadence and decline, tracing a progressive fall from cultural and spiritual 
heights to a nadir of ruin in the fifth century, or in the east the exotic, Orientalist 
repression of “Byzantium.” Within this model, decadence and corruption have 
often been a traditional element of explanations of Roman moral and imperial 
decline. As these ideas matured further, imperial effeminacy fitted nicely with the 
modern idea of “conspicuous consumption,” and old concepts of luxuria have 
morphed into puritanical vitriol against sloth and luxury, and both moral and 
Marxist tirades against the ostentation of the bourgeoisie.26   
The repertoire of concepts, images and ideas surrounding the decline of 
Rome, and the archetype of “decline” in general, have been assembled and 
mediated over many centuries. They have foundations in intertwining traditions of 
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“classical” and “Christian.”27 Historians, theologians, philosophers, writers, 
dramatists - and more recently filmmakers - have all contributed to the common 
stock.28 Gibbon took the moral evaluations of Tacitus and Sallust and expanded 
them to fit a vast new casual framework for the emergence of Medieval and 
Enlightened Europe. Cecil B. DeMille’s depictions of the pagan city of Rome as a 
cesspit of vice and decadence owe themselves to the patristic injunctions of 
Augustine and Jerome. Voltaire reapplied the classical schemata of four world 
empires to the four great ages of the arts. Contemporary cultural “mediators” have 
been heir to this growing treasury of schemata on decline. The film Gladiator 
(Dreamworks, 2000) belongs as much to this ongoing process of appropriation as 
does the sixth-century Gothic propagandist Jordanes. 
This tradition - one that conjoins disciplines of thought and methods of 
representation - is a long one with deep roots. It can be considered a conceptual 
map that historians, writers, intellectuals and the like have consciously or 
unconsciously drawn on, and the shape of its influence can be discerned in the 
contours of our cultural terrain. It helps reveal the interpenetration of the modern 
and medieval world, the universalities in narrative human thought, and the 
interplay of history and myth. It is not a strictly historiographical tradition, but 
involves a considerable amount of historical or pseudo-historical writing.  
Inevitably, the topic at hand could be treated as extremely broad. The 
“modern” archetype of a decline and fall can be roughly conceived as stretching 
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from the writings of Edward Gibbon, and extending to the present day. It has 
intensified in the years since 9/11, with renewed consideration of the place of 
America as an “empire” - a discussion that was similarly very much evident, in 
respect to both the US and Britain, at the turn of the twentieth-century. However, 
inevitable constraints of length require that some stricter parameters are defined. I 
have stated that these are covering primarily the late nineteenth to the early 
twenty-first centuries for a number of reasons. There has been an active 
interchange between academic and imaginative meanings from the nineteenth 
century into the twentieth and after. This period saw the emergence of so-called 
“professional histories” - but those histories, it can be argued, are conditioned by 
earlier rhetoric, poetic and mythic traditions, and ideologies couched as objective 
truth.29  
Nor were these representations cultivated in isolation from the “intellectual” 
side of culture, but they emerged through an active relationship with it. In 1874 
Theodor Mommsen, one of the most prominent nineteenth-century historians of 
ancient Rome, went so far as to observe: “The historian has perhaps greater affinity 
with the artist than with the scholar.”30 Film follows long-standing literary 
traditions,31 and cinema’s representation of Rome has its roots in both the 
“histories” of the nineteenth century, and literary portrayals of antiquity and its 
“fall”. More broadly, knowledge of Rome is increasingly a consequence of its 
presentation in moving images. Indeed, classicist and film historian Maria Wyke 
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contends that historical films are worth examining for creating “a consciousness of 
history far exceeding that of historical scholarship in its range and impact.”32 
An awareness of the relationship between history and these other cultural 
forms leads us to constitute the principle here of an imaginative historiography; a 
dialogue with the past that also belongs to its own tradition, one that shapes a 
society’s historical capital. They can be seen as part of a larger concept of history, 
beyond simply the knowledge and attempted understanding of the past, but as the 
web of connections to the past that holds a culture together and encodes its 
identity. As David Morgan argues, “Language and vision, word and image, text and 
picture are in fact deeply enmeshed and collaborate powerfully in assembling our 
sense of the real.”33 The representations examined here are part of the meta-
historical framework by which the present interfaces with the past, and conceives a 
sense of its heritage. The decline and fall of Rome has been constituted and 
reconstituted as a “mythic” narrative; in religion, history and politics, as much as 
literature and the visual arts.  
This emphasis on a firm historical context contradicts the approach of many 
representational studies, which focus merely on the present significance of 
depictions of the past: forging a tight recursive horizon in which the formal 
historical content is almost a coincidence, or inconvenience. I will demonstrate that 
Rome is not simply an arbitrary enabling device. Instead, I am emphasising that the 
transmission of these ideas exists within a tradition in which new meanings have 
been gradually layered over time. Writers, filmmakers and artists position 
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themselves, deliberately or unconsciously, in relation to their predecessors. Popular 
authors and creative artists often do not directly acknowledge their inspirations 
and/or sources, and may not possess a conscious awareness of the influences that 
shape their creative impulses.34 The classical and post-classical world is a 
particularly powerful source of these archetypes: such as the one under 
investigation in this thesis. Yet these sources can be appropriated and reimagined in 
new and novel ways. Rome was not described solely through the language of 
inertia, but by the assimilation of new events and ideas, and the experiences of its 
collective contributors as mediated through their interpretations. As with any living 
intellectual tradition, these ideas were not static and mechanic, but involved an 
active and engaged response to the contemporary world. Representations “have 
ceaselessly shifted in structure and meaning.”35 There is no single, universal 
conception of “antiquity” or “decline and fall” - rather, these terms denote a 
plurality of uses and appropriations. Ideas could be developed in whole new ways. 
Subsequent generations have added to or distorted the meaning of events and 
ideas, as a form of cultural “Chinese whispers.” I therefore need to pay close 
attention to how the representations explored in this project relate - and how they 
don’t - to their classical and medieval roots. Therefore this thesis emphasizes the 
interface of classical and modern cultural forms, and consequently the value of a 
productive exchange between scholarship on classical (and medieval) culture and 
cultural theories of the popular. 
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The nexus of my study is on “historical” forms of representations of decline, 
and their mutual relationship. I seek to answer the questions about this I have 
posed using an inter-disciplinary methodological framework: I need to consider 
what constitutes “myth”, and thereby delve into social anthropology; the nature of 
symbolic and metaphorical representation, as described in semiotics and cultural 
theory, and historiography for the ideas and writings of historians. This multi-
disciplinary approach was championed by Clifford Geertz, who referred to the need 
to have an “intellectual armoury” of concepts at hand when delving into the root of 
meaning.36 The value of interdisciplinary work was also praised by Terry Eagleton, 
who stated that, “much of the interesting work on the humanities” now being 
carried out is “constantly transgressing the frontiers between traditional subject 
areas.”37 Similarly, historical scholarship now involves a wide synthesis of varying 
fields - anthropology, psychology, sociology, and quantitative studies.38  
The number of possible approaches that can and are used in studies such as 
this are extremely broad. These include; taking particular examples (such as in films, 
plays, books, art) to elicit generalised patterns and trends; examining the impact of 
reception in shaping our entire view of a work, meaning they emphasise the value 
of cultural context over absolute or “universal” qualities within it; charting the 
specific history of a text, style, idea or discourse; or emphasising the formal and 
transhistorical qualities of a text in its mediated representations. 
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All of these approaches throw up obvious questions and criticisms. 
Extrapolating trends draws charges of selectivity and positivism; prioritising textual 
“reception” carries the danger or charge of cultural materialism (and very 
commonly a Marxian approach); while favouring supposedly enduring qualities 
could be judged as veneration, particularly in relation to the “classics” and their 
perceived cultural authority.     
The theories I explore and utilise therefore are guides which inform my 
research, rather than a rigid set of rules. In this study I am employing a hermeneutic 
methodology in my analysis. This is an interpretative approach that emphasises the 
subjective qualities of appraisal, over scientific or social-scientific analysis. The 
importance of hermeneutics in the study of culture was outlined by Clifford Geertz, 
who famously stated that “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance that 
he himself has spun,” and that “those webs are what we call culture.” That culture 
itself is “an assemblage of texts” - a story people tell themselves, about 
themselves.39 The hermeneutic or interpretative methodology is akin to 
“penetrating a literary text,” through the “close reading” of its cultural 
equivalents.40 For Geertz, the analysis of culture, and cultural history, is “not an 
experimental science in search of law, but an interpretive one in search of 
meaning”41 - in the context of this project, the meaning embedded in the traditions 
of the decline and fall. In contrast to the rigid and quasi-scientific structuralism of 
Strauss and Saussure, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz championed the use of a 
multidisciplinary and hermeneutic approach, providing a range of concepts and 
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theories to unravel meaning.42 He declared opposition to “increasingly hollow” 
general theories of cultural interpretation, arguing that one shouldn’t try and 
explain social phenomena by “weaving them into grand textures” or “arranging 
abstracted entities into unified patterns.”43 Instead, he stated a desire to replace 
“an experimental science in search of law to an interpretative one in search of 
meaning,”44 making his methodology particularly relevant to the hermeneutic 
approach in this thesis.   
“Anthropological” approaches to myth in a cultural context have typically 
veered between empirical field work and comparative study. The former prioritises 
the collection and comprehension of the myths, rituals, and practices of a particular 
people, in their specific context. Comparative approaches, conversely, are more 
concerned with the ontology of myth, and sought to unravel and expose common 
properties in their content, usage and themes. Comparative theories, therefore, 
hold that myths have strikingly similar features, even when widely separated in 
time and space. It is the comparative tradition, in both cultural and the social 
anthropology of myth, which is of greater interest and value to this study.   
After firstly considering the relevant and competing theoretical bases for such 
a study, and evaluating existing literature in this field, the texts will be discussed 
according to their themes relevant to the decline and fall. Much scholarship on 
media, culture and society has seen a strong tradition of “scientific” or content-
based examination, usually quantitative in kind. The danger with this this kind of 
content analysis is that it only touches the surface, and misses the deeper, 
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sometimes buried meaning.45 Objective social sciences try to render ambivalence 
into clear and precise meaning - thereby imposing their own, potentially quite 
subjective, order and narrative on the subject. Conversely, hermeneutics recognises 
the ambiguities of its art, and thrives on it.  
However, though certain conceptual tools, appropriated from fields such as 
cultural anthropology, are used in the aid of this study, I still consider this thesis and 
its method of inquiry to fall within the umbrella of “history” - as the history of ideas, 
and their manifold methods of expression, are simply another prism through which 
we view and analyse the past. I therefore wish to reiterate that this thesis is rooted 
in traditional social, historical and political theories and approaches. I am not 
interested in bracketing these topics within the novel structures of “cultural 
studies” or “media theory” - though some of the ideas in these theories are 
undoubtedly very important. Nor am I interested in using elaborate social theory, or 
conceiving large-scale conceptual models. I am arguing neither for a universal 
cultural umbrella nor for postmodern relativism, but simply stressing the coherent 
links between the past and present, and the process by which meaning is mediated 
from a text.  
It is important to emphasise that I am treating the exercise as one of social 
and cultural history, therefore the aesthetic or intellectual “value” of a work is not a 
concern - I am not attempting to justify any kind of qualitative appreciation. This 
does not mean one should be blind to the many and diverse attitudes, opinions, 
and evaluations that surrounded a cultural form. Indeed, the treatment and 
reception of an artistic medium is extremely important in this study. The grandiose 
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aspirations of much of both cinema and literature have led to a certain type of 
appropriation of the Roman past, one that purports to a higher “truth” by using a 
very specific interpretation of the past to explain the present. Understanding the 
place of a “text” within the cultural tradition, its perceived value, means of 
production, intended audience, and receptions are all extremely important - all that 
is being ruled out of this study, therefore, are personal aesthetic judgments. This 
has to be a particular concern when one considers the easy and frequent 
application of value judgements to popular culture, intentionally or unconsciously.  
As part of the backdrop of this thesis, I need to discuss how the cultural 
climates of pre-Modern Europe influenced the macroscopic perspective of several 
historians and intellectuals, notably Gibbon. This is for three reasons. Firstly, I wish 
to demonstrate the importance of social, cultural and political context on 
historiography and its tradition, especially the historiography of a remote and 
intellectually “pliable” period; secondly, because I believe that under such writers, 
key opinions and images of Roman decline and fall fossilized and have been 
transmitted through varying cultural media to the present day; and thirdly, because 
they are a useful comparative element within the myth-based model of “decline” I 
will argue for, and employ. 
The “decline and fall of Rome” is defined in this thesis as a myth or an 
invented cultural narrative. The vast majority of contemporary historiography on 
the period recognises the manifold technical historical errors in this approach; 
however, the relation between the conceptualization of its defining attributes, and 
the formations of our basic historical and cultural assumptions, has not been 
formally studied. In examining this relationship further, it is necessary to abstract 
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what I can of the “framework” of myth in more theoretical terms. In particular, I 
need to consider what anchors the decline of antiquity as an emergent cultural 
concept, not a fixed “historic” event. The trap of anachronism is a particularly 
powerful one in studies and representations of the ancient world, for a society such 
as ancient Rome can present us with both striking similarities in character and 





















CHAPTER ONE: HISTORIOGRAPHY, MYTH AND VISUAL CULTURE 
 
 
The Fall of the Western Roman Empire and its Modern Historiography 
This thesis posits the decline and fall as a myth that reflects deeper, enduring 
cultural and intellectual trends of reception and representation. For this reason, the 
very different approach of modern historiographical scholarship to the subject 
needs to be explored in some detail. This I will do by examining how the field has 
diverged from the work of Arnold Hugh Martin (A.H.M) Jones, a prominent 
historian of the later Roman Empire who wrote a key narrative history of Late Rome 
and early “Byzantium”, namely his 1964 book entitled The Later Roman Empire, 
284-602: A Social, Economic, and Administrative Survey.46 This work is of key 
significance, both to the history of its field and the subject of this thesis in 
particular, because it marked the end of the historiographical dominance of the 
Gibbonian approaches to the period. In a recent study of the historian, Bryan Ward-
Perkins considers how “before Jones, the social and economic history (indeed the 
whole story) of the late Roman empire was predominantly apocalyptic, and almost 
invariably linked to some Grand Theory of Decline.”47 Peter Brown, writing in 1967 
about the impact of Jones on the field, described that tradition in this way:   
There has been a tendency to take for granted, both that the main social and 
economic developments of the Late Roman period provide the clue to the decline 
and fall of the Roman Empire, and that the transition between the ancient world 
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and the Middle Ages is best understood in terms of the replacement, in this period, 
of an “ancient” by a “medieval” style of society… the immediate circumstances of 
the fall of the Western Empire have been understood in terms of a decline in 
population, of the barbarisation of the Roman army… the divergent destinies of the 
Eastern and Western Empires merely ratify our impression of the deep-seated 
weaknesses of Roman society in the West of the third and fourth centuries AD.48        
 
By comparison, he notes that “Jones, by contrast, takes very little for 
granted.” Consequently, “in the present state of Late Roman studies, this book is 
like the arrival of a steel-plant in a region that has, of late, been given over to light 
industries.”49  
Jones helped pave the way for the study of what is now called “Late 
Antiquity,” and staged a revamping away from the old historiographical notions of 
decline and fall. Unlike his predecessors, Jones did not argue that internal problems 
brought down the empire. In his conclusion to The Later Roman Empire, he says 
that the evidence “suggests that the simple but rather unfashionable view that the 
barbarians played a considerable part in the decline and fall of the empire may have 
some truth to it… (that) barbarian attacks probably played a major part in the fall of 
the West.”50  
Jones, in many ways, represents the beginning of a new and truly “post-
Gibbonian” outlook on the period. Yet in a significant way, he also marks the zenith 
of the older approach; with regard to both his account of the civic and economic 
structures of Late Roman society, and in the source analysis he used to derive his 
position. While he moves far away from the melancholic judgements of his 
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predecessors,51 Jones’ survey of the later empire still carries a strain of pessimism, 
and some notion of decline. Much of its core analysis has come under extensive 
criticism by a subsequent generation of scholarship.  
Jones examined the social, political and administrative developments of the 
empire from the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine onwards. His conclusion 
was that such measures - designed to restore and protect the empire from the 
crises of the third century - as the expansion of the imperial bureaucracy (at the 
expense of the old “curial” system of local government) and the legitimisation and 
endowment of the Christian Church produced a new set of “idle mouths” that, 
coupled a repressive series of laws and economic slump, pushed the empire into a 
relative decline from the peak condition of the Principate. Jones put the economic 
condition of the later empire in these terms:  
The basic economic weakness of the empire was that too few producers supported 
too many idle mouths. This state of affairs was in part an inheritance from the 
Principate, in part imposed by increasing barbarian pressure, in part again due to 
the incompetence of the government, in part finally due to the new religion which 
the empire adopted.52  
 
Jones therefore makes clear that the economic condition of the empire had 
worsened by later imperial times. In particular, the burden of the state was deemed 
                                                          
51
 Ward-Perkins (2008), p. 195 gives an excellent example in the form of Friedrich Oertel, “The 
Economic Life of the Empire,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, XII (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1939), pp. 269-70, which describes how “a complete State-socialism was in force… 
with its terrorism by officials,” and which “stamped subjection… to the will of God.” See also Michael 
I. Rostovzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(ori. pub. 1926), 1957), who had pushed the argument for this socio-economic erosion and class 
tension in more Marxist terms: for a critique, see Meyer Reinhold, “Historian of the Classic World: A 
Critique of Rostovtzeff,” in Meyer Reinhold (ed.), Studies in Classical History and Society (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 83-91. Roger Collins, analyzing Rostovtzeff’s Marxian account of 
the collapse of the Western Empire, made the observation that “this is one of those topics than can 
tell the reader more about a historian’s personal prejudices than about the historical reality that he 
seeks to describe.” See Roger Collins, Early Medieval Europe, 300-1000 AD (London: Macmillan, 
1991), p. 99. 
52
 Jones, p. 1045. 
33 
 
substantially higher.53 Extra resources were sucked out of a subsistence economy 
that, by the standards of “the more prosperous days of the Principate,”54 was 
depopulated, unproductive and succumbing to agricultural decline, into new or 
expanded institutions of church, army and state. The economic burden of empire 
was increased to a punishing level,55 which promoted famine, enhanced the 
oppression of the peasantry or quasi-feudal coloni, widened the deserted lands 
(agri deserti), and hurt the landowning classes who had built and sustained the 
cities, and upon whose support and prosperity Roman rule ultimately depended. 
The imperial system became dominated by artificial constraints, as evidenced in the 
series of proscriptive laws compiled in the Theodosian Code, and the resources of 
the empire were drained by an overstaffed and inefficient bureaucracy; whilst 
contributing to the tax hike that helped weaken the imperial structure.56 Such 
problems were felt more harshly in the poorer, less populous and more 
institutionally “unhealthy” West.57 
Jones’ assessment has been of great historiographical value to the study of 
Late Antiquity, and the transformation of the entire field in the past forty years. 
Peter Brown in 1967 considered his work “an event of the first importance in the 
study of the Later Roman Empire,” in particular for its rich and detailed account of 
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Late Roman society, and the Christian Church.58 Ward-Perkins states that “Jones, as 
far as I was concerned, had constructed a scholarly edifice so solid that there was 
really no need to look back beyond 1964…” and describes his knowledge of the 
fourth to sixth centuries as being “built on the firm foundations of the Later Roman 
Empire.”59  
Of greatest significance for the purpose of this study is the fact that Jones 
decouples the notion of decline from any real causal consideration in the “fall” of 
the Western Empire. While he critiques its social systems and administrative 
structures, the extent of these judgements is muted, and free from the burden of 
teleological doom. Nowhere is this clearer than in the very last line of the Later 
Roman Empire, where after summarising all the evidence, he concludes that “the 
internal weaknesses of the empire cannot have been the major factor in its 
decline.”60 This closing statement underscores a vital break in the academic 
historiography from the tradition of the decline and fall.  
However, despite these profoundly important steps towards the world of Late 
Antiquity, Jones’ thesis has been noticeably modified by the succeeding generation 
of historians. This principle of real Roman decline is still present in the Later Roman 
Empire - an idea which still has the shadow of Gibbon over it, even if it is void of his 
conclusions. As Ward-Perkins puts it, “in comparison to this (Peter Brown’s World of 
Late Antiquity) work, Jones’ Later Roman Empire is both very institutional, and 
undeniably bleak, with its overweening bureaucrats and soldiers, and its peasants 
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struggling under fiscal and legal oppression.”61 While he is free of the sweeping 
moral indictments of Gibbon, a shadow of them survives in the observation that, 
“The most depressing feature of the later empire is the apparent absence of public 
spirit.”62 Such a statement also echoes the notion of qualitative moral and civic 
decline found in the writings of historical theorists such as Spengler and Toynbee a 
generation before him (and who are discussed in chapter three of this thesis).   
  Modern historians have moved even further away from Jones’ academic 
predecessors than he did in arguing against the idea of institutional and civic 
decline. Jones’ arguments were founded on a detailed study of the literary and 
epigraphic evidence available to him, but he has very little to say about the 
archaeological record, or non-literary material in general. Ward-Perkins finds only 
three examples in the entire fifteen hundred pages of the Later Roman Empire.63 
Averil Cameron states that, “Visual art was not part of Jones’ conception of what to 
include. The use now made by virtually all late antique historians of archaeological 
and artistic evidence makes a vast change… one that happened in parallel with the 
development of the Brownian cultural model of ‘late antiquity’.”64 Aside from this, 
his reliance on the bare statements of the literary sources, especially legal codes, 
has come under criticism.  
Contemporary historians now use a broader base of sources to emphasize the 
cultural, political and economic vitality of the Late Roman world. In particular, 
Jones’ reliance on literary and epigraphic sources appears to have produced an 
                                                          
61
 Ward-Perkins (2008), p. 193. 
62
 Jones, p. 1058. 
63
 Ward-Perkins (2008), p. 205. See also Peter Garnsey, “Writing the Late Roman Empire: Method 
and Sources,” in Gwynn, p. 34. 
64
 Averil Cameron, “A.H.M Jones and the End of the Ancient World,” in Gwynn, p. 243. 
36 
 
overly pessimistic assessment of the economy and urban condition of the Later 
Empire.65 The boom in Late Antique archaeology from the 1970s has helped revise 
the view that over-taxation squeezed the economy; suggesting instead that this was 
a period of economic vitality, not of falling productivity and population numbers, 
for both halves of the empire.66 This sits in contrast to Jones’ view that the 
economic condition of the empire had worsened by late imperial times; a process 
involving  the new “idle mouths” of the empire, the heavy burden of taxation, and 
the abandonment of agricultural land. Such an argument was based on written and 
primarily legal sources.67 These are replete with their own inferential problems 
when viewed in isolation. For example, the term agri deserti was coined in fourth-
century legal documents to describe land on which no tax was collected, but this 
does not necessarily mean that tax had previously been collected there, as the law 
of 422 on which Jones based his argument refers to regions of desert or semi-desert 
on which it is unlikely agriculture was ever possible.68 However, Jones was far from 
unduly negative on the state of the agricultural economy, stating “the extent of the 
evil must not be exaggerated,” and that it was primarily the approximately 20% of 
marginal land that was affected.69 His summary of the state of the empire’s 
agriculture was this: “it must be emphasised that there was no general agricultural 
decline; land of good and medium quality continued to pay high taxes, yield high 
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rents and command high prices.”70 Similarly, when dealing with the lower classes, 
he states that “it would be unwise to generalise on the condition of the peasantry 
under the later Roman empire,” and sees evidence that they were not all simply 
oppressed, exploited and tied to their land - noting the existence both of free 
agricultural labourers, and evidence of prosperity amongst the coloni.71     
  When it comes to the developments in local government, Jones thought that 
the changes in the economic and administrative structures of the Late Roman state 
brought about a decline in the class of landowning curials. In his eyes, their flight 
was a symptom (as evident in the Theodosian Code) of an overly rigid and 
repressive state, whose inflexible practices and rising tax burden impoverished and 
alienated the old landowning class as much as they did the ordinary peasant.72 
Curial decline, however, has come to be recognized not as signifying the decline of 
local elites, but the evolving nature of Late Roman society. With the decline of 
secular and pagan building and civic festivals, and the confiscation of curia 
endowments by the state to fund prolonged warfare in the third century, the old 
town councils lost much of their old wealth, privileges and esteem, whilst having to 
contend with the greater financial burden imposed by an enlarged army and 
bureaucracy. Coupled with this were the alternatives developing to curial service; 
entry into the church, the expanding senatorial class of honorati, or service in the 
provincial imperial bureaucracy. But the flight of the curials was not a reflection of 
the relative decline of the fortunes of the old landowning elite to a new class of idle 
mouths. Rather it shows the former’s reorientation within the new systems of 
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organisation and patronage becoming available in the empire.73 The vast majority 
of the new imperial bureaucrats were drawn from the old curial classes, rather than 
new men. They were mostly landlords and former local administrators seeking to 
replace the increased burdens and reduced prestige of the councils with the 
opportunities present in these new institutions.74 The attractiveness of the 
bureaucracy is show in the repeated laws in the Theodosian Code attempting to 
force councillors back to their cities.75 The Theodosian Code suggests to us that the 
state did not want men to shirk their curial duties, and so was to some degree 
unaware of the extent to which the political relationship between centre and 
locality had changed. But Jones saw the restrictive measures described in the law 
codices as the suggestion of an overly regimented order. As he says, the 
government used “its powers of coercion to compel the existing workers and 
property owners to go on performing their essential functions… It conformed to the 
traditional social pattern; the emperors no doubt felt that they were merely 
preventing deviations from the natural rule.”76 Even here, however, Jones shows a 
break from his predecessors in moderating his critique, and raised doubts about the 
totalitarian force of these laws, upon which much of the image of an oppressive 
Late Roman state relies. As he says, “The theoretical extent and the actual 
effectiveness of the restrictive legislation have often been exaggerated.” In 
particular, he notes the irony of their imposing nature, for “The laws themselves, by 
                                                          
73
 John H.W.G Liebeschuetz, The Decline and Fall of the Roman City (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(ori. pub. 1972), 2001), pp. 104-5. 
74
 Peter Heather, “Running the Empire: Bureaucrats, Curials, and Senators,” in Gwynn, pp. 112-14. 
See also T. A. Kopecek, “Curial Displacements and Flight in Later Fourth-Century Cappadocia,” 
Historia, XXIII (1974), pp. 319-42.   
75
 Codex Theodosius, 12.1 on curial restrictions. 
76
 Jones, p. 1051. 
39 
 
their constant reiteration of the same prohibitions and their frequent 
condemnation of past offences, show how impossible it was… to enforce the 
rules.”77    
The final major element of Jones’ “idle mouths” thesis is the rise of the 
Christian Church, a body which diverted substantial human and financial resources 
when an increased fiscal strain made their productive application all the more 
pressing. As he says, “the Christian Church imposed a new class of idle mouths on 
the resources of the empire.”78 Furthermore, he points out the impact of this shift 
in spiritual values: “Countless earnest Christians, who despaired of saving their 
souls in the world, flocked to the deserts or crowded into monasteries. Many 
others… lived austere and secluded lives of prayer and meditation.”79  
The classic Gibbonian idea that Christianity fundamentally impaired the 
functioning of the empire, practically or morally, no longer holds. The latter claim 
Jones himself criticizes. David Gwynn points out that Jones, characterising Gibbon 
as saying that Christianity “sapped the morale of the empire, deadened its 
intellectual life and… undermined its unity,” immediately counters this with the 
vital observation that, “The East was even more Christian than the West, its 
theological disputes far more embittered.”80 Yet, of course, the East did not 
collapse in the fifth century, undermining the entire logic of that argument.   
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There is no doubt that the official adoption of Christianity brought about a 
cultural revolution.81 Churches replaced temples everywhere. The Christian Church 
acquired huge donations, from the state and private individuals. As it grew as an 
institution it drew in much of the educated talent of the empire, eventually 
including even wealthy senators such as Ambrose, and monasticism began to 
attract substantial numbers of recruits. Along with this came some sweeping 
ideological changes. Worldly goods became frequently portrayed as a barrier to 
salvation, in contrast to the pure life of the holy man or ascetic, and prominent 
aristocrats starting ceding much of their wealth to the church.82 This new ideal was 
a significant contrast to the concept of otium, or cultivated leisure, that had been 
the hallmark of the Greco-Roman aristocracy.  
But this does not mean Christian belief was disruptive to Roman rule; rather, 
it successfully integrated into Roman imperial ideology. Rome had always been 
accorded a special place in the plans of the gods, and in the principle of pax deorum 
her leaders had recognised the importance of honouring this special relationship. 
After the adoption of Christianity this relationship could be recast as a divine 
mission, ordained by the Christian god, of conversation and salvation for all. The 
emperor was his chosen representative on earth: Rome’s power and right to power 
came from the divine will. In this way, the Christianised Roman Empire lost little of 
its worldly focus or ideological cohesion. Instead, the church acted as an extra tool 
of imperial power. By the end of the fourth century the bulk of the landowning 
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classes had converted to Christianity and, despite some rioting and vocal 
opposition, most of the apparatus of paganism had been dismantled.83  
 Practically speaking, the Christian Church acquired large financial 
endowments but pagan religious institutions had also been wealthy and 
prosperous, and through the fourth century they were progressively stripped.84 
Much of the church’s wealth, land and its buildings were paid for in private 
endowments; a reflection of the continuing prosperity of landowners, at least at 
the upper end of the wealth scale, rather than a burden on a drained state. 
Ecclesiastical writers such as Jerome have given us famous examples of aristocrats 
who renounced their secular lifestyle and bestowed their worldly wealth to the 
church.85 But this number is tiny compared to those who converted to Christianity 
but maintained an active service in secular entities such as the imperial 
bureaucracy. In time, bishops would take on an increasing array of secular duties 
within the administration of the cities.86 This somewhat undermines the strength of 
Jones’ “idle mouths” view of the substantial impact of the Christian Church.         
Broadly speaking, modern historiography stresses the success of the Roman 
Empire to manage its problems, internal and external, until the fifth century AD. 
The question must therefore be asked how a healthy and vital imperial 
infrastructure collapsed in the West in the course of the fifth century. Jones marked 
a shift towards what he called “the unfashionable view” that the barbarians played 
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the primary role in its downfall.87 As Ward-Perkins puts it, “Jones’ late empire was 
an austere but powerful structure, brought down only by overwhelming external 
force.”88 This does not mean that the internal condition of the empire is not 
important to explain its political collapse in the West, but rather that the language 
of causation has to be qualified. In this sense, the modern historiography goes 
further than Jones in downplaying the existence or significance of what he calls its 
“manifold weaknesses.”89 The trend now is to think rather of limitations - many of 
which are not unique to the state of the empire of the fourth and fifth centuries, 
but inherent to any sizeable pre-industrial society and state.  
These limitations can be briefly outlined. There was the fact of the sheer size 
of the empire, stretching as it did across half of Europe and North Africa and the 
Near East. Across such large distances transport and communication were slow - 
messages from the imperial court to the localities could take weeks to travel, and 
moving an army to deal with any sizeable threat months or longer.90 An imperial 
post existed but the speed at which this could transport information was highly 
erratic, owing to seasonal cycles and prevailing local weather conditions, especially 
at sea. Lines of communication between the imperial centre and the localities were 
few and could limit the ability of the court to acquire accurate information: 
Ammianus’ account of the apparent conspiracy at Lepcis Magna, where the 
coercion of a comes and an imperial official kept the emperor in the dark about 
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Berber attacks into Tripolitania for a decade, is a case in point.91 Furthermore the 
imperial bureaucracy, though greatly expanded in the era of the “Dominate”, was 
still tiny by the standards of a modern government, its paid officials numbering at 
most thirty thousand, and serving a population in the tens of millions.  
The result of all this was that the Roman Empire was not “governed” in the 
modern sense by its imperial centre - there was no budget, health policy or such 
modern institutions, nor with the technological limitations of the time could there 
be. The primary purpose of the imperial regime was to protect the landowning 
classes of the empire (and therefore the taxpayers and tax collectors) by organising, 
supplying and maintaining the army. What passed for economic policy in the 
Roman world consisted of ensuring the adequate provision and supply of this 
entity. And if the goals of the Roman state were limited, its mechanisms of 
enforcement were even more so. There was no professional “police force” or public 
prosecution service. And the failure of Diocletian’s price edict against Constantine’s 
introduction of the solidus shows that, beyond controlling the gold content and 
therefore the value of the currency, the state had little power to regulate economic 
activity.92  
All this meant that in terms of its day-to-day operation Roman society 
operated through patronage, upon the informal but extremely important bonds 
between landowners and their dependents and within the elite. Without the 
assistance of local elites or patrons taxation could not be collected and laws not 
enforced. It was the alliance, official and unofficial, between the imperial centre 
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and local elites upon which imperial rule depended, hence the importance in the 
Late Roman bureaucracy of high officials in a province being drawn from the 
wealthy members of the landowning class. 
In relation to this complex but delicate system, modern historiography 
concentrates on how the barbarian invaders could destroy a (relatively) vigorous 
and healthy empire by unravelling it; and that, consequently, its downfall was not a 
necessary process induced by progressive internal failings, but one contingent on 
the circumstances of the fifth century, and the challenges they posed to the 
structural limitations of imperial rule. Peter Heather argues that “Political 
limitations… are directly relevant in another way to the story of Western collapse.” 
This is because the Roman system of patronage that bound the locality to the 
imperial centre was inherently at risk in a period of turmoil. The process is 
described thus: 
In return for tax payments, the machinery of the state, military and legal, protected 
a relatively small landowning class from both outside enemies and internal ones. 
Because their dominance was based on landowning, these people where 
vulnerable. They could not up sticks should the imperial centre cease to be able to 
guarantee their security, so it is hardly surprising that they tended to ingratiate 
themselves with the rising barbarian powers. This limitation within the system 
played a considerable role in shaping the nature of the imperial collapse in the old 
Roman heartlands of central and southern Gaul and Spain.93      
 
The empire had a limited capacity to respond to multiple threats. The rise of 
Sasanian Persia in the third century had already drained much of its slack military 
capacity and tax revenue, and would occupy the bulk of the attention of the Eastern 
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army until the rise of Islam.94 From 406 AD the Western Empire was faced both 
with Alaric’s Goths invading Italy and the Vandals, Alans and Suevi crossing the 
Rhine. These exceeded the capacity of the Roman state to resist or manage these 
threats, and were compounded by further mistakes, failings and ill fortune - 
perhaps most importantly, the loss of North Africa in 439 to the Vandals and the 
failed expedition of 468 to retake it.95   
In the right circumstances, therefore, the link between landowner and 
government, the whole basis of the Roman administrative structure, was prone to 
break. It was in the complex circumstances of the late fourth and fifth century that 
these conditions were met. In the wake of invasion and settlement, local elites, 
whose wealth depended on the land and hence which they could not take with 
them if they fled, could and would seek accommodation with the invading 
barbarians, allowing for them an easy transfer of taxation, manpower and authority 
from the Roman state to these new occupiers.96 This does not mean, however, that 
the barbarians exploited the manifold internal deficiencies of a crumbling state and 
social system. As Christopher Wickham outlines, “Rome’s violence (whether public 
or private), corruption and injustice were part of a very stable structure, one which 
had lasted for centuries and had very few obvious internal flaws.” He further 
observes that while “half the empire… did collapse in the fifth century, the empire 
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survived with no difficulty in the East, however, and arguably reached its peak there 
in the early sixth century.”97  
How and why this relationship unravelled is therefore a central question in 
the fall of the Roman Empire. Without an overriding thesis of decline to occupy 
historians, its collapse has to be considered contingent on the complex 
circumstances of the fifth century; what has been described by Bryan Ward-Perkins 
as a “vicious spiral” of invasion, civil war and barbarian settlement, or by Roger 
Collins as a domino effect by which the Roman Empire gradually “delegated itself 
out of existence.”98 These views represent poles on a spectrum of debate on the 
relative violence and turbulence involved in the collapse of the political structures 
of imperial Roman rule.  
Perhaps where the debate about the fall of the Western Empire is most 
evident today is in the question of how much of a fall of Rome - in the sense of the 
violent collapse of a civilization - actually occurred. It has become accepted that the 
label of “the Dark Ages” is a very limited and overgeneralised portrait of Western 
Europe after 476 AD, outside of Britain. Whether this transformation in the fifth 
century was a hostile and destructive process, or a more positive and peaceful 
accommodation, is still to some extent disputed. Goffart has argued that the 
barbarian invaders were more or less integrated into the fabric of the Roman world 
- the fall of the West being an experiment in accommodation gone astray.99 By 
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contrast, Brian Ward-Perkins has argued for a destructive and dramatic end to the 
Western Empire, with hostile and bloody invasions incurring such consequences as 
population decline, urban decay, and the disappearance of much of the comfort 
and sophistication of the Roman way of life.100 But a decline after the fall or 
transition of the Western Roman state is a very different field of debate, and the 
tradition of Gibbon, Bury and Rostovtzeff was concerned with a supposed decline 
before any such event. Factors internal to the empire - such as a tendency for civil 
war - are still cited in modern historiography, but these are better regarded as 
structural limitations, rather than symptoms of decline. Indeed, Roger Collins cites 
the continued survival of the East, “despite various modifications, for another 
thousand years,” as the evidence which “effectively undermined the arguments 
eloquently advanced by Edward Gibbon”; namely, the terminal impact of the rise of 
Christianity, and the withering of the moral vitality of the empire. This is because 
“these features… even without assessing their inherent validity, would have to have 
been as true of the eastern half of the empire as of the western.”101 
The question must also be asked of how the East survived - ultimately for 
another thousand years, in some form - while the West did not. Jones had a partial 
answer to this, saying that, “The Western empire was poorer and less populous, 
and its social and economic structure more unhealthy. It was thus less able to 
withstand the tremendous strains imposed by its defensive effort, and the internal 
weaknesses which it developed.” By contrast, the East, “owing to its greater wealth 
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and population…was better able to carry the burden of defence.”102 Nevertheless, 
he points out that the East survived even when many of the same conditions 
applied. As such his answer is not a complete one. Cameron therefore states that, 
“Jones did not seriously address the issue of why the eastern empire continued and 
in what form, and he seems unsure what he thought of it.”103     
While the East was undoubtedly the richer part of the empire, its Western 
counterpart is no longer seen as being gripped by the ills he extrapolated, so the 
reasons behind their relative fates have to be more complex. In the West, with its 
rural economy and aggregated holdings, wealth was concentrated in the hands of a 
very small number of phenomenally rich senators and aristocrats, unlike the more 
urbanized and mercantile East. This made it much easier for the Western elite to 
shield its wealth from the state, and so represented a greater potential limitation 
on imperial power. This problem came to the fore in the external pressures the 
Western Empire faced from 406 to its “fall”, as it made the problem of its shrinking 
fiscal base that much more acute.104 Perhaps most importantly, the East possessed 
a second line of defence at Constantinople. Its rich Eastern provinces were largely 
secure from the nomadic and barbarian threats that penetrated the Balkans, and 
while the Persian menace was formidable it was also stable, the East enjoying a 
prolonged period of relative peace from 363. In the West, only North Africa, its 
“breadbasket”, benefited from this kind of security, but a series of contingent 
circumstances brought about its fall to the Vandals in 439. 
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 It should be clear from this historiographical summary just how profound the 
disjunction is between professional historians on the later Roman Empire and the 
myth of the decline and fall. The latter is of very little relevance to the modern field 
of Late Antiquity, and especially the fifth century AD. This has been the case for the 
past fifty years of academic scholarship. Instead, its meaning lies in the broader 
realm of myth and cultural historiography, and consequently the subject matter of 
this thesis.       
 
 
The Decline and Fall as an Atypical Model of Myth 
In the above historiographical survey, I note that there is a disjunction 
between the idea of the “fall of the Western Empire,” or “fall of Rome,” and that of 
the “decline and fall.” The question must be asked about what is the difference 
between these two terms, how exactly they cohere in this myth, and whether or 
not that coherence is necessary and fundamental; meaning, is it necessary in the 
context of this thesis to talk simultaneously about the decline and fall, rather than 
just the first or second term.  
Clearly, the two ideas have become decoupled in the historical record, 
because the end of the political and military infrastructure of the Western Empire 
by 476 AD is no longer deemed to be synonymous with a long, preceding phase of 
decline. Historians can talk of the fall of the Western Roman Empire and debate its 
causes, or even the veracity of such a position, without invoking this Gibbonian 
narrative. The statement that the Roman Empire “fell”, or the debates and 
arguments around this event or process, are not necessarily the myth in of itself. To 
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speak of “the fall of Rome” or “the end of Rome” does not require the invocation of 
decline, as the account of the academic historiography above makes clear.       
If the “fall” is not purely in of itself a form of this myth, can the same be true 
of “the decline of Rome?” Does the fall need to be invoked for the myth to work? 
The tradition of decline as a representational concept denoting moral, political or 
theological decay is discussed at length in chapter two. It is one which profoundly 
informs this myth. It also precedes it in mythic forms of its own that influenced the 
Roman example. The Bible provides us with the expulsion from Eden and original 
“fall of man,”105 Daniel’s prophecy of four empires,106 and the apocalyptic end times 
foretold in Revelations. Such ideas are present in the classical schema of Hesiod, in 
the now-dead myths of Platonists, Manicheans and Persian Zoroastrians, and 
countless other religious traditions, the Hellenic timeline of four “ages”, each worse 
than the last - Gold, Silver, Bronze, and then an Iron Age of universal wickedness.107 
When dealing with the Roman story, however, this decline is focused around 
explaining a specific event, or set of events; whatever the nature, number and 
length of its causes. The decline of the Roman Empire, and Roman civilization, is 
deemed to produce not simply decay to a lower state, but the very destruction of 
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that civilization, to a greater or lesser degree, and the subsequent arrival of the 
“Dark Ages” in some form. The notion that Rome fell is integral to this myth, not 
simply that Rome was reduced in some measure from its earlier greatness. Such an 
idea is integral to Gibbon’s Decline and Fall, which, as is argued in chapter two, 
constitutes the real origin of the fully developed form of this myth. It is also a core 
tenant of the bleaker intellectual prophets of the twentieth century (as discussed in 
chapters three and four): characters such as Spengler and Toynbee and Tainter, 
who see in a modern process of decline, echoing the Roman example, the coming 
collapse of civilization in its current form. Anthony Mann names his 1964 Gibbon-
inspired epic The Fall of the Roman Empire, even though it never once discusses the 
actual history of the fourth and fifth centuries; instead, it purports to show the 
beginning of a long phase of corruption and decline, two hundred years earlier, 
which thereby constituted the real and meaningful “fall”. 
When it comes to this myth, therefore, the decline and fall are mutually 
inclusive concepts. They are contained together in the presumption that a decline 
necessarily precedes a fall; and that the latter is the inevitable product of the 
former, unless the trend is halted or reversed. Such logic grants the myth its 
prophetic and comparative power; for if Rome declined and fell, then a similar such 
decline in the age of the author may itself be preceding another fall.  
This method of comparative inquiry is central to the decline and fall. It is an 
approach which I will define as negative classicism; the inverse of traditional 
“classicism”, or the reception of the classical world. I will firstly define what the 
latter constitutes, which is bound up in the traditional conception of “the classics,” 
namely, the study of the culture (literary and visual) and history of the Hellenic 
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world - especially Ancient Greece and Rome during “Classical Antiquity” (600 BC - 
AD 200 traditionally).108 Stemming from this is the concept of the “classical 
tradition,” an idea popularized by works such as Gilbert Highet’s The Classical 
Tradition (1949), one of the formative texts on the subject of this form of reception 
and representation. It signifies the ongoing transmission and influence of that 
ancient culture, within a context that is still tightly conditioned by its original, pure 
precedents. These literary, artistic, and intellectual prototypes are deemed to 
constitute a set of timeless and universal values, what Peter Rose calls “immutable 
reservoirs of fixed truth about a fixed human nature, a fixed human condition.”109 
An expression of this precept, “classicism”, denotes the emulation of classical 
precedents which set the rules and standards for aesthetics, ideals and styles. It 
implies a strict canon of ideal forms. T.S. Eliot described how “The beginning of the 
twentieth-century has witnessed a return to the ideals of classicism,” and stated 
these constitute “form and restraint in art, discipline and authority in religion, 
centralization in government… the necessity for austere discipline.”110 Phases of 
“classicism” in western culture invariably involve a reverence for the models and 
rules of Antiquity, even though their application has varied wildly. Amongst its 
myriad examples, classicism can be seen in the classical architecture that appeared 
during the Italian Renaissance, which emphasized a proportion and geometry that 
accorded to ancient styles, in the Palladian architecture in eighteenth-century 
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England, in Moliere’s adherence to Aristotle’s “unities”, or the poetry of Dryder or 
Pope. Research into the classical tradition has also taught us about subjects varying 
from the ongoing transmission of ancient texts, to the afterlife of ancient rituals 
and conventions.111   
Negative classicism represents a departure from this approach in several 
ways. While it involves the same comparative approach - whereby the culture of 
the present is seen or used to emulate the classical past - it is with an explicitly 
pejorative purpose. This is an ideological approach to culture that adheres to 
certain implicit or overt maxims; namely, that Rome was decadent; that it declined 
and was destroyed by this inner weakness; and that the society, nation, culture or 
civilization of the author is falling in the same direction. It is one with little academic 
precedent. The only related usage of the term “negative classicism” can be found in 
Patrick Brantlinger’s 1983 Bread and Circuses: Theories of Mass Culture as Social 
Decay, which uses it much more narrowly in terms of a perceived tension or debate 
between a high, pure, classicised culture, and modern mass culture, where 
proponents of the former see the former as being corrupted by the latter.112 It is a 
reminiscent usage to the one here, though the remit is focused very selectively on 
the preservation of “higher” cultural ideals. Here, I am examining the appropriation 
of classical models of decline to attack or critique the contemporary world of the 
authors at large. Furthermore, negative classicism naturally lends itself in its 
themes to a consideration of Late Roman history; to find in the supposed decline 
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and fall of Rome the lessons and warnings for a later age. By contrast, classicisms 
and classicists rarely touch on this later period of the empire’s history.113 The exact 
time-frame, therefore, varies along with the nature of the approach.  
It is here that I can define precise terms of which this myth consists. It is, in its 
simplest form, the idea that the Roman Empire was brought down in the fifth 
century AD due to a preceding internal decline that took a moral, cultural and/or 
political form. For the empire to be conquered from without, Roman civilization had 
to first destroy itself from within. No other explanation is acceptable according to 
these parameters. Nor is any real attention paid to the Eastern Empire that survived 
another thousand years in some form. Rather it is dismissed as Greek empire, or by 
the anachronistic term “Byzantium”: something somehow fundamentally different 
in character.114 The fall of Rome in the fifth century is the end of the Roman Empire, 
and, consequently, suggests the termination of Roman civilization as a whole.      
Such an analysis lends itself to being cast much more widely than a local 
historical concern. If the (Western) Roman Empire was not brought down due to 
the arrival of the Huns, or the loss of North Africa, or contextual bad luck, but 
slowly rotted from the inside, then the lessons of its collapse may be transferrable 
to other empires, cultures and societies. The causes and mechanics of the decline 
and fall therefore mark the universal condition of nations, cultures or empires at 
their height. They are a prophecy, a prediction or a threat, and carry a stark moral 
force in their account of the undoing of Rome.   
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For this myth to work, therefore, its representation must by absolute 
necessity remain constant and coherent. The “decline and fall of Rome” contains 
within this very statement an expression of its own internal logic. Historians who 
question the existence of this “decline”, or who suggest the “fall” in the West may 
be overstated, or who emphasis the continued existence of the Eastern Empire, are 
immediately banishing the myth from their own conceptual horizons. Without the 
conditions defined above, it carries no force, and the fall of Rome is simply a noted 
historical event; not a profound moral story, or a universal lesson of the 
relationship between greatness and hubris.     
When considering this decline and fall in this way, it becomes apparent how 
the present is adapted to fit the enduring tropes of the Roman past. This makes this 
thesis an important variation on more established theories of representation, in 
which the past is a passive tool reanimated to fit the present; the vehicle rather 
than the content of its ideas. But the fall of Rome is not simply an arbitrary enabling 
device. I can illustrate this contrast by comparing it to the myth put forward in 
Richard Howells’ The Myth of the Titanic (1999), a study of the Straussian myth-
model in modern culture: as he says, “The story of the Titanic is a modern myth par 
excellence.”115 Howells argues that the original story of the Titanic sinking reflects 
the values of Edwardian society at the time - classist, nationalistic, patriarchal, and 
suffused with notions of honour, heroism and gentlemanly virtue.116 Later versions 
of the Titanic story, however, radically alter this original Edwardian narrative, bar a 
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few iconic details, such as the hubris around branding it unsinkable (actually a later 
legend).117    
By contrast, the 1943 version of the Titanic commissioned by Nazi 
Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, dispensed with any celebration of British 
values, and instead offers up a harsh anti-capitalist, anti-British and anti-American 
critique, with a fictitious German First Officer, Peterson, describing the ship’s 
reckless speed as evidence it was “run not by sailors, but by stock speculators.”118 
During the Cold War, the film was banned by the British in Western Germany in the 
1950s, but broadcast in the German Democratic Republic (GDP), due to its 
sentiments according with propaganda of the ruling regime.119 As a contrast, James 
Cameron’s 1997 recreation of the myth adopts the story as a personal romantic 
adventure; and, more implicitly, a class critique of Edwardian British society 
portraying a stifling and oppressive world from which the heroine is liberated by 
her American love interest. Some famous images, such as the performance of the 
band on deck as the ship sank, remain, but the story is fundamentally altered from 
the original Edwardian myth.120 
Another example of this variety is seen in the archetype of the American 
Western, in particular its films. Westerns are devoted to telling stories set primarily 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century on the American frontier, or the “Old 
West.” That Western films are a prime tool for delivering a wider meaning and 
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message has long been recognised. André Bazin describes how “The Western is at 
the same time a quintessential American film genre and an archetypal narrative of 
worldwide appeal.”121 Sam Peckinpah, who directed The Wild Bunch (Warner Bros, 
1969), defined the Western as “a universal frame within which it is possible to 
comment on today.”122  
Yet the exact terms of this engagement vary greatly. The American Western 
was long celebrated as the bedrock of idealistic American values, but has more 
recently been appropriated as a subversive critique of them. Early Westerns 
typically portrayed Native Americans as dangerous, dishonourable, or some shade 
of an exotic “other”, while celebrating the feudal values of honour and chivalry as 
embodied by the hero; usually a cowboy, lawman or gunfighter. Examples of this 
include King Vidor’s Northwest Passage (MGM, 1940) with regard to Native 
Americans, or Fred Zinnemann’s High Noon (United Artists, 1952) for a heroic town 
marshal standing up to a band of killers. By contrast, the revisionist westerns from 
the 1960s and 1970s onwards questioned and often deconstructed these attitudes 
and values; criticising the treatment of natives, the US government, ranchers, big 
business, and the local lawmen. In this way, John Ford’s Cheyenne Autumn (Warner 
Bros, 1964) shows the Cheyenne tribes being mistreated by the US government and 
vilified by the press, while Clint Eastwood’s Unforgiven (Warner Bros, 1992) attacks 
the role that masculinity and violence play in the subjugation of women and 
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minorities.123 While these films share a common setting, and certain tropes and 
motifs,124 the content and meaning of the stories, and their internal mythology, 
fundamentally change according to the priorities of the director and writer and the 
historical context of their creation; such that they can have little or nothing in 
common with each other.   
 These standard theories of representation do not apply directly to the 
decline and fall. Instead, this is a myth which has remained atypically constant, 
through and before my period of study, and even through the emergence of new 
forms of mass media from the twentieth century. The views and judgements 
offered, both in terms of the moral perspective on Rome’s fall, and its relevance to 
the contemporary world of the author(s), display a striking similarity in this regard. 
Its forms and associations have stayed broadly constant through the ages: a 
consistency we see to this very day. The myth shapes the forms of its recreation 
much more than the circumstances of production rework the original myth.  
 
 
Myth as Interdisciplinary Study 
It is important for the purpose of this thesis that I explore those 
interconnected theoretical disciplines that play a central role in framing my 
research. I am concerned with the historical, social and cultural context of a “text”, 
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the role and reinterpretation of myth, the peculiarities of different media of 
transmission, and the sociology of representation. An interdisciplinary approach is 
therefore essential to this study. I am tackling questions about what constitutes 
myth, which is highlighted by social anthropology; examining symbolic 
representation, which is explored in semiotics; and discussing writings on popular 
culture, which receive treatment in media and film theory.  
All these ideas are common to studies of “representation” and their forms. 
More specifically for the parameters of this thesis, the question of what constitutes 
“classical reception” and “the classical tradition,” and their changing interpretation, 
needs to be given considerable scrutiny. The comparatively recent emergence of 
the study of representations of the ancient world throws up inevitable questions 
concerning their theoretical basis, intellectual value, and relationship to pre-existing 
fields of inquiry. A particular issue is how it co-exists with existing specialisms. As 
the field becomes more fashionable, it is increasingly vulnerable to the intellectual 
battleground of competing methodologies in history, cultural study, and social 
sciences.  
It is important to note that the process of reviewing much of the relevant 
theoretical literature on myth and representation for this thesis is more about the 
active selection of the very parameters of study involved, than a passive recital of 
an obvious and self-defined body of material. This thesis is concerned with the 
presentation and survival of ancient myths in a modern context; more specifically, a 
myth about the fall of the Roman Empire and the decline of the classical world, 
what is deemed to have caused it, what those causes signified to a later audience, 
and what universal truths they are purported to reveal. Consequently, a substantial 
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body of theory must both be examined, and those ideas necessary to frame and 
elaborate my argument must be developed at length.  At the same time, there is a 
risk of including material that fits only one’s selective and subjective angle on a 
genre or field, thereby falling into a tautological trap. This therefore means that 
many concepts - in particularly varying approaches to myth, representation, and 
the distinction between high and low cultural forms - must be discussed in a 
broader scope here than they are elsewhere.  
In any work that describes and explores a genre - especially when those 
boundaries have been little defined before - there is the risk of choosing a time-
frame that redefines the historical context of the subject matter through the nature 
of its selective dating. Academic works on the invention and reception of historical 
archetypes frequently postulate their own relevance to contemporary debates by 
proclaiming a “current” wave of film, media, or other such texts about their period, 
before proffering explanations for this. This provides us with a reason to keep the 
parameters of this thesis as inclusive as can be reasonably allowed. A consequence 
of this necessity is that the relatively wide chronological range of this thesis is 
balanced by a relatively narrow focus of appropriate subject matter; for instance, 
on narrative feature films intended for cinematic release. Admittedly, a strict 
demarcation of cinema from television, digital media and film shorts can appear 
arbitrary, but such distinctions are important in the content and nature of the films 
themselves.  
It is a long-established truism that popular representations of Rome, and of 
the pre-modern world in general, reflect and articulate political and cultural 
identities. In this tradition, the historical and iconographic themes of the “decline 
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and fall” of Rome have often been appropriated by interest groups across the 
literate spectrum - writers, academics, filmmakers, historians, journalists - to tackle 
such ideas as the decline of empires and societies, perceived political and 
ideological “imperialism”, whether in its virtues or flaws, and a range of related 
themes. The frequency and focus of this cultural output bears witness to the issues 
of the day.125  
One would expect, therefore, that such representations would have attracted 
considerable academic attention, particularly in recent years. Yet little so far has 
been written specifically on this field.126 This absence of directly comparable studies 
forces us to investigate a wide and varying field of literature for appropriate subject 
matter and/or methodological tools. It also, of course, presents a case for the 
justification of this thesis, both as a contribution to existing knowledge in the field 
of classical reception, and the broader arena of cultural representations of the past.  
 
 
Theories of Myth  
In this section I will show how existing theory and methodology inform this 
study - while also demonstrating that there is little specifically written on this topic. 
The re-presentation of history, facts, people, ideas and situations in cultural forms is 
at the core of this thesis, making this an appropriate place to begin.127 
“Representation” as an academic notion defines the means by which members of a 
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culture uses “language” - or any system involving signs - to generate meaning. 
Stuart Hall defines “culture” as a set of meanings constructed according to systems 
of representation. They are signs that are manipulated to create meaning in the 
world. This idea contains the premise, then, that “things” - entities such as objects, 
people or events - do not have in themselves any fixed, final or true objective 
meaning: it is us who are within society and culture who create these.128  
Representations not only articulate visual or verbal codes and conventions, 
but also the social practices and forces which underlie them. Producing meaning 
depends on the practice of interpretation: because meanings are always changing, 
codes operate more like social conventions than fixed, immutable laws. As 
meanings shift the codes of a culture slowly, sometimes imperceptibly change.129 
Furthermore, these meanings can vary or change from one culture to another. 
Therefore it is important for us to retain an appreciation of the inherent 
“relativism” of many cultural ideas, forms and standards, and the need for some 
form of translation, even in the looser hermeneutic sense, as we move from the 
mindset of one conceptual universe to another. Elizabeth Chaplin argues that 
“Images and texts do not reflect their sources but refashion them according to 
pictorial and textual codes, in a way that makes them quite separate and distinct 
from the sources.”130 The challenge of studies such as my thesis, therefore, is in 
working out why exactly the past is represented in certain ways, and through 
certain dramatic forms - and how those portraits have changed over time, either in 
their form or final meaning. 
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As a concept, representation has antecedents in the classical period itself, the 
very period whose re-presentation is being discussed here. A key aesthetic and 
philosophical principle of Late Antiquity and the medieval era was “spolia” (or 
“spoils” in the English), an artistic-historical term that refers to the reuse of art, 
architecture and texts. Spolia are ancient artefacts and materials which have been 
appropriated for a different context and purpose. In possibly one of the earliest 
examples of a theory of “representation”, St Augustine allegorized the theft of 
Egyptian treasures by the Israelites in Exodus to justify contemporary Christians 
taking the great cultural treasures of the classical world - art, literature, artefacts - 
and stripping them of their paganism to adapt them for their own motives. This was 
on the grounds that “all the branches of pagan learning contain not only false and 
superstitious fantasies… but also studies for liberated minds which are more 
appropriate to the service of the truth, and some very useful moral instruction.” 
Consequently, “these treasures… which were used wickedly and harmfully in the 
service of demons must be removed by Christians… and applied to their true 
function, that of preaching the gospel.” 131  
Spolia is primarily used as an architectural term in modern scholarship, but in 
the realms of art, literature, philosophy and theology, examples abound. 
Augustine’s very argument itself is a textual example of this practice - an allegorical 
appropriation of a historical/theological narrative. Such a recycling - in a literal 
and/or symbolic sense - produced very complex objects, which themselves 
facilitated a visual and conceptual dialogue between past and present. The past and 
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present therefore become hybridised: the present is a multi-temporal 
representation, the ancient object layered with meanings foreign, sometimes alien, 
to its original context.132 Such an idea not only informs such objects of the past, but 
continues to shape our constant re-presentation of them since. 
For a modern approach to the field, the “social constructionist” approach to 
representation, as outlined by Stuart Hall, describes it as the construction of 
meaning through symbols and signs. According to this approach, we must not 
confuse the material world, where things and people exist, and the symbolic 
practices and processes through which language, representation and meaning 
function. This is not to deny the existence of the material world, but instead to say 
it is not in itself the source of meaning.133  
It is important for me to point out that in the intellectual context of this study, 
I will be using the word reception to denote the history of the meanings that have 
been imputed to historical events or artefacts; and the way that participants, 
observers and historians have attempted to make past events meaningful for the 
present in which they live. This is different from the formal field of reception theory, 
which emphasizes the audience’s interpretation of a text. I am emphasizing this 
distinction here because much of the pre-existing work on the “representation” of 
antiquity uses the word reception interchangeably with that, without connotations 
to the more formal discipline of reception theory.134  
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Focusing on the importance of our symbolic and cultural lives has important 
implications for our conception of what constitutes “truth”. In this context, truth is 
primarily - though not exclusively - the product of human need.135 Something can 
be true in the sense that it shapes and influences thinking - which can give a myth, 
story or falsehood a similar importance, culturally and historically, to a quantifiable 
“fact”. If you remove the layers of ritual and convention in human activity, little of it 
can be said to have a basis in an “objective” scientific reality. All human activity is 
an extension of the imagination - we inscribe our own realities onto the world, and 
representations act as mediators for these beliefs and ideas.  
Emerging out of this is the modern scholarly notion of a myth, the importance 
of which cannot, in the context of this study, be underestimated, and which we will 
constantly refer to in this vein. Myth, in the sense that I am utilizing it, is a powerful 
conceptual model for understanding the role of belief in defining a particular 
conception of “reality”, or the supposedly “true” meanings contained in the 
external world. It is a complex term that defies a simple or singular 
interpretation.136 Myth has often carried a pejorative meaning, denoting a fiction, 
an error, a distortion or a lie - an idea which has frequently extended even to 
academic circles.137 Its use in the study of classical representation is primarily as a 
technical literary and historic label for the stories and tales told in ancient societies 
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- for instance, Greek and Roman myths about their god or ancestors - not as a 
conceptual tool for those studies themselves. However, myth can be understood in 
a deeper sense neither as truth or falsehood, but as a sophisticated social 
representation.138  
Theories of myth have varied considerably, running the whole range of 
functionalism, structuralism and semiotics. Percy Cohen outlined seven types of 
theory of myth, starting with “nineteenth century intellectualism,” and finishing 
with their embrace by structuralism in the 1960s. The second category was a 
“mythopoeic” theory, which treated them wholly as an art form, lacking in any 
explanatory value; thirdly came the psycho-analytical ideas of Jung and Freud, 
which saw their plots and imagery as metaphors for unconscious desires; fourthly 
was the approach of theorists such as Emile Durkheim, who treated them as part of 
a religious system for maintaining social order and harmony; fifthly was the 
functionalism of Malinowski, in which myth legitimized social institutions; and the 
sixth category, as championed by Robert Graves, was concerned with the link 
between myth and ritual. The final category, pioneered in the structuralism of 
Strauss, saw individual myths as components of a larger mythic system, which 
played a somewhat abstract functional role in the “mediation of paradoxes”; and 
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the analysis of which revealed a universality underlying human thought 
processes.139  
Cohen’s first category, nineteenth-century scholarship, comprehended myth 
as a way in which “primitive” man sought to understand and explain the world.140 
This set the academic precedent of examining primitive and distant cultures, and 
framing these observations in the context of universal human tendencies. Yet these 
theories reduce myth to a redundant and obsolete method of thought - a primitive 
counterpart to a Post-Enlightenment age of reason and science. Andrew Lang’s 
Myth, Ritual and Religion (1887) describes the “anomalous” and “irrational” 
elements in modern religious myths of otherwise “civilized” people as hangovers 
from humanity’s original state of savagery.141 The Orientalist Max Muller described 
myth as a “disease of language,” a by-product of the limitations of primitive 
vocabulary in formulating abstract ideas. The anthropologist E.B Taylor interpreted 
myth as a form of animism, a literal explanation for natural phenomenon made by 
people too unsophisticated to conceive of impersonal laws of nature: and this 
outdated method of thinking survived and persisted in religious faith.142 Similarly, 
Emile Durkheim deemed religious mythic conceptions “erroneous applications of 
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the law of causality.”143 A crucial shift in twentieth-century academic thinking was 
to reject this entirely “rationalist” dichotomy between myth and science, or reason 
and superstition.144 This new trend primarily originated in the movement 
“functionalism” - part of Cohen’s fifth category of myth as social function -  which 
argued that it played a vital social and cultural role: namely in sustaining and 
reinforcing the social order.145  
In Myth and Primitive Psychology (1954), the anthropologist Malinowski 
described how, “The function of myth, briefly, is to strengthen tradition, and endow 
it with a greater value and prestige by tracing it back to a higher, better, more 
superior natural reality of initial events.”146 It legitimizes organisation within a 
society, and enshrines the sanctity of its sources of power and authority. This 
presents a powerful case for the importance of studying myth, by ascribing to it a 
social and political role: namely to validate and justify existing practices and 
conventions, by rooting them in a mythical past.147 The rooting of ideas and 
ideologies - often at political instigation - in such a past has numerous historical 
precedents: Virgil’s Aeneid glorified Roman virtues and supremacy, legitimizing the 
Julio-Claudian dynasty as descended from the heroes of Troy, while Foxe’s Book of 
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Martyrs enshrined the sanctity of the English Reformation by connecting the 
persecution of its advocates to the tradition of martyrdom in early Christianity.148   
Notable in these ideas about myth, in contrast to the nineteenth-century 
approach, is a closer equation of the cultural and mental horizons of ancient and 
modern man. Malinowski compares the value of the “myth for the savage” with the 
way that “our sacred story lives in our ritual, in our morality… controls our 
conduct.”149 Echoing Durkheim and Muller’s focus on the connections between 
ritual, myth, and religion,150 Malinowski defined a “special class of stories… 
regarded as sacred, embodied in rituals, morals and social organizations… which 
form an integral and active part of primitive culture.”151 This idea is of crucial value 
to this thesis, as the equation emphasizes conceptual and ideological continuities 
through human history, and the value the ancient world can have to “modern” 
(Post-Enlightenment) culture and the modern mind.  
For Malinowski, however, these stories held their greatest value when viewed 
in their “original”, pure state. He was critical of the academic study of ancient 
myths in their more contemporary literary forms, arguing that these were so 
distorted by subsequent generations of scribes, scholars and theologians that, “It is 
necessary to go back to primitive mythology… (to study) a myth which is still 
alive.”152 While this may be true for discerning their original and ancient historical 
context, one cannot simply treat modern reinterpretations of older stories or idea 
simply as inferior distortions, of qualitatively less value than the “pure” form. Down 
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the ages, myths have employed shifting forms and embodied mutable meanings. 
The story of Christ had a very different significance to the Emperor Constantine 
than it does to a modern-day Catholic - the content of the tale is broadly 
comparable, but the layering on of tradition and interpretation in subsequent 
centuries has greatly altered its context and significance.153 But why should the 
ancient form have a qualitatively greater (or lesser) value than the modern? They 
are both of value to the cultures that originated or redefined them. We need to 
understand “modern” myths precisely because different societies express 
themselves in ways specific to them. Furthermore, those “ancient” stories usually 
have even earlier and more ancient forms - the Old Testament flood is predated by 
a Sumerian story, the virgin birth of Jesus has a long list of Hellenic precedents.154 
And these may themselves have grown out of oral traditions which are no longer 
extant. So the very idea of an “original” myth is a fraught and subjective concept in 
its own right.155 
Malinowski’s functionalism was largely eclipsed in the “structural 
anthropology” pioneered by Claude Lévi-Strauss (and occupying Cohen’s final 
category of theory), who adapted the tools and methodology of Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s linguistics in an effort to uncover the unconscious foundations of 
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thinking in so-called “primitive” peoples. His anthropology was concerned with the 
abstract relationship between the elements of myths, as components of a 
“grammar”: in his analysis, they comprise individual “mythemes” which take on 
meaning, like the units of language, only when combined in particular patterns. The 
anthropologist’s task is, therefore, to uncover this underlying grammar - the rules 
and regulations which make it possible for myths to be “meaningful” to their 
audience and culture.156  
Strauss claimed that beneath the vast heterogeneity of myth there can be 
discovered a homogenous structure, and only by understanding this structure can 
we truly grasp the meaning of any individual myth. His methodology was to 
attempt to reintegrate all the component myths into a single semiotic structure, for 
“If there is meaning to be found in mythology, it cannot reside in the isolated 
elements which enter into the composition of a myth, but only in the way those 
elements have combined.”157 Strauss rejected Malinowski’s focus on what he called 
“obvious narrative,” which communicated only the “apparent content” of a myth. 
Instead, Strauss proposed looking deeper, into the latent content of myth.158 He 
explained the relationship between the two using the structural analogy of an 
orchestral score. The “narrative” sequences were comparable to the melody, and 
were to be read chronologically from left to right. Conversely, the “schemata” were 
comparable to the counterpoint and harmonies: they were to be read from top to 
                                                          
156
 Lévi-Strauss (1968), pp. 203-6.  
157
 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural anthropology II, trans. Layton (London: Penguin, 1978), pp. 60-67, 
p. 65. Similarly he says that, “A myth must never be interpreted individually, but in relation to other 
myths which form a transformational group,” Strauss (1968), p. 217.     
158
 Edmund Leach (ed.), The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism (Tavistock: London (ori. pub. 
1967), 2004), p. 21.     
72 
 
bottom, making sense not in isolation but in relation to each other.159 This 
relationship between the individual elements and broader themes defined a 
“story”. A cultural text can have a very specific content and purpose, whilst also 
reflecting much deeper themes. This idea is at the kernel of the approach in this 
thesis, and the treatment of the decline and fall as a modern cultural mythology. By 
comparing different versions of the same story, narrative or idea, one can identify 
both the specific elements of its authorship and context, while also being aware of 
the more universal components of the myth, or those essential qualities which stay 
constant, and define its overall properties. We can become aware of how a story is 
adapted, re-presented or interpreted - and also what remains unchanged and 
constant in the characteristics of the myth, whatever the time-frame or medium of 
presentation. There is therefore some universal element to the “decline and fall of 
Rome,” consistent in its various retellings and constant across time and space, and 
a detailed study of its varying forms can make this readily apparent. 
The approach of Strauss, therefore, allows us to make some universal and 
non-hierarchical claims for cultures, whether modern or ancient, distant or near. 
Myths, Strauss argued, were assembled from deep-rooted unconscious archetypes 
common to all humankind, using a process he called “bricolage” (an analogy with a 
French handyman), or the assemblage of the available cultural materials of our 
conceptual landscape.160 The term denotes the purpose and order we project onto 
an otherwise meaningless material canvas, even as we imagine those qualities to be 
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inherent to it. To Strauss, all myths have a similar socio-cultural function in society: 
to make the world explicable, to magically resolve its problems and paradoxes, 
thereby providing order and stability to our social arrangements.161  They consist of 
“binary oppositions” - good and bad, order and chaos - their interplay and 
mediation giving meaning and context to both. The tension between them was 
overcome by the mediation of other forces in the myth, thus resolving the story 
into harmony. It is a logical model for reconciling the conflicts and contradictions of 
their lived experiences.162 It is reminiscent of Hegel’s dialectic - a philosophical 
model which treated the advance of society as a counterpoint of tensions and 
resolutions between competing ideas - theses and anti-theses which produced 
“synthesis.”163 As Strauss says, “Mythical thought always progresses from the 
awareness of its oppositions toward their resolution... the purpose of myth is to 
provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction.”164     
Taking these ideas to their furthest conclusion, the structuralism of Strauss 
sees myth as an expression of universal and unchanging social and mental 
structures. Consequently, this means that universal laws govern mythic thought. 
The logic of this could be, and was, taken even further. For Strauss, myth was the 
testing ground for a broad and sweepingly reductionist outlook on the human 
condition. If something so seemingly wild and random could actually be 
conditioned by universal laws, then all human thinking must be the product of 
similar coherent structures - meaning that discernable rules governed the entirety 
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of human thought. “If the human mind appears determined even in the realm of 
mythology, a fortiori it must also be determined in all its spheres of activity.”165 In 
essence he argued for the equality of the savage and civilized mind. Whatever their 
surface distinctions, the two were composed of the same structures, and possessed 
the same internal logic of thought.  
This principle has important connotations for judging the very concept of 
“myth” - in regard to both its academic consideration, and the conventional, 
everyday use of the word. Strauss’s anthropology considers mythic reasoning and 
narrative to be neither a falsehood nor a sign of cultural or cognitive inferiority, but 
instead views them as a social tool: as rigorous, logical and coherent as modern 
science. The difference between the two therefore lies not in the quality of the 
intellectual process involved, but in the nature of the material to which it was 
applied.166 Myth, to Strauss, could no longer be described as the intellectual 
predecessor of logic and reason, for man, “has always been thinking equally well.” 
This, again, is a crucial idea in support of this thesis. Myth and history combine 
today just as they always have. Furthermore, as I can demonstrate, a collective 
“mythic” consciousness exists co-terminally with a collective “historical” 
consciousness, the theoretical basis of which will be outlined below. 
It is important to point out here that his anthropology, while very useful to 
this study, is liable to a number of profound criticisms, which limit its final 
significance to this study. The system is highly reductionist: it contracts history and 
humanity to a single idea, or supreme motive force. In doing so it transforms 
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individuals into algorithms, the preconditioned output of vast mathematical 
systems.167 The problem here is symptomatic to a hazard faced by the social 
sciences in general, namely that they are grounded in the vagaries and ambiguities 
of human behaviour, yet attempt to imprint onto it a precise, mathematical 
elegance. Siegfried Kracauer expressed a fear about the impact of social theorizing, 
declaring that, “the social sciences today avail themselves increasingly of computers 
to establish formal theories covering various social processes… it appears that, for 
its perpetuation, modern mass society depends on the predictability - i.e, the 
manipulation - of all individual responses and behaviour patterns that are socially 
significant. We have already gone far in preconditioning people’s attitudes: should 
society carry on this way, the so-called ‘personality’ would dwindle to a 
mathematical point - man, that is, would become a statistician’s dream.”168    
I can also point out that the Straussian equation of the “logic” of ancient and 
modern man has significant limitations. Cognitive relativism of this kind can imply 
that modern science is nothing more than a “myth” in itself - another narrative or 
social construct by today’s generation of “story-telling natives.” Strauss even called 
into question the claim that Western scientific rationalism held any intrinsic 
superiority over mythical forms of thinking.169 Yet, though the unconscious process 
of myth-making and the deliberate rationality of the scientific method may be 
borne of the same psychological imperatives - to comprehend a meaning and order 
in our environment - they do not possess the same logic of inquiry, or empirically 
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mediated relationship with the outside world.170 Scientific theories are conditioned 
by very different forces than those which shape myth. New scientific data and 
theories often arise in opposition to existing social and cultural narratives, however 
powerful those may be. The impact of Darwinism on Victorian society is an example 
of a religious mythic system of ancient origins violently and irreparably shaken by 
evidence from the objective world.171 Furthermore, this idea assumes there has 
been little essential change in what constitutes “humanity”, that the human 
experience has stayed fundamentally constant, and therefore that the vastly 
altered conditions of human existence - social, technological, scientific, conceptual - 
have not in any way qualitatively altered the thinking patterns or cultural 
programming of society. Placing such a primacy on cultural forces in defining 
human existence can itself be seen as a reaction to previous, more material models 
of human behaviour, which held these in greater accord. Yet omitting the primacy 
of such factors comprises an overreaction of extreme proportions - Terry Eagleton 
describes how rampant “culturalism” ignores such forces as “labour markets, 
commodity prices, raw materials, political forces” in shaping human affairs.172    
There are no simple methodological tools or shortcuts to comprehending a 
text, culture or society. This idea is readily accepted across the breadth of 
contemporary historiography; which incorporates many of the practices of the 
social sciences, in a hermeneutic context, without being beholden to its 
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pseudoscientific excesses.173 I wish to reiterate, therefore, that I am using some of 
the conceptual tools discussed above to emphasize both the coherence within 
certain historical narratives, and as a means of stressing the links between past and 
present systems of thinking; not for any greater theoretical purpose, or as part of a 
challenge to “conventional” historiography. 
Despite these reservations about the more reductionist elements of structural 
anthropology, a number of ideas within it are still highly germane to this study. 
Firstly, there is the premise that specific myths and stories cannot be fully 
comprehended in isolation, but must be examined as part of a broader system. This 
supports an idea central to this study, that we must embrace culture in its entirety - 
whether in “high” or “low” forms, or old or new media - in our attempt (as is the 
final aim of all “history”) to meaningfully comprehend society as a whole. This is 
particularly true in more modern times, when these “myths” have proliferated 
across a range of new media, whether in literary, dramatic or visual forms. 
Furthermore, this anthropology demonstrates how culture can be understood not 
as the product of individual authorship, but a collective tradition. Elements or 
details of a narrative may originate with a specific author, but the components and 
themes of any tale are far more deep-rooted than that. It is therefore better to 
attribute their authorship to societies rather than individuals. This accords in 
particular with the emphasis on the value of “mass” and popular culture in studies 
such as my own, and the web of tradition that I will demonstrate can be seen in the 
concept of the decline and fall.  
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The equation made by Strauss between ancient and modern man lends itself 
powerfully to the idea that myths continue to carry enormous relevance in the 
post-industrial age. Consequently, one must consider in what cultural forms these 
“modern” myths reside. It can be convincingly argued that popular culture is now 
the “repository and purveyor of myth.”174  Such an idea receives detailed treatment 
in Richard Howells’ The Myth of the Titanic (1999), which begins with a set of 
theoretical observations about the parallels between ancestral myths and 
mainstream contemporary culture, and explores this connection by applying it to 
the case study of popular depictions of the sinking of the Titanic.175 But this theory 
is not locked specifically to the Titanic, or Edwardian society, or even modern 
Europe - the connections that can potentially be made are deemed more 
universal.176 Howells takes the universalism of Strauss and inverts its central theme, 
arguing that if primitive man was as intellectually sophisticated as modern man, so 
the latter might be considered to still think like the primitive.177 Out of this 
perspective comes a universal definition of myth as “narrative tools” that “codify 
abstract ideas into concrete form.”178 Their “truth” lies not in any objective 
historical realities they describe, but in their value to those who absorb and 
mediate the narrative.  
This treatment of the past emphasizes a cultural outlook on history in which 
primacy is accorded to uncovering people’s beliefs, and their impact on the 
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historical record, over the importance of the strictly “real”.179 Furthermore, it 
allows for the consideration that myths possess both “temporal” and “universal” 
dimensions. At a temporal level they demonstrate the concerns and values of 
specific societies. At a universal level, they are a window into a much deeper 
cultural consensus that crosses the chasm of time and space. This also follows in 
the methodological tradition of John Grierson, who draws on Hegelian and Kantian 
philosophy to distinguish between the “noumenal” and “phenomenal”. The former 
is meant as a more abstract truth underlying all human experience - the latter 
simply the local, empirical and particular. Grierson therefore advocated the use of 
the phenomenal in pursuit of the noumenal or “real” truth in a story.180 In the 
context of this study, I can say that ancient stories will only continue to function 
through their continuing recalibrations for new generations of audience - yet at the 
same time, some archetypal themes exist at their core, largely preserved from the 
original form, which have proven universal in their meaning and value. This, as I 
have discussed, is a crucial theoretical component to the approach in my treatment 
of the decline and fall of Rome. 
This universal, comparative, and inclusive approach to myth sees a notable 
example in Joseph Campbell’s The Hero with a Thousand Faces (1949). A 
comparative study that draws particularly on Jung’s concept of the archetype, 
Campbell explores the idea that the major myths and stories of all cultures, past 
and present, share a fundamental structure, which Campbell called (after James 
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Joyce) the monomyth, or the journey of the hero, which is treated as a complex 
metaphor for our collective cultural psyche.181 While the elaborate narrative details 
of his theory have been subject to extensive academic criticism for unsubstantiated 
universalism and conceptual vagaries,182 Campbell argues convincingly for counting 
as myths those stories and ideas which do not explicitly involve the supernatural - 
for instance, the “myth” of American frontiersmanship, or “Aryan” superiority, or 
even ideologies such as Marxism.183 Thus he helped pave the way for the 
examination of modern myths, and their relation to secular culture and ideologies. 
Finally, of great value to this study is the contrast Strauss makes between the 
overt and latent content of a myth - or between their apparent subject matter and 
a deeper, underlying meaning. This is an approach to representation that can be 
extended to any “text”, whether cultural, literary or historic; or high culture versus 
the vernacular.  
 
 
Historiography, Myth and Literature  
An essential concept in this thesis is that history and historiography can be 
considered types and forms of representation, in the academic sense, and 
consequently fall within the scope of the ideas about myth discussed above. I must 
make it clear here that I am primarily referring to the historical writing or 
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interpretations that either came out of, or demonstrably affected, the specific 
periods that are discussed in my thesis. I am contending that together these form 
the intellectual core of a broader cultural historiography that is mediated through 
an array of textual forms. However, it must be made clear that any observations 
about historical writing or production are being made almost exclusively about 
these examples, and are not observations or wider judgements about historical 
scholarship or historiography in general.  
Attempts to distinguish myth from history are seen as early as Thucydides, 
who criticized those writers “less interested in telling the truth than in catching the 
attention of their public, whose authorities cannot be checked and whose subject-
matter, owing to the passage of time, is mostly lost in the unreliable streams of 
mythology.”184  The drive to arrive at truthful depictions, free from such tall tales, 
culminated in the transformation of history into a professional discipline in the 
nineteenth century. This is best expressed in the empiricism of Leopold von Ranke, 
which strove towards an objective comprehension of the “truth” in human history, 
through the use of primary sources with a “proven” authenticity.185   
History does not at first appear to have much in common with myth, or can 
even be thought of as diametrically opposed to its very principle. The former aims 
to grasp - however imperfectly - at something resembling real truth, while the latter 
are stories that express the beliefs and bias of their author. Indeed, Malinowski 
points out that, “Myth, taken as a whole, cannot be sober, dispassionate history, 
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since it is always made ad hoc to fulfil a certain sociological function, to glorify a 
certain group, or to justify anomalous status.”186 However, this clear distinction 
breaks down on a number of grounds. The first and most obvious one can be 
summarised quite simply: myth represents a specific form of history; not the history 
of “what happened,” but what people thought and believed. As people accept and 
absorb myths, the myths become the basis for ideas and actions that shape history. 
So in this approach, it is a mere technicality (or incidental fact), for instance, 
whether Robert Darnton’s “Great Cat Massacre” ever actually took place: the point 
is that people chose or came to believe that it happened, and invested the event 
with cultural value.187 Similarly, the factually plausible events of Christ’s life are not 
nearly as important to the subsequent history of the Christian faith as the mythic 
version of the story that came to be mediated through the Gospels, and came to 
define the institutional (Catholic) Christian Church and its theology.   
From all this, I can argue that the content of myth falls comfortably and 
squarely within a subset of the “history of ideas.” Their use as a historical tool is no 
less than any other for exploring the past. The issues of “truth” and “falsehood” in 
past events, and their interpretations, then become somewhat moot to the 
purpose of this and related studies. Myth has always been the negotiation of fact 
and fiction, event and concept, a weaving of the real and imaginary. It represents 
the construction of a meaning and order that generates a new value truth of its 
own: “The value of myth lies in its values.”188 Studying belief is not qualitatively 
different to studying reality, because those beliefs are a human reality in 
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themselves, and provide a foundation for historical awareness and action, whether 
this is embodied in social, political, or cultural forms.   
 
 
Historical “Consciousness” and Narrative 
Leading on from this discussion about approaches to the past is a broader 
challenge that should be considered to traditional conceptions of history, or our 
“consciousness of history.” In recent decades, there have been widespread, 
sometimes radical, critiques of historical methodology that challenge the formally 
clear boundaries between this and fictional forms of representation, and question 
much about the nature of knowable historical truth, particularly as mediated 
through historical texts. Much of this falls loosely within the umbrella of academic 
“Postmodernism”, a wide-ranging concept which, when deployed as a critical 
technique, involves scepticism towards the hard certainties in any field of inquiry. 
Jean-François Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition (1979) describes 
postmodernism as marking a “crisis of knowledge” in Western societies, and 
defines the movement at its essence as “incredulity toward metanarratives” and 
their “reliance on some form of ‘transcendent and universal truth.’”189 These 
metanarratives include such unifying conceptual schemes of human history as 
Marxism and the Enlightenment, and he further refers to  those “metadiscourses” 
that make appeal to such grand narratives and ideologies, for instance “the 
dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational 
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or working subject, or the creation of wealth.”190 Lyotard deems these approaches 
a teleological, totalitarian imposition of narrative on human nature. They “operate 
through inclusion and exclusion, as homogenizing forces, marshalling heterogeneity 
into ordered realms; silencing and excluding other discourses, other voices in the 
name of universal principles and general goals.”191  Consequently he sees the need 
for its replacement with a much more relativist notion that there is no certainty of 
ideas, only contending “local” narratives of interpretation.  
These ideas have been brought to bear, sometimes quite radically, onto 
traditional conceptions of historical truth. Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson describe 
historical context as more a conceptual construct than an objective reality, which 
can be used by historians in their interpretation of an idea or source.192 Michael 
Foucault criticized using historiographical assumptions - and narratives of 
“progress” and “meaning”- in descriptions of the past.193 Karl Popper in The Poverty 
of Historicism went further, expressing a fundamental thesis that “belief in 
historical destiny is sheer superstition... there can be no prediction of the course of 
human history by scientific or any other rational methods,” due to both the 
innumerable components and characteristics of a society, and the impossibility of 
modelling future growth in scientific or technical knowledge.194   
These critiques become especially relevant when examining the more 
“literary” and subjective qualities of historical authorship. The key useful point that 
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they make here is that the historical context in which a literary work is written is 
not (simply) a factual, independent series of events that exists in a realm separate 
and distinct from the observer. Hans-Robert Jauss describes literary work as “the 
product of reciprocal interaction of work and readers, from whose experience it is 
inseparable.”195 Terry Eagleton observes that the meaning of a “text” exceeds the 
intentions of its author - as it is passed from one cultural and historical context to 
another, new and unforeseen potentials in a work can be realized.196 The reader, 
therefore, “Makes implicit connections, fills in gaps, draws inferences and tests out 
hunches… drawing on a tacit knowledge of the world in general and of literary 
conventions in particular. The text itself is really no more than a series of ‘cues’ to 
the reader, ‘invitations to construct a piece of language into meaning.’”197 In a more 
extreme approach, from his semiotic deconstructions, Barthes denied a distinction 
between history and literature, seeing “history” as nothing but another deceptive 
discourse; a surreptitious, imaginary elaboration of cultural values.198 In The Past Is 
a Foreign Country (1995), critic and cultural theorist David Lowenthal observes that, 
The most pellucid pearls of historical narrative are often found in fiction, long a 
major component of historical understanding… The segregation of historical from 
fictional narrative was a by-product of late-Renaissance concern about the validity 
and accuracy of historical sources… as history retreated to the arid confines of 
empirical rigour, novelists took over the richer if more fanciful aspects of the past 
that historians relinquished... historical fiction shares with history the burdens of 
hindsight, not just to make the past intelligible but to account for processes of 
change not originally apparent. All accounts of the past tell stories about it, and 
hence are partly invented… The history-fiction difference is more one of purpose 
than of content.199 
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Here, the argument is not to emphasize that history writing is inherently 
pregnant with fictional narrative (though the last quoted line reiterates that idea), 
but that academic developments in the discipline required a different form of 
literature to satisfying the purpose of making the past meaningful and intelligible 
for a broader audience.  
Most in line with the approach of this thesis are the works of Stephen Bann 
and Hayden White, which provide a detailed critique of the distinct categorization 
of historiographical and fictional literature. Their arguments play a crucial role in 
the outlook of this study; both in the interconnections they highlight between 
history and other forms of representation, and for the attention they draw to the 
evolution of historiography in the nineteenth century. Bann is concerned with how 
the emerging discipline of history had to negotiate its own conceptual corner within 
the emergence of other professional and “scientific” fields. He contends that the 
nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of “historical poetics” - a system of 
rhetorical techniques that appeared in tandem with a deepening conception of 
historical consciousness.200 Hayden White applies this idea to a broader critique of 
historical literature as a genre by comparing four major historians (Michelet, Ranke, 
Tocqueville, and Burckhardt) and four principal philosophers of history (Hegel, 
Marx, Nietzsche, and Croce) from the nineteenth century, contending that the 
“works of the principal philosophers of the nineteenth century differ from those of 
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their counterparts in what is sometimes called ‘proper’ history (Michelet, Ranke, 
Tocqueville, and Burckhardt) only in emphasis, not in content.”201 White describes 
historical narratives as “verbal fictions, the contents of which are more invented 
than found,” and argued that they were narratives with more in common with 
literature than science.202 His concern is instead with critically establishing the 
“poetic” elements in historiography and philosophy of history “in whatever age 
they were practiced.”203  
Crucially for my purpose, White argues that while these descriptions proceed 
from empirically validated facts or events, they necessarily require imaginative 
steps to place them in a coherent story. He therefore states that “the techniques or 
strategies that (historians and imaginative writers) use in the composition of their 
discourses can be shown to be substantially the same, however different they may 
appear on a purely surface, or dictional, level.”204 
 The consequence of all this is that, in White’s view, what we may consider 
“facts” are instead deemed, “constructed: in the documents attesting to the 
occurrence of events, by interested parties commenting on the events or the 
documents, and by historians interested in giving a true account… and 
distinguishing it from what may appear to have happened. It is the “facts” that are 
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unstable, subject to revision and further interpretation, and even dismissible as 
illusions on sufficient grounds.”205 The assertion he derives from an examination of 
nineteenth-century historical consciousness is that all “proper” history or 
historiography is a form of philosophy. Its authors possess no absolute theoretical 
grounds to legitimately claim their authority, and so are forced to choose between 
“contending interpretative strategies.” Consequently “the grounds for choosing one 
perspective on history rather than another are ultimately aesthetic or moral rather 
than epistemological.”206 Historiography to White is primarily a literary genre, 
following literary tropes and conventions, and conforming to genres and poetic 
archetypes that are driven first and foremost by “ideology”. All historical 
discourses, according to this mode of analysis, are forms of “fiction”. All history 
involves storytelling and a plot.207 This means that its claim to possessing real truth 
or objectivity can be seriously challenged. This leads on to his most important 
concept for my purpose, that of the “metahistorical understructure.” White 
postulates a “deep level of consciousness on which a historical thinker chooses 
conceptual strategies,” and describes how the “historian performs an essentially 
poetic act.” This act produces the accessible vision of literature, for the “coherence 
of literature as an event is primarily mediated in the horizon of expectations of the 
literary experience of contemporary and later readers, critics, and authors.” Such 
metahistory, as defined by White, draws to the overlapping forms of nineteenth-
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century historical representation - its “professional” history, museum displays, 
paintings, plays, and eventually films.208 Such is an integrated regime of historical 
representation at work that incorporates both high and low cultural forms. 
While there is a great deal of value in the above approaches, some important 
criticism of it can be noted. It should be pointed out that one very easy 
consequence and extrapolation of these postmodern critiques of history is an 
unbridled, extreme relativism; one that can only end in the deconstruction of all 
accessible meaning. Karl Popper describes historical events as “unique” and “non-
repeatable” processes, without comparable cases - thereby depriving us of much of 
the value of comparisons of past events, or even the study of history itself.209 
Similarly, Lévi-Strauss “called into question claims that Western scientific rationality 
possessed any intrinsic superiority over mythical forms of thinking.” Saussure, 
arguing for the subjectivity of semiotic experience, held that “language shapes 
images of reality but does not refer to it.”210  
The problems with this outlook are manifold. In terms of our ability to 
positively construct a comprehension of the past, they offer very little of use to 
historians, anthropologist, or social scientists - being more concerned with 
emphasizing just how much we can’t say, than suggesting anything useful that we 
can. Such reductionism leads to absurd and self-contradictory extremes. If we take 
White and other deconstructionists too literally, and conclude that historical events 
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exist only in the mind of the historian, then we would also have to conclude that 
there are no connections between different things that happened in the past. By a 
logical irony, this would also render White’s own thematic assemblage of 
nineteenth-century writers invalid, as it reduces such analysis to a reflection of the 
interior of his own mind, rather than the outside world.  
Much of the postmodern critique of Western scientific, rationalist, and 
empiricist historical worldviews is an outgrowth of a progressive ideology that holds 
that their perceived status as “universal truths” has proved a justification for abuses 
of power and authority, is a legacy of colonialism, and a form of cultural 
imperialism.211 This attack on hegemonic Western value systems is a key 
component of a revisionist and rebellious movement in society, the arts, and 
politics.212 It may (or may not) be a valid one in these respects, and is a core 
component of the approach in postcolonial literature.213 However, not all historical 
writing succumbs completely to such distorting ideals of purpose, or an overt 
teleological frame. White’s model works very well for the post-Enlightenment 
writers that reflected and glorified its more Whiggish ideals. It applies very 
effectively to the eloquent, propagandist rhetoric of Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of 
the Roman Empire, and much of the subsequent literature, media and material 
inspired by this - which is precisely why it is a very appropriate model for this thesis. 
It also describes well the histories of the nineteenth century that focused on the 
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medieval world, and which informed the cultural output explored here. The extent 
of their influence was such that the medievalist Norman Cantor argued that “any 
bright American college sophomore who today takes a good survey course on 
medieval history has a better understanding of the components of the medieval 
world than anyone who wrote before 1895.”214  
This approach is not, however, as strong a fit with modern historical 
scholarship, as an academic discipline, which places a more conscious distance 
between itself and the ideals and techniques White placed under the microscope. 
Arthur Marwick puts this point forward by praising White’s “brilliant analysis of the 
rhetorical techniques of some famous early nineteenth-century historians... before 
the emergence of professional history (emphasis added).” Consequently he 
criticised him for showing “very little acquaintanceship with what historians write 
today.”215  
There are a number of important conclusions to be drawn from this 
discussion of history, myth, and literature. Historical writing does not exist 
independently of cultural or social activity, or present an unchanging objective 
truth. Much of it consists of a series of debates between historians, an ongoing 
dialogue on the past. Furthermore, all forms of representation, including the 
historical, are potentially loaded with cultural and ideological values, whether 
latent or more overt. Consequently, a work of history can be treated as a cultural or 
“mythic” text as much as any other. Just as myth involves a negotiation of fact and 
fiction, so history occupies an ambiguous position between art and science, and the 
gap between reality and representation is not always clear.  A critical examination 
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of these traditions of historical scholarship is vital to understanding the very 
material forms that historical representations acquire when translated into other 
cultural media. This is especially true when considering the period of study for this 
thesis, where, as even his critic Marwick had observed, White’s analysis holds 
particular value.  
Without being beholden to its more extreme postulations, much of the 
postmodern critique of history can be integrated into my concept of myth. This is 
not to deny any and all historical objectivity, or reduce it to White’s depiction of a 
rudderless “conceptual anarchy,”216 but simply to argue for its lack of primacy, 
compared to such forms of myth, in defining the cultural historiographical record. 
The value of the above critiques of rigid historical paradigms is not that they abolish 
any meaningful concept of “truth” or “fact”, but that they help soften the 
boundaries between historical discourse and fiction, truth and falsehood, and 
scholarship and propaganda. This allows one to focus on “beliefs” over “realities”, 
and the complex and recursive relationship between historical and artistic 
representations. There is no reason for this approach - and studies of 
representation in general - not to constitute an entirely and perfectly valid field of 
historical study, within the ever-widening remit of the discipline today. 
A final point can be made here about White’s ideas, and the particular value 
they hold to the study of cinema, visual culture, and its connections. As I have 
discussed, strict factual priorities have not always been the primary tool for 
retelling the past. In a culture replete with more visual media, the truth of the 
individual fact is arguably (or, as will be argued) less important than the overall 
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value of the metaphors we create to help us to understand the past. Says Robert 
Rosenstone,  
The historical world created by film is potentially much more complex than written 
text. On the screen, several things occur simultaneously - image, sound, language, 
even text - elements that support and work against each other to create a realm of 
meaning as different from written history as written was from oral history. So 
different that it allows us to speculate that the visual media may represent a major 
shift in consciousness about how we think about our past.217  
 
The idea that film may function as an interconnected text, embodying a 
number of representational forms at once, lends itself to the notion that it has a 
broad base of cultural and textual connections, and benefits the most from an 
interdisciplinary study. It adheres to White’s integrated regime of representation, 
not necessarily as a universal (or reductionist) cultural point, but rather as a trend 
of post-industrial culture that has empowered popular forms of representation, 
especially the visual.    
 
 
Classics and the Vernacular 
One of the themes at play in studies of representation is the long-standing 
debate about the meaning, interpretation, and ultimate value of popular culture. 
The very term “value” is of course itself a contested category, beholden to a 
plurality of meanings. It includes the culture of, or “imposed” on, the “working 
class”; those mass cultural forms unique to post-industrial society; or rural and folk 
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practices, and/or their appropriation and re-articulation in the contemporary 
world.218  
Within this variety of approaches is a debate of particular pertinence, namely 
the perceived disjunction between “high” and “popular” cultural forms. The latter 
have been frequently portrayed as conflicting with traditional ideals of high culture, 
which was famously described by Matthew Arnold as representing, “The best that 
has been thought and said.”219 T.S. Eliot declared that culture is inclusive of 
everything from dog races and Wensleydale cheese, to Gothic churches and the 
music of Elgar: yet he also advocated a system of cultural segregation to maintain 
the division between high and low cultural forms.220 Astonishingly, Eliot also argued 
against encouraging the majority to partake in high culture, as this would 
“adulterate and cheapen” it - consequently its minority status was necessary for its 
very survival and preservation.221 These ideas echo deep-rooted and long-lasting 
fears about allowing the masses to become a dominant force in culture, thereby 
realizing the tyranny of the ignorant majority over cultivated minority taste.222 
More recently, John Storey speaks of seeing “a neo-conservative revival of the 
distinction between high and popular culture.”223  
The long tradition of popular culture being reviled by academics also comes 
from the political left, as embodied in particular by the Frankfurt School, which 
perceived mass culture to be an expression of the dominant ideology of elites: a 
“False Consciousness” generated to secure the stability of exploitative capitalism. 
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Popular cultural forms are seen in this school of thought as ideological weapons, 
fashioned by the owners of the means of cultural production to make capitalism 
appear natural and inevitable. They reflected not the people’s authentic values and 
interests, but the indoctrinating propaganda of their “master’s voice.”224 Kracauer 
in particular took this approach in connecting cinema and representations of the 
pre-industrial world, arguing that films set far in the past were deceptions 
disguising realities about the present day. He believed that the presentation of 
current events in cinema posed a threat to the institutions of power or the 
“excitable masses,” who could potentially turn against those institutions. Therefore 
he suggests that it is in the interests of those institutions to project their attention 
into the remote past of the ancient or medieval worlds to rob them of this 
subversive potential.225  
Debates about culture and value tie intimately into the consideration of how, 
why and even whether antiquity and the classics maintain a presence in the 
modern world.226 The significance of this tradition of learning, derived from the 
culture of the ancient world, has long been deemed to be immense, bordering on 
the sacred. Christopher Higbert describes in The Classical Tradition how without its 
Hellenic heritage “…our civilization would not merely be different. It would be 
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thinner, more fragmentary, less thoughtful, more materialistic… it would be less 
worth to be called a civilization, because its spiritual achievements would be less 
great.”227 This sacrosanct reverence lends itself to a view in which classical 
archetypes are deemed to be a special form of high culture, antithetical to the 
popular. The timeless, universal values of the “classic” are therefore weighted 
against the seemingly mundane and localized interests of popular culture. 
Consequently, the appropriation and reinvention of these formal, sacrosanct texts 
into new, popular, and interpretative dramatic forms has been frequently deemed 
anathema to the classical tradition - an intellectual perversion, portrayed by its 
detractors as “cultural vandalism” and “vulgar attempts to attract students to a 
discipline in crisis,”228 or to the trivial interests of popular culture.229 In Backing into 
the Future: The Classical Tradition and Its Renewal (1994), Bernard Knox describes a 
fear that progressive cultural attitudes threaten to “abolish the cultural traditions 
on which the West’s sense of unity and identity is founded…”, and that “it is only to 
be expected that in this age of cultural dilution, of plastic substitutes, of mindless 
television shows... the genuine article is no longer valued.”230  
Popular culture can easily perceived a threat to the “classic”, and a modern 
form of barbarism.231 As the archetypal “mass medium” of the twentieth century, 
cinema in particular has been a challenge to the more “elite” elements of both high 
culture and “classicism”, and a focal point for much of this disaffection. Many 
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writers and intellectuals have expressed disquiet at the public’s taste for the 
representation of historical and classical romance on-screen.232 Walter Benjamin 
and D.W Griffith’s hopes for the potential of cinema as a principal cultural device 
have constituted some of the worst fears of many traditional classicists.233 Quentin 
Leavis, writing in 1932, outlined the detrimental impact of cinema as alienating 
modern man from the great literature of the past, seducing him with the “frivolous 
stimuli” of “cheap and easy pleasures offered by the cinema.”234 This trend is not 
just confined to representations of the ancient world - Arthur Lindley describes how 
“One could note the absence of books by medievalists as well as books of any kind 
devoted to medieval film.”235  
Popular cultural forms have often then been disregarded by many writers, 
historians and intellectuals as a means for constructing the past - or a past - that 
might have a legitimacy and value of its own. The superficially exciting allure of 
popular media leave them open to qualitative judgments of its worth. Yet it has 
become increasingly recognized that one cannot ignore popular culture in favour of 
“high” or “elite” materials, because, subjective aesthetic considerations aside, the 
former far better illuminates broader social and historical phenomena. The 
centrality of popular culture to contemporary society and the modern state is 
increasingly being emphasized by theorists. This more contemporary approach to 
“culture” eschews value judgments about its intellectual worth, and instead focuses 
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on its anthropological treatment, as the lived experience and activities of a society, 
and the meaning and values implicit in them.236 This is where my considerations of 
Strauss and Geertz, and the relationship between history and myth, become so 
important, as these approaches both demonstrate the worth of popular culture, 
and provide us with the conceptual tools to comprehend its value. “Classics” itself 
involves the study of ancient forms of popular culture; arena tournaments, “street 
latin,” and graffiti from the walls of Pompeii have all been the subject of extensive 
study. As T.S Eliot put it, “Even the humblest material artefact… is an emissary of 
the culture out of which it comes.”237   
If we assume that mass cultural artefacts have to satisfy commercial 
imperatives and compete in a market for public attention - in contradiction to the 
extreme dismissals of the Frankfurt school - then they can prove to be powerful 
indices for public concern. Popular culture occupies an increasingly central position 
in society. Being vernacular does not make it peripheral. It is crucial to note that in 
modern (post-industrial) times, mass production and mass popular culture has 
subsumed society and become the salient feature of social life. Symbolic production 
is a central component of this post-industrial economy. We live in a world deluged 
with images, where the bulk of people’s ideas about the past come from cinema 
and television - feature films, documentaries, news programmes and the like. 
Consequently, the centrality of popular culture and visual culture to modern society 
is being increasingly emphasized by historians and intellectuals. Vachel Lindsay was 
already describing America, in 1919, as utterly transformed by photography, 
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cinema and advertisements into a “hieroglyphical” civilization resembling Egypt.238  
Umberto Eco describes us as a civilization “now accustomed to thinking in images… 
It is the visual work (cinema, videotape, mural, comic strip, photograph) that is now 
part of our memory.”239 
Within this new paradigm, popular culture becomes an ideal barometer for 
shared social experience. Seen in this light, one does not need to focus on how film 
- and other, related forms of representation - gets the past wrong, or theorise on 
the purpose of film as a presentation of the past, or what it should do for the past, 
or how it “should” construct history. Rather, it is better to be concerned with how 
historical filmmakers have been working, and grasp the rules of engagement by 
which history is rendered on screen, and elsewhere outside of academic treatises.  
David Morgan regards it as shaping a crucial part of society’s collective memory, by 
which he means that the cultural artefacts surrounding us in everyday life can tell 
us about who we are: “by shaping our memories of the people, places, institutions, 
and events that have formed our lives - often in utterly forgettable yet tenacious 
ways.”240 
All these ideas acknowledge the significance and potential power of popular 
cultural forms. As a symbolic source for modern times, and a central component of 
our cultural consciousness, it can be considered to denote deep, commonly held 
myths and mores. All this makes distinctions of “high” and “popular” rather 
redundant, at least in regard to social and cultural value, and the underlying 
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complexity of the processes involved.241 Cultural theorist Colin MacCabe contends 
that, “Those who isolate themselves within the narrow and exclusive traditions of 
high art… can only expect a narrow understanding of the breadth and complexity of 
culture.”242 The totality of a division on aesthetic grounds can also be questioned. It 
can be seen as the means by which ephemeral ideologies are accorded the status of 
eternal values. In Notes on Deconstructing the Popular, Stuart Hall argues that the 
distinction between high and popular, or ideal and substandard, works to legitimize 
class distinctions and hierarchy.243 Cultural categories themselves are not frozen 
but fluid, and subject to the whim of historical contingency. Cornerstones of the 
“high” cultural tradition, such as Shakespeare, were never written or intended to be 
venerated. And it is one thing to intellectually dismiss adaptations such as Ridley 
Scott’s Gladiator (2000) - but what about Jean-Luc Godard’s sophisticated, self-
referential Le Mepris? (1963). Just as drama and theatre did in an earlier age, in the 
face of much traditional opposition, so cinema has proven itself as a vehicle for 
creative and artistic talents.244  
In recent centuries, classically-influenced texts and commentaries have 
changed enormously, as the very conception of “classics” and the classical world 
has been varyingly understood. Furthermore, the range of what has been deemed 
to count as classics has been constantly defined and redefined. Mary Beard and 
John Henderson define the field as “a subject that exists in that gap between us and 
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the world of the Greeks and Romans.”245 Consequently, its aim can be seen as not 
just the uncovering of the ancient world, but defining and debating our own 
relationship to that world. This leaves it more open to discussing novel cultural 
forms, such as cinema, than the historically rigorous parameters of “classicism” 
would naturally appear to allow. In this vein, Martin Winkler describes classics as “a 
versatile and exciting discipline, capable of combining methods of traditional 
scholarship with an openness to modern critical thought in its approaches to the 
ancient cultures and to the classical tradition.”246  
Decoupling the distinctions between high and popular culture in this way 
allows for a richer academic engagement with the wide array of cultural discourses 
between the ancient and modern world. It enables a productive exchange between 
scholarship on ancient culture and cultural theories of the popular. These are 
different, though interrelated, fields of inquiry; drawing on similar material, but 
which is filtered through the lenses of different societies, and calibrated to a 
changing set of social and cultural criteria.  
From this discussion I can draw on an important idea for my purpose. The 
history of the reception of antiquity cannot ignore its modern cultural formations, 
extensive and all-pervading as they are. Both high and low culture meld fact and 
fiction. Classical representations pervade not just high culture but all culture: this 
process is not composed solely or primarily of elite responses, but ranges across the 
cultural spectrum. Such an approach has far more value to the study of 
contemporary culture and society, and the varied interrelations of past and 
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present, than a narrow focus on “high” culture, or its expression via the concept of 
an innately purer and superior “Classical Tradition.” 
There are a number of valuable approaches to the post-industrial 
representation of antiquity, and these include such interdisciplinary approaches as 
the psychoanalytic, structuralist, political and historical.247 However, the nexus of 
my project is “historical” forms of representations of decline, and their mutual 
relationship. Those artistic/imitative and psychological fields of inquiry commonly 
explored in such studies are of limited importance. Film, however, is central, as it is 
the primary means by which the ancient (and medieval) past is featured in popular 
culture. The reception of antiquity in relation to film has become an increasingly 
vigorous field of study in the past few decades. It was largely initiated by Jon 
Solomon’s The Ancient World in the Cinema (1978), an encyclopaedic study of 
various classical topics in film.248 Research in this field has typically taken two 
directions. There are those works focused on direct representations of the past in 
present cultural texts. For instance Maria Wyke’s Projecting the Past (1997) 
highlights this through a number of case studies: Spartacus, Nero, Cleopatra and 
the city of Pompeii. For example, the book provides a history of how men’s attitude 
to women is displayed in evolving representations of the sexuality of Cleopatra.249 
Most recently there is The Fall of the Roman Empire: Film and History (2009), a 
collection of essays, editing by Martin Winkler, providing a critical re-evaluation of a 
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highly controversial epic film, featuring topics from the representation of Roman 
history onscreen to the contemporary extra-cinematic discourse about Mann’s 
film.250  
A second, more interpretative approach to classical reception has been 
directed at those films, or other visual texts, that are deemed to reflect both the 
archetypal features of classical literature, and new, novel, original, and more 
modern methods of interpretation. Many films that at first sight seem to have 
nothing to do with Greece or Rome can, it is argued, reveal narrative structures or 
archetypal themes familiar since antiquity. This analytical approach is well 
represented in Winkler’s Classical Myth and Culture in the Cinema (2001), a 
collection of essays that present an interpretative study of a variety of approaches 
to cinematic texts which are deemed by the authors to reflect classical literary 
archetypes. For example, Martin Winkler’s “Tragic Features in John Ford’s The 
Searchers” draws out the “Aristotelian” features of tragedy in the stated film. 
Winkler outlines parallels between the social, political, and moral reflections in 
Greek tragedy and the “hero myths” of the American West, and describes the tragic 
and morally ambiguous figure of the Westerner as “a modern reincarnation of the 
archetypal mythic and tragic hero.”251 The Western sees close analogies to Greek 
epic and tragedy, the two foremost classical literary genres. It is crucial for me to 
note that this ideal of representation was itself recognised by one of the most 
significant modern purveyors of the “decline and fall” mythology in his work, 
Anthony Mann, who said in a 1967 interview:  
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You can take any of the great dramas… you can always lay them in the West, and 
they somehow become alive, and this kind of passion and this drama - you can have 
patricide, any kind of -cide... in a Western, and you can get away with it...252 
 
A more radical approach to ancient and modern media is “Film Sense in the 
Aeneid,” in which Fred Mench discusses the “cinematic” style of presentation found 
in selected parts of Virgil’s Aeneid. Mench claims that in Virgil’s use of visual 
techniques, such as the montage, and alternately positioned shots, “Virgil is much 
closer to being a film director than a painter or a dramatist.” Mench compares 
Virgil’s techniques with that of directors Kurosawa and Bergman, a juxtaposition 
which leads to the conclusion that “the flexibility that we associate with the cinema 
is a hallmark of Virgil’s epic.”253  
While these approaches to classical scholarship are far from universally 
appreciated, they now mark one of the dominant attitudes in the study of such 
ancient texts in relation to the contemporary world.  Considerable in scope though 
they are, there are a number of grounds in which it can be considered to fall short. 
It is possessed of ideological motive of its own; namely, the retooling of the 
discipline of classics for the modern world, and a modern audience, and thereby 
ensuring its ongoing survival. An evident purpose of these comparative studies - 
such as between classics and cinema - is to subvert conventional attitudes to 
classicism. Indeed, Rose’s “Teaching Classical Myth and Confronting Contemporary 
Myths,” is an essay on the use of contemporary film in teaching Greek mythology 
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that argues for a progressive and open-minded approach to teaching Greek myth 
through popular culture, with the aim of showing “historical perspective on their 
own society’s cultural production by contrasting it with that of ancient Greece,” and 
engaging students “in critical dialogue with the received conglomerate of ideas, 
beliefs, and ideological practices” of past and present. 254 It is attempting to redeem 
the “worth” of classical representation,255 and can also be related to a broader 
movement to rehabilitate popular culture by finding “high” art values residing in 
low art forms.256 This agenda has also been the most common criticism of this new 
form of reception from traditional classical scholars, who have believed such 
compromises to be unnecessary at best, and “dangerous” or demeaning to the 
form at worst.257 Thus, it is always necessary to keep the contemporary horizon of 
interest of the comparative interpreter in view. This thesis makes a conscious effort 
to avoid these kinds of subjective assessments of quality or worth, taking as its 
premise that the most valuable evaluations of cultural forms are made by those 
who seek not to praise or condemn, but rather to understand. Nevertheless, the 
horizon of interest itself is one highly pertinent to this study, as it is so fundamental 
to the forms that such relevant representations take.258  
With regard to these trends in classical reception, it needs to be reiterated 
here that - critically for the purposes of this study - the theme of “decline and fall” 
has received comparatively little attention in the above approaches. Most 
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scholarship on antiquity in more modern media has been taken up by traditional 
classicists, whose academic background and consequent area of focus is on the 
depiction of a much earlier “high” period of Greco-Roman culture and history. 
Consequently, while there are works on specific relevant topics, for instance a 
recent study of Anthony Mann’s The Fall of the Roman Empire (Paramount Pictures, 
1964),259 there is not yet any coherent synthesis or study of this theme.  
 
 
Film and a Consciousness of Antiquity 
The study of the representation of history as presented through cinema is 
comparatively recent, and has not been uncontroversial. The Hollywood method of 
presenting history has received particular criticism in this regard, both for its 
simplicity, and its tendency to wedge the past into contemporary tropes, slang and 
conventions.260 It has frequently been sidelined in discussions of the development 
of the discipline for these reasons. That Noble Dream (1988), Peter Novick’s survey 
of American historical practices in the last century, has a single reference to motion 
pictures, a letter of complaint from a historian in 1935 to the president of MGM 
about the low scholarly standards of historical films.261  
Those that hold cinema to have some value to the historian can also be 
dismissive of their actual content. Marc Ferro suggests cinema has much to offer 
the historian, but that historical fictions, unlike documentary films, work only as 
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modern-day allegories, with the historical details simply a veneer.262 Pierre Sorlin 
focuses on how and why films reflect their own periods, rather than applying those 
questions to their representation of the past.263 Even classicists, who accord value 
to vernacular interpretations of their subjects, often defend historical films through 
the reasoning that, as they are always contemporary, it scarcely matters which 
historical period has been chosen for cinematic reconstruction.264 If one takes that 
position, then the “history” present in such output is virtually an irrelevance.  
Taken as “literal” presentations of the past, popular portrayals have obvious 
weaknesses. Those representations of ancient Rome that are anchored in historical 
material - for instance Spartacus - are typically presented by means of anachronistic 
frameworks: modern Christian beliefs, modern moral values and especially modern 
romantic ideals are commonplace. But these technical inaccuracies do not rob the 
material of its worth. Films are a lynchpin of popular culture, a pervasive medium of 
cultural and social activity in the modern world. The role of cinema in contemporary 
western culture is very well documented. David Seed argues that, “From its very 
beginnings the cinema has played a special role in defining American culture.”265 By 
the 1910s, Norman K. Denzin says, “American society became a cinematic culture, a 
culture which came to know itself... through the images and stories which 
Hollywood produced.”266  
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The significance here lies in the fact that films are stories that situate us in a 
value-laden world. Cinematic representations are fictions, but fictions that bring up 
a constellation of meanings for their audiences. As every film is a product of its own 
culture, it reflects in some way the mores and concerns of the ordinary people. For 
the past century, cinema has been a revealing index of social and cultural concerns. 
Siegfried Kracauer contended that, “The films of a nation reflect their mentality.” 
German expressionist films suggested a dark and moody angst lurking within the 
cultural flamboyance of Weimer Germany.267 Italian Neo-realism depicts the 
harshness of life in that country after World War II.268 Early Soviet cinema revelled 
in the modernist machine age.269 Different genres have proved radically mutable in 
meaning even where they retained technical and stylistic consistency of form. 
Science fiction evoked communist paranoia in the 1950s and utopian and 
philosophical idealism in the 1960s. Film takes a very prominent position in the 
wider study of classical reception, precisely because the themes of the classical past 
- and the decline from those glories, the fall and loss of that world - are, to the 
modern mind, still so laden with myth and meaning.  
Consequent to all this, film critics and academics have often justified reading 
the films of a particular nation as a manifestation of that nation’s psycho-social 
dispositions. Kracauer described the psychological elements of films in From 
Caligari to Hitler, saying that what films reflect “are not so much explicit credos as 
psychological dispositions - those deep layers of collective mentality which exist 
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more or less below the layers of consciousness.”270 This is an idea crucial to this 
thesis, and which binds much of the social, cultural and historical theorizing I have 
brought to play. As a concept, it echoes the approach of structural anthropology in 
uncovering the inner mentalités of societies; it is also reflected in Hayden White’s 
theory of the “metahistorical understructure.”271   
A final note to make here is that the semiotic-inspired emphasis on signs and 
signifiers in structural anthropology has a particular value in describing 
representations that come from, or were influenced by, the pre-Industrial era. The 
idea of the world as a collection of crafted symbols would have resonated with 
medieval man. In philosophy and science, the “Middle Ages” was dominated by a 
teleology centred on the divine will and purpose, in which nature served as the 
symbolic expression of God’s existence.  Man’s supreme task was redemption from 
the original fall, and a return to an original, harmonious state of being. 
Consequently, everything in the universe was a symbol linked to the spiritual 
destiny of mankind. The world was a collection of signs created by god.272 This also 
makes for a notable comparison to the visual aspects of post-industrial society, 
where through advertising, television, cinema, and all the paraphernalia of mass 
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Film, Mass Culture and Rome 
In regard to the popular cultural presence of antiquity, film has been crucial 
to the formation and wide dissemination of a historical consciousness of ancient 
Rome. Cinematic resurrections of ancient Rome are one of the chief transmitters of 
twentieth-century knowledge of the Roman world. This does not resemble a 
“break” from past cultural traditions, so much as its mediation in a new form. 
Historical film has its roots in the “histories”, literature and novelizations of the 
nineteenth century. Cinema’s representation of Rome in the twentieth-century was 
forged in the discourses of the nineteenth, while film as a medium has its roots in 
the representational forms of that century; it fitted a principle of that period to 
make the past reawaken in the present, and grew out of technologies such as 
engraving, lithography and photography.274  
More broadly, these discourses were part of a wide, integrated and evolving 
regime for representing the past. Classical Antiquity endowed America with the 
legitimacy of a cultural, moral and intellectual tradition linking its “New World” to 
Athenian Democracy. As Maria Wyke points out, “The two nations most prolific in 
the manufacture of cinematic histories of Rome - Italy and the United States - were 
also those that assiduously created a whole array of "invented traditions" to 
connect themselves to a Roman past now appropriated as their own.”275 Cinematic 
reconstructions of Roman history have mirrored both the evolution of their genre 
and industry, and wider cultural and historical developments. In the 1910s they 
sought to legitimize cinema as a new art form, in the 1930s they served as a 
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showpiece for commodities and the bourgeoning consumer culture, and in the 
1950s they came to challenge the assault of television on film industry profits.276  
In the analysis of these trends, it must be noted that the production and 
reception of visual art has long been argued to be a social process, one which 
cannot be explained purely by its internal, aesthetic qualities. Walter Benjamin in 
his 1961 essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” suggested 
that cinema is not only discontinuous with tradition, but wholly disruptive of it, 
challenging the “aura” of traditional texts. Benjamin argued that the qualities of a 
work of art were embedded in its place “in the fabric of tradition.” He claims that, 
“An ancient statue of Venus… stood in a different traditional context with the 
Greeks, who made it an object of veneration, than with the clerics of the Middle 
Ages, who viewed it as an ominous idol. Both of them, however, were equally 
confronted by its uniqueness, that is, its aura.” Such an aura lay in the external 
attributes of the object, not its intrinsic and necessary properties. These included its 
history of ownership, and the progressively primitive, feudal, then bourgeoisie 
structures that mediated its cultural value over the ages. To Benjamin, the 
mechanical reproduction of a text allowed for the “withering of the aura” around a 
work of art. “For the first time in world history,” Benjamin wrote, “mechanical 
reproduction emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on 
ritual.”277 By challenging the sacred aura surrounding and imprisoning a text, it 
democratized access and attitudes to cultural objects, and allowed for a real range 
of human responses (especially, in his Marxian interpretation, the political and 
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revolutionary).278 These ideas can be connected to the debates surrounding 
classicism and the classical tradition, and imagine that the popular appropriation of 
antiquity challenges any sense of “ownership” that scholars, traditionalists and 
cultural “elitists” may feel about the ancient world, literature and classical learning. 
Rosenstone suggests that historical film is troubling and disturbing most 
professional historians, for the simple reason that, “Film is out of the control of 
historians. Film shows that academics do not own the past. Film creates a historical 
world with which the written word cannot compete, at least for popularity.”279 
Filmmaking techniques are comparable to the writings on the explosion of radical 
and subversive ideas - for instance Puritanism - that were unlocked by the invention 
of the printing press. One wonders what Benjamin would have made of the digital 
revolution, which amplifies the easing of production and distribution a hundred-
fold.   
In emphasizing the mass cultural significance of cinema, it should be pointed 
out here that I am drawing a contrast to the aforementioned “auteur” theory in 
regarding films - or at least relatively mainstream ones  - as the outcome of a team 
or social group, rather than an individual’s creativity. Films need a public, have 
financial backers and often appeal to a heterogeneous mass audience, therefore 
they can often be easily seen as reflections of the collective mentality of a nation - a 
historical text that society writes about itself. Film is an inherently collaborative 
medium.  Samuel Bronston, the producer of Anthony Mann’s The Fall of the Roman 
Empire, described his role in the manner: “I consider myself a twentieth-century 
artist whose medium consists of the most complicated elements: armies of talented 
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people, huge financial capital, awesome communication technologies, and a 
collection of creative peers whose brilliance and discipline set a standard of quality 
that is still a global source of inspiration.”280 Because mainstream movies such as 
this were turned out on an assembly-line basis in such massive numbers, tuned to 
appeal to a vast audience base, they were often better indices of public concerns, 
and shared myths and mores, than individually conceived artistic projects of the so-
called auteur.281 On this note, Geoffrey Richards points out that many of the early 
critics of cinema missed out just how well these hugely commercially successful 
films reflect the tastes and attitudes of their audiences.282 Consequently, I am not 
treating the medium as being defined by the interplay of free signifiers, divorced 
from historical realities. Rather, cinema’s very complex relationship to history 
necessitates an interdisciplinary approach. Both films and history are entry points 
to a unified system of culture. 
 
 
Truth and Accuracy in Historical Cinema 
The visual and literary arts, in both high and low culture, have always 
combined fact with fiction when dealing with history: even when purporting to be 
offering an accurate and meaningful account of a historical event or process. This is 
especially true when examining a distant past which is not easily recovered; where 
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the setting is idealised, the proper context, beliefs and motives can be exotic to 
modern audiences, and the sources are fragmentary and obtuse.  
The impulses behind historical cinematic presentation of this sort could be 
varied and competing. There was the pursuit of strict historical authenticity, or the 
communication of some essential, selected historical truth. The importance of the 
authentic haunts discussions of films about the past.283 There is a broad range of 
academic studies about historical film which seek to defend it against charges of 
inaccuracy, and establish criteria for its quality different from those of academic 
historiography. Works that have led this field include those published by Pierre 
Sorlin, Vivian Sobchack and Robert Rosenstone. Academic historians and literary 
critics who comment on historical film recognise that they do not own “the past” - 
and that their past is not necessarily the only one.284 Much academic discourse has 
attempted to banish any discussion of the significance of historical authenticity. 
Robert Rosenstone cautions that “movies occupy a world apart from the historical, 
and if historians trespass onto that realm, they should acknowledge the different 
rules of the game.”285 Nevertheless, this does not mean that the concept of 
authenticity is irrelevant to this discussion - indeed, it is vitally important in how 
“historical” cinematic texts present themselves. Nor can film and history be seen as 
separate and exclusive worlds. It is certainly true that historical films are not 
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academic histories; and, to invert the point, neither are academic histories strictly 
“of” the past, but they are representations governed by their own particular set of 
discursive conditions. The interpenetration of these two fields is therefore a major 
theme in this thesis. Furthermore, perceptions of authenticity are derived from 
those representations of the period, such as an earlier book or studies, which are 
already familiar to the author (and sometimes audience), whether “authentic” or 
not. This is crucial to remember with a text such as Mann’s Fall of the Roman 
Empire, which draws on a familiar array of tropes and pre-existing notions of the 
decline and fall, especially those of Edward Gibbon, in its stated claim to historical 
truth. 
This authenticity therefore takes a number of forms. Directors who make the 
strongest claims for a return to a medieval or otherwise historic reality often draw 
on specific details - such as the armour, heraldry, architecture or other such details, 
to craft a supposedly authentic mise-en-scene of authorisation.286 Whether the 
deeper content is indeed “truthful”, or even intended to be, such a strategy can be 
highly successful in engendering that response. The reception of Jean-Jacques 
Annaud’s 1986 film The Name of the Rose, set in a fourteen-century Benedictine 
Abbey, indicates it largely succeeded in producing the “effect” of authenticity, and 
projected an image of its devotion to historical accuracy. Author Umberto Eco, who 
wrote the book on which the film was derived, did his best to foster the perception 
of the accuracy of The Name of the Rose, describing the desire of the director “to 
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reproduce the period in all its details.”287 The Guardian expressed admiration for 
Annaud’s “obsessive attention to historical authenticity, from specially-woven 
monk’s habits to having all the fillings and crowns removed from the actors’ 
mouths.”288 This desire for authenticity, or “truth” of a sort, is not even unique to 
factual and historical film - it was a much-touted selling point of the Lord of the 
Rings trilogy, and in other examples of “medieval fantasy.”289 D.W Griffith, the 
filmmaker of ancient-themed epics such as Intolerance (Triangle Film Corporation, 
1916) and The Ten Commandments (Paramount Pictures, 1923),290 believed cinema 
had a unique role in transmitting a historical consciousness to the public, and would 
one day usurp history books in that role; its intimacy and immediacy made it a 
powerful and provocative way of capturing the public imagination.291 This is not a 
unique outlook: as David Williams argues, the demand for such authenticity - for 
“the real thing” - works subtly and unconsciously in the minds of all watchers of 
film.292 Alternatively, this “authenticity” could be less a purposeful pursuit than it 
can be a “veneer” or smokescreen, one contrived both for entertainment purposes 
and/or to convey an ideology of some sort.293 Historical film suited this purpose 
particularly well, allowing for a pointed comparison, whether direct or implicit, to 
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be made with the modern world. It can enshrine such comparisons, however trite, 
with the shroud of authority. As William Woods argues, “Our feeling for the 
authentic can be sustained by what seems typical, the kinds of clothes, gestures, 
and so forth that we expect of medieval reality.”294 Film is often cast as “superior” 
to writing as it can bring the illuminations to life by animating them. But it is 
ultimately ideas which are animated, rather than strict realities. This, in fact, is a 
place where the decline and fall holds particular power, as a path through which 
ideological statements are crafted, consciously or implicitly, about the present.  
Exotic and distant, the ancient and medieval worlds catered for this purpose 
in varying ways. Cecil B. DeMille cared greatly about maintaining the visual accuracy 
of his material, but not the content - his characters may wear historically accurate 
garb and drink out of the right goblets, but their dialogue is replete with modern 
slang, and anachronistic assumptions about the lives of the ancients.295 Roland 
Barthes noted the stereotype of the “Roman fringe” - an arbitrary sign, unrelated to 
actual historical practice, which nevertheless serves as a period marker, and 
signifier of Romanitas, or Roman-ness, in certain films set in ancient Rome, such  as 
Joseph L. Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar (1954).296 Medieval artists and audiences 
would have found the Roman fringe an entirely comprehensible signifying system. 
 This kind of “historical myopia” is partly a function of the desire to produce 
films which entertain enough to be commercially viable. It is a common treatment 
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of the subject in cultural and media theory.297 However, it is far from the exclusive 
purpose of history in cinema - even of commercial, epic filmmaking. In particular, 
the concept of authenticity can be central to the ideology of historical cinema - and 
therefore those ancient and medieval films that incorporate the decline and fall 
myth - even and indeed especially where that ideology contrasts to the reality of 
the production, its use of facts and sources, and the intentions of the author. 
It should be noted here that central to many medieval or early-medieval films 
through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is the idea that the Middle Ages 
are represented as a form of prehistory, rather than as part of a secular historical 
narrative. The distinguishing difference in this approach is that it projects a world in 
which the supernatural conjoins with the real. Such cinema is much more likely to 
include miraculous or supernatural events than representations of later historical 
periods. These can be very overt, or embody more implicit examples woven into 
the historical record. Literary inventions such as Arthurian Knights or Siegfried can 
be portrayed as often as historical figures like Charlemagne and Saladin.298 This 
tendency proves almost as common in “historical” representations as it is in purely 
fictional or stories. These frequently belong to the “mode of the marvellous,” 
where the supernatural is accepted as existing within the world by its characters. 
This lack of strict realism explains much of the perceived inferiority of these genres 
of cinema. The cut-off point from this pre-historical time appears to be the 
transition from the Middle Ages to modernity - or what Arthur Lindley describes as 
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“dreamland” and real “history”.299  The genre - if it can be called that - is easily open 
to an injection of fantasy and the supernatural. It fits best to the dream-like 
qualities imposed on the “Dark Ages”; a construct that can stretch in the historical 
imagination over the early medieval world, the “other” fringes of society, and the 
end of Late Roman history, and which also allows one to explore themes of the 
contrast between “barbarity” and civilized values.   
Although historical cinema is by nature different from historiography, there 
are affinities. These, however, are not necessarily the ones argued by its advocates, 
which can resemble an apologetic for the perceived intellectual inferiority of the art 
form. Rosenstone argues that the fictive elements of the historical film should be 
seen as ways of summarizing and symbolizing more complex facts and themes. He 
considers Hollywood films to be both invented and true; “true in that they 
symbolize, condense, or summarize larger amounts of data; true in that they carry 
out the overall meaning of the past that can be verified, documented or reasonably 
argued.”300 On this note, he further argues for relative truthfulness by pushing the 
idea that, “We always violate the past… yet this violation is inevitable, part of the 
price of our attempts at understanding the vanished world of our forebears.”301 In 
the same vein, Winkler describes the essence of cinema as recapturing, not literal 
historical truth, but a “feeling of history.”302  
As with the attempts by some classicists to rehabilitate the aesthetic value of 
popular culture, these arguments for the “inherent” worth, either in artistic merit, 
or historical truth, of a cinematic representation, are not the purpose or primary 
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concern of this thesis. Instead, from my earlier considerations, I can demonstrate 
the value of these representations as indicators of cultural myths and mores; 
insights into the reception and reworking of the past. This value is not in any way 
determined by their ability to capture factual “truth”.    
Furthermore, in the light of postmodern revisions to objective renderings of 
the past, the strict boundaries between film and history are also disappearing. 
Historians have now become receptive to narrative strategies and fictive elements 
in the writing of history. Written history is a subjective and selective process, and 
the recognition of that fact allows for the reconciling of film and history, at least in 
terms of finding common conceptual ground.303 Rosenstone notes that “historians 
are increasingly interested in the visual media as both a competitor and a 
collaborator in our attempt to convey the past to our students and the culture at 
large,” and describes a changing attitude reflected in our conferences and journals 
towards film, noting that “major journals in the field regularly publish reviews and 
essays on film, panels on films are held at annual scholarly meetings, and entire 
conferences have been devoted to history and film in various countries...”304 He 
does, however, point out the inconsistency present in these academic observations, 
noting that:   
Judgements about historical value are made on wildly divergent grounds - accuracy 
of detail, the use of original documents, the appropriateness of music, the looks or 
apparent suitability of an actor to play someone who’s body language, voice and 
gestures we can never know from the historical record - all of these may be invoked 
in praising or damning a film in the pages of journals like the American Historical 
Review and the Journal of American History.305  
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The mediating dynamic of the motion picture has become a vehicle for 
historians (and classicists) to reinterpret, sometimes radically, the role of their 
discipline. Historical film must be taken seriously on its own terms; as an 
interpretation and poetic speculation on the past, and a key component of a wider 
cultural discourse with that past that frames our relationship to it. The analysis of 
historical film, and all forms of historical representation, opens up not one but two 
avenues of inquiry - the study of contemporary society through the representation 
of the past, and, less overtly, the study of the modern transmission of historical 
consciousness. These representations make up a “cultural historiography” of their 
own, as a tradition in which culture acts as the primary agent in the ongoing 
reception by the present about the past. They shadow and shape the collective 
historical imagination. In this study, this force can be witnessed in the evolving 














CHAPTER TWO: THE FALL OF ROME AND IDEAS OF DECLINE 
 
 
The Tradition of Decline 
In order to approach the subject of the decline and fall as a representational tool, I 
first have to consider what, historically and culturally, the term “decline”, and 
related concepts of decadence and corruption, have signified.306 The idea of decline 
contains within it a theory about the nature and meaning of time and temporal 
change; as does the countervailing notion of “progress”, which receives vastly more 
discussion in academic literature on historiography and the philosophy of history. 
Much more has been written on the idea of progress than on notions of historical 
decline: the origins, forms, and significance of the myth of the decline and fall have 
attracted considerably less attention. This may be an indication that progress is the 
more distinctive conviction of “the modern mind” - or at least that academic 
representations of the concept have been built around this idea. Studies of the idea 
of progress constitute a proper, coherent field, complete with its “classic”,307 its 
later revisions, and schools of thought on both. Such work as there is on historical 
pessimism and ideas of decay or decadence remains quite fragmentary, without 
conventional boundaries or, usually, a common title.308  
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Yet the two ideas and traditions are two sides of the same coin. Every theory 
of progress contains a theory of decline - seemingly inevitable historical laws, 
whether secular or supernatural, can just as easily reverse as move forward; or 
embody the metaphor of the ever-revolving wheel. Lurking underneath a theory 
about decline is usually one about progress, and vice versa. As Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer describes it, “The curse of irresistible progress is irresistible 
regression.”309 Yet the academic focus is not necessarily suggestive of its wider 
significance or appeal. Randolph Starn put the point across thus: 
The most systematic student of “the idea of progress” has found it not only very 
widespread in Western thought; he has also ventured to suggest that almost all 
Western theories of decline turn out to be theories of contingent progress. One 
conclusion follows from the other.  
 
The result of this principle, then, is the ubiquity of decline narratives: 
Neither beliefs in progress nor historical relativism seem to make much head-way 
against commonplace talk of political, economic, or cultural “decline” and of 
“decadent” morals, literature, or art. Doubt has ways of springing quite as eternal 
as hope; and the belief in progress may actually encourage it, since criteria for 
measuring progress can easily be turned around to detect decline.310 
 
Where this discussion finds a special purpose in this thesis is that the 
prototype of these narratives tends to be found, wholly or partly, in the 
representation of the later history of Rome. If the heights of classical civilization 
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concealed or indeed fostered a slow inner decline, if the achievements of the 
ancients produced the means for their own destruction, if decadence and decay 
proved inescapable and fatal, then surely, this logic goes, modern society, or the 
“modern” world of an author contemporary to it, could be in danger of walking 
down the same road. It therefore presents one of the most powerful, and creatively 
pliable, counters to a theory of progress - with an example of how such apparent 
progress can go wrong. It is worth noting the above point Starn makes about the 
popular appeal of such ideas, regardless of academic or intellectual trends; or, if I 
am again to invoke Strauss, the “latent” and buried qualities present in ideas and 
representations of progress. Starn suggests that the very language of decline itself 
invites historical comparison: 
In a static sense the logic of “de-cline” posits disjunction from some norm. It implies 
comparison and contrast between higher and lower or normative and “other” 
points. Applied to history, this suggests or even forces comparison and contrast in 
time or type between republican and imperial Rome, for instance, or between 
Augustus and his successors.311 
 
I can lead this observation into a much broader insight, that the language and 
idea of decline, specifically when tied to the Roman example, has comparison so 
deeply embedded in its meaning, origin, and continued usage, that the process has 
become fundamental to the very idea of the fall. Virtually every social and cultural 
author and commentator who discusses the theme falls into a comparison with 
their own period, whether unconsciously or through explicit intent. In an academic 
and cultural context, the word myth is by far the most appropriate term to describe 
this.  
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Neither the belief in progress nor postmodern and relativist trends in history 
and culture have made much impact against the presence in high and popular 
culture, of political, economic, or cultural decline, and of decadent morals, 
literature, or art. From Hesiod and Thucydides to St. Augustine and Orosius, 
Montesquieu and Gibbon, Bruni and Machiavelli, Spengler and Toynbee, some of 
the most significant historical speculation and narratives, influential far outside 
their original academic and intellectual field, have been phrased in terms of decline. 
The word “decline” is not necessarily one that covers everything historical 
(and cultural) decline may imply. The “decline and fall” is by far a smaller subset of 
this idea. Furthermore, it is only one familiar term for many approaches in historical 
discourse. The concept of historical decline, like most historiographical themes, 
cannot be contained so easily within neat academic territories. As a term, “decline” 
has a logic which lends itself to speaking about historical experience, and on a 
deeper level, latent value assumptions and ideologies. While it can be either secular 
or theological in final form - or a complex mix of the two - it typically resembles the 
trappings of a “theology” in its sense moral authority and teleological purpose.  
This logic relates to networks of ideas, concepts and images. The language, 
ideas, and schemata of historical decline may be connected in turn with the 
situations and needs of individuals and groups using them. If the theme has several 
levels, then a variety of strategies should be deployed in trying to understand it, 
lending the concept, even in a highly specific form, to an interdisciplinary study.  
Essential to defining the scope and field of the relevant material underlying 
this myth is the idea of a long cultural tradition around the “decline and fall” that 
connects Augustine to Gibbon to Gladiator. It takes a multitude of connected 
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forms, some very localized in theme - such as the political decline of Rome, and its 
relevance to the contemporary world of the author, whether Machiavelli or 
Anthony Mann - and others that are more overtly universal in scope. Decline as an 
idea draws a long arc through history, and some conception of a decline and fall 
exists through most creationist and other stories of theological origin. Views of a 
cosmic decline from grace are an ancient component of theological narratives of 
the cosmos. They are present in the classical schema of Hesiod, in the now-dead 
myths of Platonists, Manicheans and Persian Zoroastrians, and countless other 
religious traditions, the Hellenic timeline of four “ages”, each worse than the last - 
Gold, Silver, Bronze, and then an Iron Age of universal wickedness. Both the Old and 
New Testaments outline a narrative of history from creation to the foreseen second 
coming. Godfrey Goodman’s The Fall of Man, or the Corruption of Nature Proved by 
the Light of our Natural Reason (1616), describes how “nature now beginning to 
decay, seems to hasten Christ’s coming,” and provides extensive and detailed 
examples of this decay from ancient and more contemporary times to justify the 
continuing cosmic fall from grace.312 Religion and even secular authorship so 
frequently harkens back to a lost “golden age” that the idea has been readily 
imbibed in literary and cinematic production.313 
Ancient and medieval sensibilities on decline took a number of forms. Firstly, 
there is the idea of cosmic decline:  the slow decay of the universe, the old age and 
unwinding of the world. Such ideas are seeded throughout Judaeo-Christian 
theology and profoundly shaped the concept of the decline and fall of Rome, an 
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idea with latent theological dimensions, even when taking secular form. This is both 
directly - as in the comparisons of Augustine, discussed below - and through 
precedents and archetypes. The Bible provides us with the fall from Eden,314 
Daniel’s prophecy of four empires,315 and the apocalyptic end times foretold in 
Revelations. Roman Catholic biblical exegesis affirms the fall of man as a primeval 
event, the beginning of the history of man that forever defined it.316 This first and 
original sin was “transmitted” by Adam and Eve to their descendants, causing 
humans to be “subject to ignorance, suffering and the dominion of death, and 
inclined to sin.”317 Although the state of corruption, inherited by humans from the 
primeval event of Original Sin, is clearly called “sin”, it is understood as a defect 
inherited in the unity of all humans through the descent from Adam, rather than as 
the product of personal responsibility. Even children, therefore, share in the guilt 
and sin of Adam; but not in its responsibility, as sin is always a personal act.318   
Morality is deeply involved in this type of religious framework, and in that 
vein is the tradition of flood myths - moral purges of decadence by the divine will - 
that originated in Mesopotamia and spread to Greece. However, ideas of moral 
decline also have a secular dimension. The transition from a life of simplicity and 
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virtue to one of luxury and decadence is frequently lamented. The corruption of the 
simple life, and the Roman nobility, features prominently in Tacitus.319 The 
Humanist Leonardo Bruni in the fifteenth century followed Tacitus in ascribing the 
decline of the Roman Empire to the loss of liberty, and consequent decline of virtue 
and morals, following the end of the Republic: a threat he saw in danger of being 
repeated in his own time.320 Gibbon, too, saw the universal value in his analysis of 
the corruption of Rome.321  
The decline of Rome therefore became a paradigm for interpreting the 
decline of other states. In doing so, its authors could argue for a powerful re-
evaluation of present institutions and their claim to authority, in any form. If Rome 
had declined, then the model of the Roman Empire could not be thought of as the 
sole or primary precedent on which medieval and modern foundations were to be 
built or justified. It thus deprived agencies which had claimed continuous authority 
from Rome in later ideals of political and social order - notably, but by no means 
exclusively, the Papacy and Holy Roman Empire - of some of their mystique.322 This 
revisionist model proved just as useful for criticizing the later claims of post-
Enlightenment Britain and the United States.  
As an eschatological and prophetic myth, the belief in the imminence of end 
times is one of the oldest theological traditions, one the persistent failure of the 
world to end did little to diminish - traditional notions of cosmic decline have been 
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rewritten to accommodate new realities, often political and social. Salvian, a 
Christian ecclesiastical writer of the fifth century, blames the miseries befalling the 
Western Roman Empire in its last decades on the neglect of God's commandments 
and the terrible sins now endemic to every class of society. Slaves are depicted as 
thieves and runaways, wine-bibbers and gluttons - but the rich are even worse.323 It 
is their harshness and greed that drive the poor to join the Bacaudae and fly for 
shelter to the barbarian invaders.324 As he says, “Everywhere taxes are heaped 
upon the needy, while the rich escape comparatively free.”325 Contemporary 
historians do not deem this a reliable social account: Salvian is a writer concerned 
with telling a moral tale, where the empire has been ruined by a slew of vices, 
including its love of debauchery and public entertainment.326 However, its themes 
and judgements are precisely those which have cropped up so often since. 
The most important scheme of history here, with regard to the perceived 
providential fortunes of the Roman Empire, was the Six Ages of the World, 
described in Augustine’s De Catechizandis Rudibus (On the Catechizing of the 
Uninstructed), XXII, and in more general terms in De Civitatas Dei (City of God). 
Mirroring the six days of creation, the sixth age denotes the time from the coming 
of Christ to the End Days, making the current period also “End Times” and a presage 
of the eschatological finish.327    
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Augustine’s approach to the empire plays a fundamental role in shaping the 
moralistic and spiritual critique of the later Roman Empire.328 Notably, in City of 
God he attacked the Christian eschatological myth of an eternal Roman Empire, and 
reduced its providential significance to that of any other human power, which on 
the cosmic scale were always fleeting and ephemeral. Augustine refused to accept 
Rome’s moral qualities as having been any better than their predecessors. True 
virtue is impossible without true religion as, “What kind of mistress over the body 
and the vices can a mind be that is ignorant of the true god, but instead is 
prostituted to the corrupting influences of vicious demons?”329 And so the Romans, 
blind to the one god, were led astray by philosophers given over to idle speculation, 
and the temptation of demons.  
While deeply influenced by the major Classical historians such as Tacitus and 
Sallust, Augustine sees the rise of Rome primarily as the result of a simple, abstract 
law governing the rise of every earthly state, namely a rough balance of virtue over 
vice that produces an expansionist mentality: thus he compares the ascendancy of 
Rome with the earlier successes of the aggressive Assyrians. Consequently, the 
continued existence of Rome was not a necessary precondition to the triumph of 
Christianity on earth. He condemns the citizens of the early Empire for embracing 
polytheism and suggests that its later continuing “decline” is down to surviving 
pagan elements in society (i.e. as in the fact that Rome, still a bastion of the old 
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faith, was sacked rather than a “purged” city such as Carthage or Constantinople); 
Christianity has to survive independent of the continued existence of Rome, 
because the empire is too morally degenerate to carry the torch of the true faith 
forever.330 Such an approach grants Augustine his relevance to later, and even 
Gibbonian representations of this subject. It is entirely possible to draw on the 
human (if not strictly “secular”) and moral aspects of his judgments, separate from 
the strict Christian philosophy. Indeed, Augustine did not perceive the religious 
failings of either the pagan or Christian empire as the reason for their doom, or as 
necessitating divine purpose in their downfall. The mind of God, we are told, is too 
mysterious to be reduced to such a simple human causation.331 When compared 
with other classical, pagan historians, Augustine’s work strips Roman history of its 
mythical aura; he attempts to “secularize” our understanding of the Empire and 
regards it as a finite, flawed state whose function within God’s plan is not absolute 
or eternal.332 
While these approaches above are predominantly theological narratives, the 
emphasis on imperfection, decadence, and decline also functions as a universal 
theme - a spiritual and moral subsurface to even ostensibly secular accounts. 
Christian writers added excited visions of the Apocalypse to Roman moods and 
terms.333 Reaching for an antiquity he intensely perceived as now lost, Petrarch 
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reworked or ignored medieval chronologies of continuity, or Augustine’s six ages of 
universal history. He saw a more meaningful break between the Roman Republic 
and the Empire as the seeds of a “decline and fall” - then between the classical 
world, encompassing both these, and the period of darkness extending to his own 
time in the fourteenth century. Petrarch could not only sense historical 
discontinuity; his sensibility gave him historical perspective for a new periodization 
of history which disconnected the condition of the present with the past.334  
With respect to “decline”, Petrarch helped foster the notion that European 
culture had stagnated and drifted into what he now called the “Dark Ages,” since 
the fall of Rome in the fifth century - represented both physically by the loss of 
priceless classical texts, but also in the corruption of the language and culture of 
contemporary discourse and debate.335 While retaining the theme of decline from 
the apogee of ancient Rome, Petrarch's division was not based on theology, but on 
a perception of cultural and political decline - ideas which proved critical to the 
evolution of this myth, and whose core characteristics remain central to it.336 His 
intellectual successors formalized the insight, applying an explicit vocabulary of 
decline, and suite of associated concepts, to Roman history and to what they began 
to see as the Middle Age coming after it.337 Such an idea could also be extended to 
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the expanding spatial horizons of the Renaissance. When humanists set a decline 
between themselves and the ancients, classical or Late Antiquity could become 
quite as much a new and “other” world as the Americas. European imaginations 
persisted in transforming new-found peoples into the classical barbarians, noble 
savages, and virtuous or vice-ridden Romans of classical literature.338  
The decline of Rome from its material and spiritual zenith also lends itself to 
the idea that such virtues, while lost in the empire’s moral decay, could 
nevertheless be somehow revived. Rome’s (often self-purported) successors and 
imitators took up the mission of establishing, re-establishing, or at least imagining a 
universal empire or culture that would be global and harmonious. The idea is 
present in that central Christian image of Christ on Judgment Day, the “king of 
kings” into whose universal and permanent empire all previous and present ones 
would be dissolved. To Christians of Late Antiquity, Rome’s universal empire had 
seemed to presage Christ’s katholikos or “universal” Church. In the words of 
Prudentius, the Roman Christian poet from the fourth century, “What is the secret 
of Rome’s historical destiny? Is it that God wills the unity of mankind? God has 
taught the nations to be obedient to the same laws and to all become Romans… 
This is the meaning of all the victories and triumphs of the Roman Empire: the 
Roman peace has prepared the way for the coming of Christ.”339  
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Gibbon’s Decline and Fall 
The most important single source for the decline and fall myth comes from 
Edward Gibbon. Not only does he represent its most influential and iconic 
formulation, but the historian is frequently and directly invoked by intellectuals or 
filmmakers throughout the period relevant to this thesis, right up to the present 
day. Exactly what his theory of the decline and fall constitutes therefore warrants 
considerable attention.  
Before Gibbon, the chief emphasis in much Late Antique and Medieval 
historiography had been on the translatio imperii, the “transfer of rule,” or the 
passing on of the heart of civilization: from pagan to Christian Rome, from the 
Roman Empire to the Holy Roman Empire, and from pax Romana to pax 
Christiana.340 In this philosophy, Roman history and culture had changed, 
developed, even declined from its highs; but it did not necessarily collapse into 
oblivion and ruin. Gibbon, however, initiated a new phase in the retrospective 
contemplation and moralizing interpretation of the Roman Empire. It is in Gibbon 
that the decline and fall myth emerges in its consolidated, coherent form - and one 
with a clearly comparative purpose.   
In the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire Gibbon wrote a prose epic, in 
which the panorama of historical experience is viewed on a universal, yet highly 
subjective scale. The title of his work reflects the concerns of the time: it is less a 
work of “history” in the narrow or descriptive sense than a broad treatise on human 
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nature, its triumphs and failings, and highly notable for how much it is indicative of 
contemporary concerns, rather than the remote past it describes.341 Gibbon took as 
his theme the central episode of the apocalyptic, Augustinian view of history - the 
fall of the Roman Empire – with the caveat that where Augustine was the 
preeminent theologian of the early Christian Church, Gibbon’s vision was decidedly 
secular.  
Gibbon’s influence on intellectual history has been extensive. The main 
evidence for this is the fact that “the decline and fall of the Roman Empire” has 
become a standard expression. This idea took hold of the popular imagination as a 
consequence of the man’s enormous historiographical influence. As Bowersock put 
it: “it is Gibbon… who dominates discussion of the subject today… our modern 
obsession with the fall of Rome not only began in the eighteenth century but also, 
as most of us have known it, bore the Gibbonian stamp.”342 But the concept and 
study of the decline and fall of Rome itself also has a long history. It has been stated 
by Walter Goffart that Gibbon's problem was “discovered” when an observer such 
as the sixth-century historian Zosimus could put Rome behind him as past 
history.343 The record of fairly explicit usage of this comparison, in relation to 
classical decline, begins in later medieval encounters with the Roman past and 
present. The twelfth-century chronicler Otto of Freising, generalizing from the 
example of Rome, reflected on the decline of worldly empire as an immutable cycle 
in the metaphor of a turning wheel: “if it is at its height, soon it will need to 
                                                          
341
 Hugh Trevor-Roper writes at length on its relevance to contemporary concerns in his introduction 
to a recent edition of Gibbon’s work, see Gibbon (1993), pp. liii-xcvii.  
342
 Bowersock (1996), p. 30 and pp. 36-37. 
343
 Walter Goffart, “Zosimus, the First Historian of Rome’s Fall,” American Historical Review, LXXVI 
(1971), pp. 412-442.  
136 
 
decline.”344 Physical ruin, historical fall and universal fate were linked as early as the 
famous epigram by Bede: “Quandiu stabit coliseus, stabit et Roma; quando cadit 
coliseus, cadet et Roma; quando cadet Roma, cadet et mundus.”345 This idea of the 
rise and fall of states and societies was an integral part of ancient theorizing about 
the cyclical nature of history and the fate of states - revived in Renaissance 
historiography by authors such as Leonardo Bruni and Flavio Biondo.346  
Such discussions tied in with the subject of Rome’s fall and speculation as to 
its causes. Machiavellli, who coined the term the “five good emperors” for the reign 
of Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius, marked the 
transition to hereditary succession as the ruin of the empire, stating that, “From the 
study of this history we may also learn how a good government is to be established; 
for while all the emperors who succeeded to the throne by birth, except Titus, were 
bad, all were good who succeeded by adoption, as in the case of the five from 
Nerva to Marcus. But as soon as the empire fell once more to the heirs by birth, its 
ruin recommenced.”347 In 1734, Montesquieu famously expressed it in his 
Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline. 
Montesquieu emulates the Roman historian Sallust in emphasizing “corruption” 
(though he discussed economic factors in mirroring it with the “decline of Spain” in 
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the seventeenth century). This is a work Gibbon knew well, and whose influence on 
the man is well documented.348  
It is important to note in this context the historical periodization of the “Dark 
Ages,” one emphasizing the cultural and economic deterioration in Europe 
following the supposed decline and fall of the Roman Empire. The label employs 
Manichean light-versus-darkness imagery to contrast the darkness of that period 
with both earlier and later ages of light, in respect to their culture and civilized 
values.349 The term itself mainly derives from the Latin saeculum obscurum, applied 
by Caesar Baronius in 1602 to a tumultuous period from the ninth to the eleventh 
centuries after the fall of the Carolingian Empire.350 It is rarely used by historians 
nowadays because of the value judgment it implies - though sometimes meant to 
suggest that little was known of the period, it’s more common pejorative sense is of 
a period of intellectual darkness and barbarity.351 It also echoes a disdain for the 
medieval world, and - as is especially important to note - a need to both emphasize 
and account for the “Roman decline” that preceded and enabled it. Robert Bartlett 
describes how “Disdain about the medieval past was especially forthright amongst 
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the critical and rationalist thinkers of the Enlightenment. For them the Middle Ages 
epitomized the barbaric, priest-ridden world they were attempting to 
transform.”352 Gibbon expressed contempt for the “rubbish of the Dark Ages.”353  
By contrast, from the late seventeenth century onwards, Enlightenment ideas 
had secured the belief that civilization was finally progressing beyond the 
achievements of the classical world.354 This allowed for history to be seen as a 
teleological train of progress that began after the collapse of antiquity, through the 
Middle Ages, gathered momentum in the Renaissance and reached its pinnacle in 
the Enlightenment and Age of Reason. The problem, therefore, of what brought the 
ancient world to ruin haunted many of the philosophers and historians of the 
Enlightenment.355 Imperial nations from the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
onwards were driven to social and cultural self-examination because, in their eyes, 
it appeared hard to blame anyone except the Romans themselves for the collapse 
of their great empire and civilization. 
Consequently, the final fate of the Roman Empire fortified an anxiety in 
Gibbon and successive writers that in their civilization’s greatest moments of 
triumph lay the seeds of its own destruction. Thirty-eight of the seventy-one 
chapters are devoted to the decline of the “primary” empire, up to 476 AD, and 
discuss different kinds of decline operating at different speeds. In his “General 
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Observations” - which, while featuring half-way through the work, was written 
before the publication of the first volume356 - he contemplates whether or not 
Enlightenment Europe could fall into a political and cultural nadir.357 Earlier in the 
text, he suggests that, “This awful revolution (of the decline and fall of Rome) may 
be usefully applied to the instruction of the present age.”358 To Gibbon, the history 
of Rome was of universal significance and possessed a profound symbolic value. It 
was an event so momentous, so revealing of profound truths of human nature, that 
it was applicable to other societies at other times. The historian wrote in the 
opening paragraph of Chapter I that the fall of Rome was “a revolution which will 
ever be remembered, and is still felt by the nations of the earth.”359 It is not purely 
or even primarily a work about the Roman Empire, but a lesson for British and 
European society in the failings of a past civilization; comparable at least in part in 
its greatness, yet still undone. It is a series of moral judgments about how society 
should be ordered, and how it falls into disorder when its rules, principles and 
values come undone. Such judgments, we will see, rise up again and again in 
representation of decline and fall. This theme, and moral lesson, is what stitches 
together a narrative that spans 1000 years of history and almost two million words; 
a delineation of Gibbon’s personal conception of history and human nature, in 
respect to the historical processes that both engender and result from Rome’s 
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decline and fall.360 The combination of the monumental size and reputation of his 
work, coupled with its provocative and judgemental tone, is precisely what has 
made it such an ideal text and reference point for later authors and 
commentators.361 It purports to be “history” in the strict, technical, academic sense, 
and bears the weight of such a reputation - but at the same time, bears all the 
hallmarks of a moral and ideological myth or story, in the terms I have defined.  
This contrast between its appearance, image and reality make it a powerful 
source for comparing the fall of Rome to the perceived iniquities and failings of the 
present. Gibbon is a philosophical historian in the semi-heretical tradition that can 
be traced back to Giannone and Machiavelli. The work is full of contemplative 
judgements of human affairs that show the author as a man of the Age of Reason; 
he is a polished and derisive sceptic who uses his skill with humour and wit to subtly 
convey highly controversial notions and opinions, particularly concerning 
Christianity, both objectively as an ideology and in its historical role in the fall of 
Rome. In this sense he carries on the offensive against Christianity begun by 
Voltaire and the Parisian tradition, by fashioning a conception of history built 
around his own humanist, empiricist, and moral ideals.362  
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In the first fifteen chapters of the Decline and Fall, Gibbon is preoccupied with 
setting the scene for what he sees as the irreversible stages of the late fourth and 
fifth centuries by outlining the political, cultural and geographic reality of the 
classical empire and the discord of the third century. From this emerges the 
administrative re-organisation of Diocletian and, most importantly to Gibbon, 
Constantine and the adoption of Christianity as the official religion of the Empire. 
Throughout this part of the book Gibbon has a clear overall scheme, purpose and 
objective; he is not writing blind, but fashioning a grand narrative in which clear 
reasons are delineated for - and lessons learnt from - the decline of the empire that 
preceded its fall. The five Antonine dynasty emperors who ruled from AD 96-180 - 
Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius - he identified for the 
starting point of his account, arguing, “It is the design of this, and of the two 
succeeding chapters, to describe the prosperous condition of their empire; and 
afterwards, from the death of Marcus Antoninus (i.e. Marcus Aurelius), to deduce 
the most important circumstances of its decline and fall...”363 
This long period of grace is described as the highest state, not merely of the 
population of the empire, but of mankind as a whole, for, “If a man were called to 
fix the period in the history of the world, during which the condition of the human 
race was most happy and prosperous, he would, without hesitation, name that 
which elapsed from the death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus.”364 As he 
goes on to outline in idealised terms,  
The vast extent of the Roman empire was governed by absolute power, under the 
guidance of virtue and wisdom. The armies were restrained by the firm but gentle 
hand of four successive emperors, whose characters and authority commanded 
                                                          
363
 Gibbon (1993), I, p. 3. 
364
 Op. cit., I, p. 43.    
142 
 
involuntary respect. The forms of the civil administration were carefully preserved 
by Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, and the Antonines, who delighted in the image of liberty, 
and were pleased with considering themselves as the accountable ministers of the 
laws. Such princes deserved the honor of restoring the republic, had the Romans of 
their days been capable of enjoying a rational freedom. 
 
The peak state of classical civilization, however, also proved to be the catalyst 
of its undoing. The summit of prosperity attained by the Antonines is considered to 
contain within it the seeds of its own decay; the very peace and prosperity that the 
system had created bred a corruption and complacency that sapped the strength of 
the empire. Thus, 
The long peace, and the uniform government of the Romans, introduced a slow and 
secret poison into the vitals of the empire. The minds of men were gradually 
reduced to the same level, the fire of genius was extinguished, and even the 
military spirit evaporated. The natives of Europe were brave and robust… their 
personal valour remained, but they no longer possessed the public courage which is 
nourished by the love of independence, the sense of national honour, the presence 
of danger and the habit of command.365    
 
The eventual consequence of this is discussed later in chapter thirty-eight, his 
“General Observations of the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West.” As he says,   
The decline of Rome was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate 
greatness. Prosperity ripened the principle of decay; the cause of the destruction 
multiplied with the extent of conquest; and, as soon as time or accident and 
removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its 
own weight. The story of the ruin is simple and obvious: and instead of inquiring 
why the Roman Empire was destroyed we should rather be surprised that it has 
subsisted for so long.366  
 
For Gibbon the paradox was political; the decline of Rome the natural result 
of this “immoderate greatness.” This criticism is worth emphasising because it is so 
often a fundamental feature of representations of later empires and powers that 
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seek to question or undermine their place in the world - with reference to the 
Roman example. The idea of a simple life or virtue, corrupted by luxury, features 
prominently in Sallust and Tacitus, is expounded on by Ammianus and enshrined 
with Judaeo-Christian theology by Augustine.367 Gibbon, as did Machiavelli before 
him, saw the transition from a politically moderate Republic to the era of Imperial 
tyranny as fatally corrupting Rome’s spirit - the ease and luxury of the age of the 
Antonines “introduced a slow and secret poison into the vitals of the empire.”368 
Such a view is not uncommon amongst other writers of the Enlightenment. Adam 
Smith referred to the danger to the civilized world coming from “the natural 
superiority” in military terms of the barbarian militias over those of a civilized 
nation.369 Rousseau reversed the poles of civilization and barbarism, his praise for 
primitive man reiterated in his strictures of how civil society weakened mankind. 
Those innovations his predecessors had praised he frequently subjected to a harsh, 
critical analysis; the hallmarks of progress were not driving mankind forward, but 
enfeebling it, and his discourses specifically mention “the disillusion of morals” and 
“the corruption of taste.”370 
Such is the process of “decline” that produces the eventual “fall”. Its decay, in 
this account, resembles those ideas of the inevitable cycle of civilization, and the 
internal pressures that cause it to expand and, later, contract. Gibbon sympathized 
with the Roman’s own moral analysis of the causes of decline: luxury, decadence 
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and the corruption of behaviour and manners.371 This produced both a degenerate 
and self-indulgent populace and a corrupt political class greedy only for power in 
the moment; thereby rendering the empire so vulnerable to outside invasion.372  
At the same time, however, Gibbon attributed more novel and specific forces 
to the process of internal corruption, and deals in particular with the corrosion of 
the empire’s moral and intellectual spirit by primitive new belief systems. It is here 
that his idealisation of the cultural merits of a lost classical age comes out in force; 
intertwined with an emerging pejorative image of the more “medieval” 
characteristics of Late Roman civilization. In particular - and unsurprisingly, 
considering his humanist, atheistic, and Enlightenment values - Gibbon attacked the 
cultural and intellectual traditions of Christianity and Neo-Platonism as “dire 
superstitions” that ruined the Hellenic tradition of reason and rationality. Neo-
Platonism comes under criticism for its wholly abstract character, devoid from logic 
or empirical reason. As he says,   
The decline of learning and of mankind is marked… by the rise and rapid progress of 
the new Platonists… Ammonius, Plotinus, Amelius, and Porphyry… by mistaking the 
true object of philosophy… contributed much less to improve than to corrupt the 
human understanding. The knowledge that is suited to our situation and powers, 
the whole compass of moral, natural and mathematical science, was neglected by 
the new Platonists.373 
 
Having argued that Platonic rationalism neglected the only meaningful 
aspects of (natural) philosophy, Gibbon proceeds to mock the achievements, and 
delusions, of the Neo-Platonists, in their slide into superstition and mysticism, 
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Consuming their reason in deep and insubstantial meditations, their minds were 
exposed to illusions of fancy… The ancient sages had derided the popular 
superstition; after disguising its extravagance by the thin pretence of allegory, the 
disciples of Plotinus and Porphyry became its most zealous defenders… The new 
Platonists would scarcely deserve a place in the history of science, but in that of the 
church the mention of them will very frequently occur… by a very singular 
revolution, (they) converted the study of philosophy into that of magic.374 
 
As a consequence of this intellectual trend in the empire, Gibbon argues that 
Christianity - to him, a primitive superstition that replaced the spirit of the secular 
intellectual inquiry of the ancients - made the populace less interested in the 
spoiling condition of the human world, because it was willing to wait for the 
rewards of heaven.375 He remarks in the opening sentence of his notoriously anti-
Christian fifteenth chapter of the Decline and Fall that, “A candid but rational 
inquiry into the progress and establishment of Christianity may be considered as a 
very essential part of the history of the Roman Empire.”376 Gibbon argues that the 
ideology of Christianity and the organisation of the church stifled public spirit and 
freedom, and thus the advancement of knowledge in a pluralistic society. He sees it 
as inheriting the “inflexible perseverance” and “zeal” of the Jewish world, but then 
disastrously imposed, not on a small ethnic group, but the empire as a whole; thus 
it was “armed with the strength of Mosaic law, but delivered from the weight of its 
fetters.”377 Institutional Christianity therefore poisoned and polluted society. It was 
responsible for the outrages of religious intolerance and warfare, and the violent 
destruction of so much of the culture of the ancient world.378  
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Such an approach was repeated in the fortunes of the Eastern Empire after 
476, an entity perceived as medieval, repressive, and religious in its character. As he 
says, 
From the time of Heraclius, the Byzantine theatre is contracted and darkened… the 
subjects of the Byzantine Empire, who assume and dishonour the names of both 
Greeks and Romans, present a dead uniformity of abject vices, which are neither 
softened by the weakness of humanity, nor animated by the vigour of memorable 
crimes.  
 
Gibbon further emphasises the stifling of freedom and its effects by creating a 
comparison with Homer, “The freemen of antiquity might repeat, with generous 
enthusiasm, the sentence of Homer, ‘that, on the first day of his servitude, the 
captive is deprived of half his manly virtue.’”379 Such statements display the arc of 
his thesis for the decline and fall of the classical world - not just the “Western 
Roman Empire,” but civilization as a whole - into the stagnation of the Middle Ages, 
until the revival of the Renaissance and the triumphs of the Enlightenment. Indeed, 
he closes his vast account of the history of the Eastern and Western Empires, up to 
the fifteenth century, with the words, “I have described the triumph of barbarism 
and religion… the ruin of Ancient Rome.”380  
Such is the story of the decline and fall which so crystallised in both popular 
and intellectual consciousness. The true value of this tale - and hence its role and 
purpose as a “myth” - comes not purely from the historical and ideological 
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narrative, but its applicability to the wider, and often (if even implicitly) 
contemporary, horizons of the author. Gibbon’s tireless emphasis on this dramatic 
fall from grace, a major reason for the unified tone of the Decline and Fall, is 
reinforced by his use of contrasts and comparisons through time.381 It is used to 
describe the Roman Empire, the city itself, the successor “Byzantium”, and the 
Islamic Caliphate. He uses the dramatic potential of these far-flung associations to 
create striking comparisons; comparing, for instance, Alaric’s sack of Rome with the 
careers of Hannibal and Charles V.382 Many of his most powerful contrasts 
juxtapose the Roman Republic with the empire to emphasize decline. As the 
description of decline progresses, the mighty early empire, especially under 
Augustus’ rule, serves as a contrasting measure of the decline of later centuries: “A 
territorial acquisition, which Augustus might have despised, reflected some lustre 
on the declining empire of the younger Theodosius.”383 Such juxtapositions render a 
sense of the living past, the echoes in the present of a past tragically and 
irretrievably lost.384 
A particular and notable instance of this can be highlighted for my purposes. 
Rome and America have served as powerful comparisons for contemporary writers, 
and this extends as far back as Gibbon. What is very clear in the Decline and Fall is 
the impact that the American Revolution left on his prose. One can see the 
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presence of the “American issue” in his extant collection of letters. In almost half of 
his published letters from 1775-1783, Gibbon mentions the American conflict. In 
the prose of his third and second volumes, written after these letters, and focusing 
explicitly on the narrative of the demise of the Western Roman Empire, civil 
disturbances and taxation problems play a much greater and more central role in 
accounting for its downfall. For example, the language and imagery used in his 
account of the fifth-century revolt of Armorica, modern Brittany, can be seen as a 
parallel with America: “The Armorican provinces… were thrown into a state of 
disorderly independence… and the Imperial ministers pursued with proscriptive 
laws and ineffectual arms the rebels whom they had made.” Gibbon ties the 
disturbance with the Armoricans’ refusal to send customary tribute, and later refers 
to “the slight foundations of the Armorican republic.”385  
For many scholars, the comparative iconography conjured up by Gibbon can 
typically be written off as his irony, the artful rhetoric of his prose.386 Pocock in 
particular downplayed the significance of the American Revolution on his 
thought.387 Whether the loss of the American colonies was a catalyst in Gibbon’s 
historical approach is subject to debate but also irrelevant to my purpose; the very 
fact that Gibbon makes explicit reference to America - whether in the context of 
irony or serious analogy - is, in itself, a clear indication that his perception of the 
present day infiltrated his own writing. This is noted by Christopher Highet in The 
Classical Tradition, who refers to the Decline and Fall as a symbol of the 
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“interpenetration” of the Roman and modern world.388 Similarly, Glen Bowersock, 
otherwise critical of its surviving relevance or importance, nevertheless argues that 
the work fulfilled its stated purpose, to “connect the ancient and modern history of 
the world”, a task which Gibbon “ultimately achieved,” meaning that: “The very 
idea of connecting the ancient and modern history of the world under the heading 
of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire is something that should give us 
pause.”389 Visions of an empire doomed to destruction by its own success had a 
powerful and profound impact on the modern historical and cultural imagination: 
suggesting that all great empires and civilizations reach an end point of no return. 
The “course of empire” embodied a cycle of growth, decay and destruction. History 
seen like this is not static, but forever in motion; stagnation invites not a final state 
of being, but the threat of terminal decline. Gibbon suggested this very idea when 
he stated in an epigram considering the fortunes of the empire: “that all that is 
human must retrograde if it does not advance.”390 
 
 
Gibbon and Concepts of Decadence  
Political and cultural decline of the sort discussed by Gibbon could also be 
interpreted as decadence, and from the sixteenth century and especially the 
eighteenth, this usage appears to have been fortified and widely accepted; with the 
original prototype of the Roman Empire very firmly in mind.391 “Decadence”, 
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literally meaning “falling away,” became often inseparable from the notion of 
decline - which had been used by the Romans to describe the loss of an early norm 
or standard of excellence, and was itself interwoven with the image of the fall of 
the Roman Empire. Decadence in the post-Enlightenment lexicon brimmed over 
with ideas, principles and metaphors which the ancients had previously used 
against themselves.392 In particular it implies a decline in moral standard, of ethics 
or other qualities of character.  
For eighteenth and nineteenth-century critics the idea of decline was, in the 
Roman tradition, an attack on any lapse from the perceived proper classical norms - 
to which the Renaissance had aspired - but it also introduced the critic into the 
present as the bearer and arbiter of balance and order, and the mediator of these 
“proper” classical ideals in a corrupted present. Such an idea reflects the role of this 
myth as a bridge between antiquity and the contemporary human horizons of the 
author.  
Like the older term “decline" (and together with it), “decadence” in the 
eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century lexicon refashioned, in more modern 
cultural language, images the ancients had previously turned against themselves.393 
The new verdict of decline, arrived at in this period, allowed for an attack on any 
lapse from proper classical norms. It also brought the critic into the present as the 
bearer of balance, order, and measure; according power to the author as 
watchman of cultural, moral and intellectual standards. A powerful example of this 
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is elaborated by Carl Jacob Burckhardt, the art and culture historian of the 
nineteenth century, described as one of the first figures of his age to rise beyond 
the idea of history narrowly defined as “past politics.” His similarity to Gibbon is 
borne out both in his use of cultural themes to argue for universal trends and 
patterns, and the significance of the concept of Roman decline to his thesis. This is 
despite not sharing quite the same positive attitude to progress itself, or the 
pejorative outlook on the Middle Ages.  
Burckhardt believed that the vitality of a people or a race did not determine 
the health of a society, but the other way around; a challenge to the social fabric 
could lead to the enervation and exhaustion of a people. What matters is the state 
of the larger social order; on whether it is still growing and developing, or on 
whether it had achieved overripeness, and featured the “inward degeneration and 
decrease of life” that marks the end of the old and the beginning of the new. 
Though most famous for his account of the high cultural achievements of the 
Renaissance,394 Burckhardt described his preference not for the radical cultural and 
social changes of that period, but the organic unity and community of the Middle 
Ages.395 
All societies and civilizations, Burckhardt argued, are a dynamic balance of 
three social elements or powers. The two traditional elements were religion and 
the state, but the third was culture: “that process by which the spontaneous and 
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unthinking activity of a race or nation is transformed into considered action.”396 
Each element follows a course of “growth, bloom, and decay,” or a rise and fall of 
social groups and forces over the passage of time.397 Consequently, “During epochs 
of high civilization, all three powers exist simultaneously at all levels of mutual 
interaction.”398 However, when they collide or conflict with each other, “a crisis in 
the whole state of things is produced,” which affects entire societies and 
civilizations as a whole.399 Burckhardt’s history does not present us with a smooth 
and progressive working out of human forces and movements, but instead with a 
recurring tension among the three elements, expressed in these periodic crises.  
The fall of the Roman Empire was one such crisis. Burckhardt’s first extended 
historical work, The Age of Constantine the Great (1852), described the flaw in the 
Roman imperial state being that it had expanded at the expense of other social 
institutions, to the point that civilization itself broke apart. While the form his cycle 
takes, and the emphasis on culture as the driving force in history, is somewhat 
particular and specific to his approach, Burckhardt falls in line with the stereotypical 
notion that the barbarian invasions did not “cause” the fall of the Roman Empire; 
they simply exacerbated a crisis that was already under way in Roman society itself. 
Such a decline is evidenced mainly in the cultural and artistic subtleties apparently 
obvious to Burckhardt - “the decline of plastic art and painting,” the “decline of 
beautiful form in architecture,”400 which “contributed no less to the final dissolution 
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of the structural system inherited from the Greeks,” and even, in a chapter entitled 
“Physical Degeneration,” the decline in the physical beauty of man, as witnessed in 
“the average as presented in classical art”401 - evidence, he assumes, of a general 
decline in the standard of living, the “neglect of agriculture” and the “ravages of 
disease.”402    
The result of this process is the destruction of the empire itself, and its 
replacement with a vital new cultural and social force. As he puts it, the “youthful 
peoples across the Rhine”403 - literalizing by this contrast the metaphor of a dying, 
aged empire - broke through a weakening and vulnerable imperial defence, 
prompting a series of ruthless military emperors to seize power and accelerating 
the spiral into decline. It was these emperors and their legions, not the German 
tribes, who destroyed the ancient world’s civilization as its rulers tried to prop up 
their own tyrannical dominion. As a result, another power - religion, or the 
institutional Christian religion founded by Constantine - rose up to replace the 
state, and the new church dominated European affairs and civilization until it, too, 
became unbalanced and eroded from within, resulting in a new historical force to 
topple its previously unchallenged might - the Reformation.404  
Such, then, is the perceived “cycle” between the primacy of the Roman 
Empire and the supremacy of the Christian Church. Where this becomes pertinent 
to this thesis is in the purpose of this account of Rome’s fall; namely as an 
expression of a universal, revolving trend found in civilization and cultures. 
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Burchkardt believed that in his own time, European civilization was undergoing 
another similar crisis - a cultural crisis in origin, brought about by the movements 
and ideals, notably radicalism, democracy and socialism, unleashed in the 
nineteenth century, notably in the revolts of 1848. Men hoped “to find salvation in 
demolishing and rebuilding the whole (social) structure” in the name of progress 
and reform, an impulse for them to escape their own natural station, and resulting 
in them imposing their own mediocrity on society as a whole.405 Such a selfish 
desire for pay and privileges beyond those appropriate would lead to chaos, and 
out of the vacuum, tyranny and absolutism.406  
Burckhardt’s conclusion that democracy inevitably gives way to dictatorship is 
as old as Plato and Aristotle, and common with political theorists such as 
Machiavelli.  Where he gains particular relevance to this thesis, in his account and 
analogy of the fall of Rome, is his role in imagining the triumph of a debased and 
growing mass culture coming to dominate society; one which disrupts the organic 
balance of institutions, values and ideals.407 Burckhardt therefore acted as a 
pioneer for an idea which featured widely in critical discourses on social and 
political decline in the twentieth century; particularly those that use the Roman 
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CHAPTER THREE: ROMAN DECLINE AND THE WEST IN THE MODERN AGE 
 
 
Rome and Reflections on Twentieth Century Society  
In the early part of the twentieth century, there were numerous ways that 
Americans and Europeans could talk about time, change, and history. There was the 
myth of the original Golden Age, and a countervailing awareness of the relentless 
decay of time. There were invocations of universal empire, together with their 
critics. At the same time, the affirmation of decline and decay might serve to 
explain present troubles, re-synthesize the intense meditation on historical 
mutability so widespread in Antiquity and the Middle Ages; and, in the end, suggest 
a solution. In doing so, they helped to recharge classical images of historical decline 
which would have a profound impact on the broader culture, and the perceived 
“underworld” of modern thought - those ideas and philosophies which critique 
aspects of the modern world.408 Theories of time such as this ultimately remain 
pessimistic about the fate of the world. There was awareness that each stage of a 
civilization’s advancement required a destruction of what came before. In criticizing 
these ideals of Progress, they betray the same basic notion - that societies and 
civilization had a fixed life span and function, and that the form of their decline and 
fall followed a shared and comparable path. 
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Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West (1932) and Arnold Toynbee’s The 
Study of History (1934-61, written in twelve volumes) are an attempted summary of 
all the meaningful history of mankind. These both comprised the best-known 
assessment of Western civilization’s overall place in “world history.” Spengler and 
Toynbee both took as their symbol of the peak of western civilization the modern 
British Empire, and both were driven by the conviction that its guiding place in 
History was coming to an end. For them, the end of the classical world served as the 
prime precedent, both to compare to the fortunes and future of Britain, and to 
suggest a more general set of rules at work in the process of decay.   
Inspired by the sight of a volume in a store entitled “The Decline of Antiquity,” 
Spengler conceived of his theme and title as “The Decline of the West.” Spengler 
believed he had moved to a whole new level of historical thinking, in 
“predetermining history.”409 This would, for the first time, relegate Classical and 
Western culture to its proper, diminished place in the overall story of mankind.410 
Relying very heavily on the discussed tradition of cultural criticism, the work 
summed up a long period of historical and cultural pessimism and discontent. For 
Spengler, Europe had reached this sterile winter stage in the nineteenth century, 
and entered a period that was the common thread of all civilizations - from 
Buddhist India to Hellenistic Greece to Taoist China - namely, the disturbing of the 
previous order and harmony.411 As he says:  
Long ago we might and should have seen in the “Classical” world a development 
which is the complete counterpart of our own Western development, differing 
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indeed from it in every detail of the surface but entirely similar as regards the 
inward power driving the great organism towards its end…412  
 
Spengler describes how these entities may exist in stagnation “for hundreds 
or thousands of years,” dominated by “dead bodies, amorphous and dispirited 
masses of men.” Such a state “loses its desire to be… as in Imperial Rome.”413 The 
cultural and implicitly moral aspects of this decline receive special notice from him, 
for “it is one of the most impressive facts of historical symbolism” that the change is 
manifested in “the extinction of great art… of great formal thought… but also quite 
carnally,” and that, above all, this is “a phenomenon not peculiar to ourselves but 
already observed and deplored - and of course not remedied - in Imperial 
Rome…”414 The message is therefore made clear. The modern world is losing its 
spiritual essence and values, and, through the precedent of other civilizations - of 
which Rome is the best understood and comprehended example - we learn that the 
path trodden by mankind is irreversible. How exactly Rome was brought down, in 
terms of detailed historical mechanisms, is not discussed - but its myth is typically 
invoked in artful, poetic language, as a universal truism of human nature, one which 
can be subjectively applied to those qualities of the present the author (here, 
Spengler) dislikes or abhors.  
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Spengler’s approach to Antiquity was notably criticized by the prominent 
Marxian cultural and historical theorist (who I discussed previously), Theodor 
Adorno. “If the fall of Antiquity were dictated by the autonomous necessity of life 
and by the expression of its soul,” he wrote in a 1941 essay on Spengler’s The 
Decline of the West, “then indeed it takes on the aspect of fatality and by 
(analogy)… carries over to the present situation.” As a Marxian of the Frankfurt 
School, Adorno rejects Spengler’s historical model of the organic cycle, and the 
Roman analogizing on which it is largely derived. This is not, however, because of a 
fault with the analogy itself, but the purpose to which it is derived. Adorno is just as 
willing to draw on a Roman model of decline and fall to make his point, just not a 
Spengler-ian one that attaches to this process a grand, inevitable cycle. As he says, 
 If… the fall of Antiquity can be understood by its unproductive system of latifundia 
(landed estates) and the slave economy related to it, the fatality can be mastered if 
men succeed in overcoming such and similar structures of domination. In such a 
case, Spengler’s universal structure reveals itself as a false analogy drawn from a 
bad solitary happening - solitary in spite of its threatening recurrence.415 
 
Consequently, the decline of Rome is perceived as a prophetic warning, not 
an eternal and inevitable process. Universal decline may not be inevitable, if the 
Roman example is heeded. Conversely, to “deny the decline is to become even 
more firmly caught in its fatal coils.” It still invoked as an abstract historical force. 
Drawing on another comparison to the fall of Rome, Adorno suggets that to avoid 
this fate, the “barbaric element in culture itself must be recognized,” and those 
societies which survive must “challenge the idea of culture as well as the reality of 
barbarism.” Furthermore, decay itself, as it is produced by an oppressive system, 
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provides an opportunity to escape from the “dictatorship of culture” through the 
“forces released by decay.” As he concludes on the matter, “What can oppose the 
decline of the west is not a resurrected culture but the utopia that is silently 
contained in the image of its decline.”416 Though these are two very different 
thinkers, they are invoking a comparable model of decline, with the same, Roman, 
frame of reference. As put by Northorp Frye, “The decline, or aging, of the West is 
as much a part of our mental outlook today as the electron or the dinosaur… and in 
that sense we are all Spenglerians.”417 
It is clear in these writings that, while the idea of an eternal and irrevocable 
pattern of decline is intended to hold a universal value, the precedent for that 
abstract is specifically the Roman myth. As Spengler says, “Rome… will always give 
us, working as we must by analogies, the key to understanding our own future.”418 
The potent, poetic imagery of Roman ruin and fall is evoked, not in military and 
political terms, but through the broader idea of inward collapse. Notably, this 
overall criticism of civilization as a whole, and the value systems it evolves through 
its life-cycle, incorporates concepts of degeneracy into the ideologies of any such 
civilization, as they are perceived to manifest in its advanced stages. In this way, the 
temporal and universal elements of the story are connected. It is in this fashion that 
Spengler attacked liberalism as the outdated, bankrupt ideology of a dying 
civilization, and described imperialism as “civilization unadulterated.”419 Drawing 
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inspiration from Hegel and the British “Idealist”’ tradition,420 he makes it clear that 
it was up to the free thinkers remaining in the Western world to refurbish and 
redefine it as a spiritual community of shared moral values, accepting of its eclipse, 
and not defined by its material, political or imperial base.421 
The same building blocks are present in these stories of the downward path 
of civilization. The example of Rome is extrapolated beyond a simple comparison, 
and into the grander language of a universal framework, organism, or cycle: an 
objective and recurring constant of human nature.  
At the same time, the specific details described reflect the subjective 
prejudices and preoccupations of the author, even when they are couched as 
objective features of the system. The history, or comparative history, demonstrated 
in these examples is laced with a specific ideology and borders on personal 
“propaganda” - just as it does with the other authorial voices discussed here. Yet 
the underlying values of the myth, the belief in internal decline and decay fatally 
weakening the empire and its culture, such that it “destroyed itself from within,” is 
constant and immutable, whatever the historical record or advances in the field of 
study.422 To invoke Strauss’s analogy of the score, the harmony - or latent content - 
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stays broadly the same, even as the melody, or narrative, is localized to its time and 
audience.423    
This model can be further applied to Toynbee’s twelve-volume A Study of 
History (1934-61), a collection intended to cover the entire history of mankind, 
from Hammurabi to Hitler. Toynbee came from an intellectual tradition quite 
different from that of Spengler, namely nineteenth-century English liberalism. 
Nevertheless, they both took as the symbol of the modern West the British Empire. 
Toynbee represented a generation of disenchanted intellectuals who dominated 
the English scene in the inter-war period, and who feared that industrial growth 
had impoverished the working class, socially, culturally and morally. For Toynbee, 
the industrial revolution was “a period as disastrous and terrible as any through 
which a nation ever passed.”424 Such a disaster he compared to the decline of a 
“creative minority” in Late Antiquity.425 This statement echoes Leonardo Bruni 
when, creatively re-interpreting a passage of Tacitus on the exclusivity of brilliant 
historical minds, said that, “After the Republic had been subject to the power of 
one man, the brilliant minds vanished.”426 The modern tradition of liberal English 
pessimism had many of its roots in Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy. In his 
view, the nation lacked any cultural compass, and he worried that an upwardly 
mobile, overly commercial middle class would pollute the wellspring of culture.427 
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These barbarians would “rule by their energy, but they will deteriorate it (Britain) 
by their low ideas and want of culture.”428 
The decline in intellectual and moral standards could therefore be related to 
the process of larger social and/or economic changes. Arthur Balfour, the 
Conservative writer and politician, outlined in 1903 how Roman history revealed 
that in “an ancient but still powerful state, when the reaction against recurring ills 
grows feebler, enterprise slackens and vigour ebbs away…” He concludes his 
observation with the remark that there must be “present some process of social 
degeneration, which we must perforce recognize,” and that “those who are most 
reluctant to admit that decay, as distinguished from misfortune, may lower the 
general level of civilization…”429 
Clearly these authors concerned with culture and the industrial world shared 
the same central conviction and attitude: that Western civilization was in crisis. 
Furthermore, the precedents of the classical world, and the circumstances of its 
ruin, were entirely relevant to understanding this crisis and its likely path, if 
unchecked. In criticizing these ideals of progress, they betrayed the same basic 
notion - that societies and civilization had a fixed life span and function, an 
organistic notion of society (as opposed to a progressive one) dating back to  
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ancient, Hellenistic and Roman notions of decline.430 Writing in the period after the 
Second World War, Catholic historian Christopher Dawson, in an observation and 
reflection on Gibbon’s Decline and Fall, wove it into a concept of the cosmic order, 
taking away from it an image of universal decay: 
All earthly things are subject to mutability. Growth and decay, life and death, are 
the law of states as well as of individuals… this conception only needs to be 
interpreted in a vitalistic sense in order to become an organic theory of social 
development. And though such theories are often regarded as characteristically 
modern, they were by no means unknown in Gibbon’s day... In reality, the Roman 
Empire fell not by war or political incapacity but because of a process of sociological 
decay which destroyed the foundations of its strength.431  
 
Dawson references modern theories of sociology, yet reiterates the very 
same precepts found in virtually all iterations of this myth - that the empire was 
finally corrupted from within, a victim of its own hubris. In this way, the historical 
analysis is ultimately beholden to a much broader narrative. Such an approach to 
the cycle of civilization is reiterated in writer Francis Neilson’s The Decline of 
Civilizations (1945), which again, pulls out the Roman precedent to fortify his 
example:  
We can no longer ignore the manifestation of cycles and repetition of growth and 
deterioration. Spengler suggests that this civilization is dying of an overdose of 
history. It may very well be that the historian of the future, in comparing what is 
now taking place in the world with those events that brought Rome and Greece to 
the winter of their despair, will say that the only difference is in the fact that the 
tragedy of our day covers a greater area, goes deeper, and that the outlook for us is 
more hopeless… we have entered our winter, according to the findings of Adams, 
Spengler, and many others, is a fact no amount of optimism can hide.  
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The repeated reference to the ancient world by these authors is, according to 
Neilson, evidence in itself of the “winter” of civilization.  Any possibility of optimism 
is challenged by relating it to the misguided attitudes of past ages, including the 
somewhat spurious and convenient comparison of ancient prophets to the radio,   
And, yet, those who wish to be deceived scarcely ever pause to reflect on what 
happened to the optimists of other ages. The soothsayers of Greece and Rome 
were no different from those who use the radio morning, noon and night. Before 
anyone here realized the coming of this catastrophe, I wrote: Those who imagine 
that this civilization is proof against decay disregard the warning which is present in 
the history of the decline of every people that has passed. They seem to be under 
the impression that inventiveness and machinery or, to use the much-worn phrase, 
scientific approach, will enable us to escape what other nations suffered before 
their fall. There were always, however, optimists in every civilization who took just 
exactly the same attitude.432 
 
Again, the argument here is generalized in its scope, and intended to convey a 
universal truth - the fall of the classical world is not simply a unique historical event, 
but part of a universal process that also informs us about the present. The 
perceived faults and failings of the modern world reflect this fundamentally very 
similar path to destruction. Historical cycles, and organistic notions of society, lend 
themselves to the central paradox of negative classicism - that out of progress and 
achievement can come decline and fall; and that the classical forms, in its twilight,  
a path to the medieval.   
This castigation of the developments of Western society is hardly unique to 
the literary record of the early twentieth-century. Cecil B. DeMille makes the 
comparison between past and present achingly explicit in Manslaughter 
(Paramount Pictures, 1922), where images of debauched flappers are juxtaposed 
with flashbacks to orgies in ancient Rome; conveying a similar message and moral 
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tone about the dangers of decline. It finds a particular resonance with the rise of a 
new medium of entertainment in the middle of the century. From its commercial 
beginnings in the late 1940s, television has been accused of causing cultural and 
political decadence - in its varyingly suggested forms - more than any other visual 
medium aside from cinema; and, unlike cinema, has benefited from less 
enthusiastic defenders. Anything it broadcasts is apt to be deemed antithetical to 
the spirit and purpose of high culture. As the apparatus for automated barbarism, it 
lends itself easily to analogising with Roman decadence and decline. Milton 
Shulman, writing in 1952, described public political opinion as mediated over the TV 
set to “the electronic equivalent of the mobs in the Roman colosseum being asked 
to give a thumbs up or a thumbs down sign about the fate of an intended victim.”433 
In an account of the influence of television on the 1965 “Watts” rebellion, John 
Dunne wrote in the New Republic magazine, “television turned the riots into some 
kind of Roman spectacle, with the police playing the lions, the Negroes the 
Christians.”434 More recently, Anthony Quinton described the inclusion of popular 
culture - including the study of television drama and fiction - in educational syllabi 
as “comparable to the fall of the Roman empire, and its replacement by the 
barbarian kingdoms,” and criticized “cultural studies” in which “the simple mental 
fare served up by the entertainment industry will be scrutinized for its political 
content.”435  
These are not original ideas about mass or popular culture, despite the topics 
in question, namely the advent of television and visual mass media, being a 
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comparatively new and novel form. The Romans did not have TV sets, but yet the 
advent of TV is seen to somehow make us more like the Romans: in precisely the 
wrong ways. Something of this notion of commonality is addressed by David 
Manning White, who defends the medium precisely by pointing out the frequency 
of this depiction, “The mass culture critic always insinuates that in some previous 
era the bulk of men were rational, pacific, and learned. The good old days - like the 
Roman Empire under Nero? Admittedly, the Romans didn’t have a television set to 
massacre various unwilling guests during the coliseum half-time shows.”436          
In these examples, the identification of the decline, corruption and downfall 
of the Roman world is assumed to be obvious; despite, that is, the wildly different 
technologies, the historical and cultural context of ancient rituals and practices, and 
the rise of modern media culture. While the specific subject of criticism may vary, 
there is little difference in the high moral tone, or ideology of corruption and 
decline. To invoke Strauss, I can say that the melody of the story changes, but the 
harmony remains the same.437  
 
 
Roman Narratives and the Cold War 
It is evident, therefore, that the decline and fall proves a particularly powerful 
model for describing social, cultural and political trends in the middle of the 
twentieth-century. The impact of the Cold War functions as a crucial mechanism for 
such comparison. Gilbert Highet, writing in The Classical Tradition (1949) soon after 
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the beginning of the Cold War, describes the post-Roman Dark Age as an era 
characterized as a “scarcely civilized” era of “the raiding savages, the roaring 
criminals, and the domineering nobles.”438 Highet mourns the consequences of the 
age following the end of the Western Roman Empire, and Sidonius Apollinaris’s 
apparent ignorance of their consequences.439 In particular he compares the 
emerging Cold War of the late 1940s and its sundering of far-reaching trans-
national intellectual horizons to the Dark Age surrounding Sidonius. Gilbert talks of 
the supposed end of the Renaissance from sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, and 
breaks out into emotive, poetic language as he equates the tragedy of Sidonius’ 
time with his own:  
Are these shadows on so many of our horizons the outriders of another long night, 
like that which was closing in on Sidonius? Modern scholars must regret that they 
have to work in a time when... it is becoming more and more difficult to exchange 
opinions across the world... and to feel oneself part of a world-wide structure of art 
and learning, greater than all the things that divide mankind: nationalities and 
creeds, fear and hate.440  
 
The lesson Highet wants to pass on in his writing, and the focus of his fears, is 
clear; that the “dark age” that consumed Rome is a constant and universal threat, 
in this and every culture, including his contemporary world. As he warns,  
… we are so accustomed to contemplating the spectacle of human progress that we 
assume modern culture to be better than anything that preceded it. We forget also 
how able and how willing men are to reverse the movement of progress: how many 
forces of barbarism remain... still powerfully alive, capable of not only injuring 
civilization but of putting a burning desert in its place... but two or three 
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generations of war and pestilence and revolution destroy culture with appalling 
rapidity.441 
 
Gilbert Highet suggests that the consequence of the industrial revolution was 
that “most of the great nineteenth-century writers hated and despised the world in 
which they lived,” and that “it is difficult to think of any other period in which so 
many talented authors have so unanimously detested their entire surroundings and 
the ideals of the people among whom they were forced to exist.” This means that, 
instead, “they look to other lands and other ages… they admired the cults of 
antiquity as free, strong and graceful.” Cited by Highet as evidence of this tendency 
is the periodical Parnassus, a symbol for the nineteenth-century idealism which 
loved Greco-Roman culture.442  
Aside from the literary record, it is in cinema that, implicitly or explicitly, the 
connection between a dwindling Roman Empire or culture, and the modern world, 
becomes a dominant trait in the epic cinema of the period. Hollywood epics made 
after World War II frequently compare and contrast the character, fate and 
fortunes of the Roman Empire and United States.443 The prologue to Cecil B. 
DeMille’s The Ten Commandments (Paramount Pictures, 1956), the hugely 
successful remake by the same director, makes clear the film’s relevance to the 
Cold War; DeMille offers a choice between the law of God and the whims of the 
dictator.444 Those more “Christian” stories - The Robe, Quo Vadis, Ben Hur, and The 
Sign of the Pagan - describe the possible rise of a better, Christian empire, out of 
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the rubble of a pagan and decadent Rome; with clear analogies to their 
contemporary world, and a Christian America. At the end of Mervyn LeRoy’s Quo 
Vadis (MGM, 1951) Marcus Vinicius, its hero, and his friend reflect on the fates of 
empires from Babylon to Rome, and their seemingly inevitable decline. In heavy 
Christian overtones, the friend offers hope for “a more permanent world… or a 
more permanent faith.” Vinicius answers, to the sounds of a heavenly chorus 
singing “Quo Vadis, domine?” that “One is not possible without the other.” In Henry 
Koster’s The Robe (1953), which describes the rise of Caligula and the persecution 
of Christians, the hero and his beloved are condemned to death, but through the 
use of special effects they walk straight up to heaven. Gore Vidal, novelist and a 
screenwriter for Wyler’s Ben-Hur, accounted for his work on a series of American-
historical novels with the overarching title Narratives of Empire in this way:  
I had been taken to task by Time magazine in a review of my first book of essays… 
Time wrote that I had dared to refer to our minatory global presence as “an 
empire” which of course it could not be as we were, in the Luce publications, 
Christian goodness incarnate. It seems I had… said the unsayable too soon. I was 
subversive.445  
 
Hollywood’s Roman epics from Quo Vadis to William Wyler’s Ben-Hur (MGM, 
1959) and Stanley Kubrick’s Spartacus (Universal Pictures, 1960) typically presented 
the Romans as ruthless and ambitious warmongers, as inhumane and oppressive 
slave-owners, or as degenerates obsessed with spectacle and orgies. Judah Ben-Hur 
argues with his former Roman friend Messala with the words “I warn you! Rome is 
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an affront to God! Rome is strangling my people and my country, the whole Earth! 
But not forever. I tell you the day Rome falls there will be a shout of freedom such 
as the world has never heard before!”   
The idea of the decline and fall as a historical fact or inevitably is seeded in all 
these films.  In most of them, however, the end of Rome is only implicitly touched 
on, rather than central to their theme. It is suggested as an inevitable outcome of 
the process of decline, but its actual process of events is not formally represented 
or described. The most direct cinematic exception to this (before, less directly, 
Anthony Mann) is Sign of the Pagan, a 1954 historical epic directed by German 
émigré Dougal Sirk. This is also a film which, while set nominally in Late Antiquity, 
incorporates many “medieval” elements in its content and themes.446 Sirk was a 
former film and theatre director in Weimar and Nazi Germany who was steeped in 
the German concern with medieval visual art - studying art history at the University 
of Hamburg in the 1920s, and at least “claiming” to have been taught by 
Panofsky.447  
The Sign of the Pagan sets its drama during a crisis of the fifth-century 
empire, as it is victimised by the predations of Attila the Hun. This failing state is 
supposedly replaced by a unified and wholly Christian Roman Empire under 
Marcian (who never, historically, ruled in the West). At the beginning of the film, 
Marcian is a Roman centurion sent by the Western Roman Emperor Valentinian to 
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urge Theodosius to stay loyal to Rome in the face of the barbarian onslaught. On his 
way to Constantinople to meet Theodosius, Marcian is captured by Attila, but 
escapes and makes it to the city. Attila also rides to Constantinople to make his own 
demands on the emperor there. Theodosius rejects Marcian’s plea to stay firm and 
loyal and instead makes a treacherous pact with Attila against Rome. Marcian, 
however, wins the ear and love of Theodosius’ sister Pulcheria, and with the 
support of a loyal general, Paulinus, they manage to expose Theodosius’ treachery, 
overthrow him in a coup, and institute Pulcheria as empress.  
Marcian then sets off to protect Rome against Attila’s invasion. Valentinian 
flees the city, leaving him in charge. Attila has assembled his troops to march on the 
city but he hesitates, as he and his seers are plagued by portentous visions. 
Meanwhile, Attila’s daughter, Kubla (not in any way, shape or form a historical 
figure), who has fallen in love with Marcian and secretly converted to Christianity, 
secretly informs the Romans of Attila’s portents of doom. Enraged, Attila kills her, 
but abandons the attack. Marcian arranges an ambush in which Attila’s retreated 
troops are wiped out and Attila is killed by Idilko, his long-suffering prisoner and 
wife. The film ends with Marcian marrying Pulcheria and becoming, in a historical 
fabrication, the Emperor of both the Western and Eastern Empire.   
I have discussed the role that the decline and fall plays as a source of portent 
and judgement in the literary record, and such also applies to its presence in the 
cinematic tradition. The power of prophecy plays an important role in Quo Vadis 
(1951) - the title itself a proverbial phrase from the bible, meaning “Where do you 
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go?” or “Whither goest thou?”448 It takes a more secular form in Anthony Mann’s 
The Fall of the Roman Empire, with the doom-laden warnings of senators about the 
threat to Rome. The Sign of the Pagan is a film itself riddled with omens and 
portents. Attila is undone by his inability and unwillingness to deal with the 
numerous visions and signs he receives of his impending fall. A seer falsely 
prophesises to him that Rome will fall that autumn, and is then crushed by a 
biblically appropriate thunderbolt that hits an overhanging tree. Attila, a pagan, is 
unable to comprehend the value of this warning, and so imagines that his God 
intended the seer’s greatest prophecy to be his last. Similarly, he rejects the 
portents of his daughter he kills for converting to Christianity, concerning his death, 
treating the account she gives of his blood being spilled as her (and therefore 
family) blood. Throughout the film, Attila demonstrates this inability to 
comprehend abstract and spiritual truth, and is instead lost in his appreciation of 
the purely material. As he tells Theodosius, “What are words? A little noisy breath, 
spoken and forever gone. Your gold has greater security.” Marcian, aware of the 
weakness of his word, mocks Theodosius’s conviction that the Barbarians will 
honour their agreement and not attack Constantinople, and for thinking he is “safe 
behind a shield of parchment.”  In this vein, Attila refers to the Christian cross as 
merely a “symbol” of their faith, as he describes it to two pilgrims. He believes that 
the symbolic, religious culture of the Romans cannot compete with his raw displays 
of strength - but he retreats in horror from the image of a cross floating in a church 
(though it is carried by a priest, hidden by the dark), and is finally cowed by the 
power of the Pope Leo, retreating - too late to save him - from his campaigns 
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against Rome. The supernatural elements of the movie are justified by their 
Christian context - it is the spiritual power of the faith that triumphs over the 
earthly, barbarian might of Attila (This bears easy comparison to the spiritual 
victory of Christian Roman values in Quo Vadis and King Arthur).  
Sirk’s analogy to the geopolitical climate of the 1950s is an easy one to make. 
In The Sign of the Pagan (1954), when Attila’s hordes threaten Rome, the Empire 
can readily be taken to stand for the US, and Attila for the USSR. The film’s message 
is that unity in Christian ideals is necessary to resist the “barbarian” threat from the 
East. This reflects the broader portrait of Christianity reflecting liberty and humane, 
moral value, suggested more commonly in stories of persecuted Christians. 
Nevertheless, the Christian empire it depicts is fundamentally corrupted. The 
Emperor Valentinian is a coward - Theodosius, selfish and treacherous. Marcian, a 
true Christian, is the closest thing we have to a hero (aside from the distant spiritual 
presence of the Pope), but as with Livius in The Fall of the Roman Empire, he is 
surrounded by human corruption - appropriately enough on the eve of the fall. The 
film therefore suggests the survival of Christian spirituality and values, past that of 
the dying and decadent body of the empire; in this way, the Roman Empire itself 
may be dying, but the Pope saves the city of Rome itself, and its spiritual legacy. 
Such a model fits with the typical suggestion of American as a superior empire to 
Rome, precisely because she better embodies those values. One is reminded, 
therefore, of the end of Mervyn LeRoy’s Quo Vadis (1951), where Marcus Vinicius, 
its hero, and his friend muse about the fate of empires from Babylon to Rome. In 
heavy Christian overtones, the friend desires hope for “a more permanent world... 
or a more permanent faith.” Vinicius answers that, “One is not possible without the 
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other.” Such a statement is not made explicitly in The Sign, but nor is it overtly 
needed.  
Such a positive appraisal of the redeeming power of Christianity, and its role 
in the rise of a new and better order out of the ashes of Rome (or at least a 
thousand years later, in the New World), may appear to sit at odds with the 
traditional, Gibbonian narrative of the decline and fall. But Christianity, despite its 
prominent place in Gibbon’s critique and invective, is not at the core of this myth. It 
is not a necessary property of its structure or form. Christian authors from 
Augustine to the modern era have been cited above who use it in its varying forms. 
Anthony Mann, discussed below, self-consciously articulates a version of Gibbon 
without any of the religious criticism present. Indeed, it must be remembered that 
Gibbon himself did not merely attack the religiosity of the Christian faith - he 
condemned the Roman populace at large for its broader slide into superstition long 
before the advent of that creed. The adoption of Christianity was merely one aspect 
of the degradation of rational thinking and Roman moral values.449 Removing that 
content does not alter its underlying principle.  
The decline and fall can function both as a secular and a theological narrative. 
The core property of this myth is not in the attributed specifics of its cause, which 
vary, but the process itself. What remains strikingly common in all these 
representations, by different degrees direct or implicit, is the type of moral and 
value judgements that can be placed on this process. A great empire must and can 
only fall because it is morally corrupted from within, whether in its political, social, 
cultural or religious dimensions. It is through understanding such truths that the 
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final story of Rome can be related to the modern world as a moral tale. Such are 
the constants and axioms out of which this myth is necessarily constructed.  
 
 
Mann, Hollywood and Historical “Truth”  
It is in this context that the particular significance of Anthony Mann’s The Fall 
of the Roman Empire (1964) to this thesis must be made clear. It is the only epic 
film of this era that directly discusses the theme of the decline and fall of Rome - 
and, furthermore, in a way which deliberately and consciously invoked the 
historical record. At least partly because Mann’s film is an intermediary between 
Gibbon and Gladiator, this historian of the Roman Empire, who originally wrote for 
an upper-class British audience in the late eighteenth century, continues to exert 
his influence in a part of modern and mass culture where most people would not 
think to look for it. Secondly, of interest here is the content of the critical attention, 
mostly academic, that the film has received. Despite the flaws, distortions, 
inaccuracies, and arguably simplistic moral judgements presented to the viewer 
(which I will outline in detail) the film’s reception - for its accuracy and historical 
merit, not simply its creative qualities - has been almost universally positive. Indeed 
it is perhaps the “epic” film most lauded for its factual accuracy, profound thematic 
qualities, and historical relevance. Thirdly - and reinforced by its discussion in the 
above criteria - The Fall is a revealing instance of my “integrated regime of historical 
representation,” to paraphrase White,450 and a prime example of the intersection 
of high and popular culture involved in creating and perpetuating the myth of the 
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decline and fall. Historians, and particularly historians of cinema, have written 
about the links between Gibbon and Mann, but not discussed the broader cultural 
and historiographical significance of what this means - just taken it as a given that 
this was an “accurate” or “appropriate” model to represent the past. Here, instead, 
Mann will be related to Gibbon in the context of the study of the myth paradigm - a 
more appropriate avenue for its appreciation - then through a judgement of its 
merits as a historical account.  While the tools conveying Gibbon and Mann’s image 
of Roman decline are, on the surface, very different, the underlying message still 
strikes a common critical cord.       
To properly examine the place of the Fall of the Roman Empire in the 
intellectual tradition of the decline and fall, it is necessary to discuss the film’s 
academic reception, on which much has been written. The Fall has typically been 
praised for its value, not simply as a piece of art or entertainment, but as a faithfully 
effective recreation of history for popular audiences. Derek Elley, who in The Epic 
Film: Myth and History provides one of the earliest and most influential academic 
appreciations of the film, in which he praises its mediation of an essential Roman 
spirit, calling a particular senate scene “one of the most thoughtful sequences ever 
placed on 70mm film.” He also, pointedly, values the film for the truth and depth of 
its portrayal: for Mann and his associates “examine Roman thought at its most 
civilized peak… breaking new ground.”451  
The Fall is also given positive treatment in Jon Solomon’s defining work on 
film and antiquity, The Ancient World in the Cinema.452 Martin Winkler, a classicist 
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and staunch defender of the reputation of The Fall of The Roman Empire, argues on 
academic and artistic grounds, “the case for the defence of serious and committed 
fiction based on history as exemplified in the genre of epic cinema, with special 
focus on Anthony Mann’s The Fall of the Roman Empire.”453 The film is worthy of 
these laudations because it so effectively “delivers the excitement, spectacle, 
action, and romance audiences expect from their epics, but it transcends them. The 
film articulates the meaning of historical cinema with greater eloquence, passion, 
and conviction than any other ancient epics have managed to do.”454 The 
significance of this positive assessment can, it is hoped, be applied more broadly, 
for it, “Can provide a test case, a kind of apologia pro pellicula historiographica, 
that can be applied to other historical films.”455  
The key analysis in this context is provided by Elenora Cavallini, who praises 
the historical plausibility of the film on these grounds:  
It is based on the historically plausible assumption that the primary causes of the 
epoch-making phenomenon referred to in its title can be traced back less to the 
barbarian invasions than to the weakening of Roman institutions and the ascent to 
the imperial throne by a series of mentally unstable and megalomaniac princes, 
who were incapable of, or uninterested in, their governing responsibilities.456  
 
This holds that its account of the causality of the decline and fall is a plausible 
and perceptive analysis. Its historicity, whatever liberties are taken with events, is 
thereby cause for great respect. Furthermore, “The Fall of the Roman Empire ought 
to be appreciated for its attempt to undertake an analysis of Roman society. The 
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results may be sketchy, but they are not too distant from historical reality, at least 
in some respects.”457 Allen M. Ward echoes this with the words, “What makes The 
Fall of the Roman Empire a worthy film is how seriously its director, producer, and 
screenwriter approached the history they portrayed.”458 
The problem with these assessments is that they are primarily concerned with 
proving and promoting the intellectual integrity of historical cinema and their value 
as methods to mediate history to the public. It is very reminiscent of that ideology 
of the “Classical Tradition,” and its appropriate forms for our age. To examine all 
these attitudes in their proper context, I need to return to the aims and intentions 
of The Fall, and see why they have found such a resonance with this scholarship. 
Mann’s thesis can be elaborated both by looking at the content of the film (in terms 
of its overt and latent or implicit meaning), from the essay, “Empire Demolition” 
that he wrote in the same year as The Fall to discuss its themes and purpose, and 
from additional interviews he provided on the subject.459 His asserted aim is to 
“dramatize how an empire fell.”460 The thesis presented runs thus. Rome is an 
advanced civilization and the basis of western culture, enlightenment and 
prosperity. Its fall presented a tragic setback to peace and prosperity for mankind. 
This fall is not the consequence of a material defeat by outsiders, or an actual 
process political, military, or territorial collapse, but a tale of decline and corruption 
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at the centre of the Imperium; a tragic genre narrative of folly and hubris that 
deserves repeating as a cautionary tale for future generations to avoid these 
mistakes.  
This thesis of Mann achieves its final fruition at the close of the film. Right 
before the credits roll, the film finishes pointedly - in 193 AD, almost 300 years 
before the actual “end” of the Western Empire in 476 AD - with the narrator, 
returning for the first time since the opening scene, quoting William Durant to say, 
“This was the beginning of the Fall of the Roman Empire. A great civilization is not 
conquered from without until it has destroyed itself within.” The rest of the Durant 
line, as it was originally published, summarises the fall of Rome in this way: “The 
essential causes of Rome’s decline lay in her people, her morals, her class struggle, 
her failing trade, her bureaucratic despotism, her stifling taxes, her consuming 
wars.”461 Aside from trade and bureaucracy - very difficult subjects for a feature 
film to tackle - all of these factors are explored in the film, and mark the stated 
beginning of the process of “decline and fall,” and thereby the fundamental reason 
for the end of the Roman Empire and an era of civilization, which we learn 
originated in the tumultuous and self-destructive reign of Commodus.462 The film 
shows how these enervating processes were first set in motion - the “First Cause” 
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of the eventual fall, unseen here, 300 years ahead in the future, yet still deemed 
inevitable by the close of events.  
It is here that I need to turn back to the influence on this film of Edward 
Gibbon. Both Mann and Gibbon desire to communicate a certain philosophical 
“truth” to their audience, through their own respective media, and we need to 
remind ourselves of what exactly that intended truth is. They equally mourn the 
death of the “heroic spirit of the Romans.”463 To both of them, the history of Rome 
was of universal significance and possessed symbolic value: it was something 
momentous, something that both had to be understood, and also whose lessons 
were applicable to other societies at other times. 
In Mann’s Fall of the Roman Empire, Roman civilization is represented as 
becoming subject to a sort of internal paralysis, which prevented the inhabitants, 
consumed by apathy and hubris, from averting its downfall. Its people no longer 
believed in it; they felt that their government did nothing for them, and so they did 
nothing in return to help it. Consequently, not only did Rome fall, but, on a more 
philosophical level, this fall was both a justified and at least partly morally inevitable 
result of the processes set inevitably in motion by the reign of one mad ruler, 
Commodus, three hundred years earlier. Gibbon wrote in the opening paragraph of 
Chapter I of the Decline and Fall that the fall of Rome was “a revolution which will 
ever be remembered, and is still felt by the nations of the earth.” Such decay is also 
the reason for the fall of Rome in Mann’s film. Gibbon’s influence on the film was 
reinforced by the participation of William Durant, a widely read American historian, 
whose Roman history Caesar and Christ, deeply influenced by Gibbon, Mann 
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appeared to have held in high regard. In a message to Durant, a mutual associate at 
Samuel Bronston’s production company called Mann “a disciple of yours.”464  
Ironically, Durant was cognisant of the film’s historical weaknesses when 
asked to become a consultant for the film. His comment on first reading the script 
was that though it was “brilliantly done” and dramatically effective, the problem 
was nevertheless that “it took so many liberties with history that I felt I had better 
withdraw from any connection with the film.” The particular divergences he cites 
are centred on Commodus. Factually, he disliked the manner of Commodus’ death - 
and thematically he felt that the “character and reign” of Commodus were 
“comparatively minor factors in the fall of Rome.”465 Durant finally relented, citing 
concessions provided by Mann, and an account of its popular context. It should, 
however, be noted that whatever the surface details of the story - Mann’s emphasis 
on Commodus, and Durant’s dismissal - the exact same core themes, of decline, 
enervation, and the loss of some ineffable Roman spirit, are still at play; and 
consequently it is no surprise that the “historian” was, as his biography makes clear, 
quickly brought on board.466    
The general respect accorded to William Durant is indicated not only by the 
quotations that bookend the film, but also by the prominent identification the man 
receives in the film’s opening credits, as their historical consultant. Mann claimed 
to have read much of Gibbon and Durant - together with ancient sources such as 
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the Historia Augusta - in preparation for this film.467 This is aside from the 
significant artistic influence of German Expressionist cinema on the project; 
characterised as it is by tales of corruption, doom and decline.468   
This concern with the causal processes of Rome’s fall, together with a 
melancholia that this transpired, sets The Fall apart from the contemporary era of 
epic filmmaking in some ways. It is a key reason for the film’s rehabilitation as a 
more serious, thoughtful, and somehow more “worthy” piece of historical 
filmmaking. The Fall of the Roman Empire is widely considered an “intelligently” 
made film and the most accomplished screen representation of ancient Rome. 
Historians generally think highly of The Fall but criticize Gladiator: for example, 
Eleonara Cavallini argues that in contrast to the more limited and sensationalist 
approach of Gladiator, Mann’s film “focuses on the mechanisms that underlie 
historical events.”469   
While The Fall is explicitly acknowledging its place in the cinematic tradition 
of the Roman epic, the film is clearly and consciously attempting to be a very 
different kind of film to the contemporary epics of its time. Instead, in The Fall 
viewers are invited to identify with the Romans as bringers of peace and civilization, 
as personified by a philosopher and ruler capable of resisting the corruptions and 
temptations of absolute power - unlike, tragically, his son Commodus. Rome at its 
best is still a symbol of great virtue - almost, in the form of Marcus, a progressive 
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ideal - even though at its worst, it mirrors the decadence of an epic such as Quo 
Vadis. In its initial voiceover, Mann’s film declares a significant distance between 
itself and the earlier Cold War narratives of Christianity triumphant,470 over the 
decadent and immoral body of Rome. Notably, its historical pretentions are 
revealed in the opening narration, which repeated almost word for word the first 
paragraph of Durant’s epilogue to Caesar and Christ, “The two greatest problems in 
history are how to account for the rise of Rome and how to account for her fall. We 
may come nearer to understanding the truth if we remember that the Fall of Rome, 
like her rise, did not have one cause but many and was not an event but a process 
spread over three hundred years. Some nations have not lasted as long as Rome 
fell.”471 Implicitly, this also emulates the famous statement by Gibbon: “instead of 
inquiring why the Roman Empire was destroyed we should rather be surprised that 
it has subsisted for so long (emphasis added).”472 
All this is a very deliberate attempt to stand outside of the Hollywood 
traditions of the genre, in an apparent quest for some greater historical truth. It is a 
self-conscious challenge to the entrenched Hollywood style for representing Rome. 
This serves its purpose as a contrast to the triumphalist Roman religious epics of the 
time, such as that found in Ben Hur and Quo Vadis; whose glorious message of 
rebirth, and allusions to American supremacy, it replaces with a cautionary message 
of the threats of overextension, imperialism, and the moral decay of a great society. 
The primary concern of the film, therefore, appears to be using the narrative and 
visual techniques available in contemporary cinematography to tell a tale of the 
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events which set the “decline and fall” in motion - and, more indirectly, to relate it 
to the problems and issues of the contemporary world of its audience. Despite the 
trappings of novelty and cinematic radicalism, this supposedly radical challenge to 
the conventions of Hollywood, for which the film had received very positive 
attention, is, at least thematically, nothing new.473 While The Fall is frequently cited 
as a bold, historically-minded departure from filmmaking traditions, its whole 
purpose has actually been one very fundamental to epic, historical, and ancient 
cinema. Mann observed in “Empire Demolition” that meaningful historical epics 
should differ from common spectacle films, and that he wanted to distance himself 
from the common approach.474 This purpose was suggested forty years earlier by 
DeMille, who wrote in an article published in The Ladies’ Home Journal in 1927, 
“The Public Is Always Right,” that “spectacle, for spectacle’s sake, is not only not 
worth what it costs, but it can be a positive detriment if it is not hooked up with 
human action.”475  
While its academic proponents have argued for the film’s concentration on 
the “mechanisms” of history, the content and narrative direction of Rome’s fall, as 
presented in this film, is rather simple. For all the talk by the opening narrator of a 
vast scale and subtle exploration of historical causation, the bulk of the story is 
woven around the tale of a simple contest of leadership between Commodus, and 
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his entirely fictional rival, Livius - an archetypal contrast to the villan, and an 
idealised representation of Roman virtue. The cinematic conventionality of this 
rivalry is demonstrated in its similarity to the antagonism between Roman and Jew 
in Ben Hur.476 Pointedly in fact, Stephen Boyd - who had played Ben-Hur’s rival 
Messala in that 1959 film - is cast as the hero, Livius, this time. Rome “destroys 
itself from within,”477 with its final and inevitable downfall quickly and rapidly set in 
motion after the loss of Marcus Aurelius - even if, implicitly, that doom may take 
centuries to be finally realised. One is reminded, in fact, of Gibbon: “…the decline of 
Rome was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness… the story of 
the ruin is simple and obvious.”478  
This point is driven home at the very end. As the honourable Livius refuses 
the throne of the now hopelessly corrupted empire, corrupt senators, greedy for 
that power, outbid each other with offers of increasingly huge bribes to the soldiers 
who would help them seize power. That scene, combined with Livius’ earlier failure 
to rally the senate to overthrow Commodus, also underscores the major theme in 
Gibbon: the inability of the empire’s political class - neutered by authoritarian 
powers of the emperor, and their own corruption - to provide the leadership 
necessary to preserve Rome’s greatness, and thereby proving to sit with the 
imperial throne as the rot at the heart of the decline and fall. 
Consequent to all this, it is critical for us to highlight a conspicuous absence 
from the film, and one that receives little attention from its academic criticism - 
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namely, that the film, whatever its purported merits, deficiencies, academic or 
artistic values aside, does not actually describe the fall of Rome - meaning in strict 
historical and “factual” terms the collapse of the Western Roman Empire over the 
course of the fifth century AD. It does not narrate the actual end of the empire, 
which persisted for another 300 years in the West - at least in nominal terms - to 
476, and in 400 AD was still nearly at its full geographic extent relative to the time 
of the death of Marcus Aurelius in 192 AD.479 The film itself is perfect example of 
the moral and thematic archetypes of this “decline and fall” mythology. While it 
purports to be concerned with an “authentic” recreation of history, it does, 
however, have very little to do with that history at all, as I shall demonstrate. Even 
the events, dates and people it describes have nothing to do with the actual Fall of 
Rome, but are connected to it only in the most tenuous fashion, and through a 
causal leap across almost 300 years.480 
This brings me to the heart of the film’s ideological stance. Rather than 
actually narrate or describe “The Fall of Rome” as a historical event, The Fall 
elaborates a universally applicable moral and political theory of decline: as 
demonstrated through a very loose historical narrative about the accession of 
Commodus, for when the empire supposedly, and with little offered evidence, 
doomed itself to eventual, unavoidable destruction. This hypothesis is deemed to 
be applicable outside this time-frame and to issues of the present day. It is precisely 
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through this logic that the “decline and fall” acts as a vehicle to paint a view of the 
present. As Mann himself says,  
The reason for making The Fall of the Roman Empire is that it is as modern today as 
it was in the history that Gibbon wrote: if you read Gibbon, like reading Churchill, it 
is like seeing the future as well as the past. The future is the thing that interested 
me in the subject. The past is like a mirror; it reflects what actually happened, and 
in the reflexion of the fall of Rome are the same elements in what is happening 
today, the very things that are making our empires fall.481 
 
Mann acknowledges a debt to the historical record, and suggests objectivity 
in his essential approach. The efforts of the film supposedly represent a balance 
between historical fact and an imaginative recreation of the past.  When examined 
in detail, however, his use of history is tenuous and replete with very obvious 
factual or thematic problems. The director prided himself on his use of historical 
sources.482 The Fall, for one of its great narrative “twists”, draws on the rumour 
from the Historia Augusta, a Late Roman biographical collection, that Commodus 
was the son of a gladiator, not Marcus Aurelius - providing in the film for a very 
dramatic revelation scene, near the climax of the action, where Commodus kills his 
birth father upon this revelation in a moment of mad rage.483 This fabrication has 
no real factual basis. Rumours of Aurelius’s wife Faustina’s adulteries do feature in 
the Historia Augusta, which appears to seek a narrative explanation for why 
Commodus had a character quite so different from his stoic, austere father.484 
However, more than a century of criticism on the Historia has shown the text to be 
extremely unreliable at best, and that it often veers into the imaginary and 
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invented. The content of the Historia varies from simply inaccurate, to deliberately 
misleading and fraudulent: it contains some “primary” documents, such as the 
speeches of senators, but almost all of these are now rejected by historians as 
fabrications. The true authorship of the work, its date of production, and intended 
purpose, have long been matters of academic controversy.485 Modern scholarship is 
largely dismissive of these stories of Commodus.486 Nor for that matter is it seen in 
the more reputable history of Cassius Dio.487 Gibbon, otherwise a frequent 
inspiration for Mann, does not see fit to legitimise or even discuss the possibility. 
The Historia Augusta also shows its influence here in the depiction of the manner of 
Marcus Aurelius’s death according to Mann, killed by conspirators who wanted to 
secure the succession of Commodus for their own political interests. The blind 
advisor Cleander tricks Marcus into eating the poisoned half of an apple, cutting it 
in full view with a knife that is smeared with poison only on one side; a clever plot 
device that very closely follows the description in the Historia Augusta of Marcus 
killing Lucius Verus, his former co-emperor, in the same way.488  
Mann’s Commodus still remains very close to the Commodus of the 
Gibbonian tradition - a self-mythologizing maniac and psychopath who tried to 
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drown every revolt in blood; and who, above all, proved utterly unable to hold on 
to the reins of the empire.489 But most of the details narrated to support that image 
are wholly fictional. The two major events depicted in The Fall that catalyse the ruin 
of the empire - the great Eastern revolt and civil war, and the punitive taxation 
policy by Commodus that fuelled them - are both fictions.490 They are possibly 
inspired by the rebellion of Queen Zenobia of Palmyra in 270 AD, who seized the 
Near East, Egypt and part of Asia Minor, putting her efforts on a scale similar to the 
rebellion shown in this film. These are the only major precedents, but they had very 
different causes, and no connection to Commodus’ reign and policies.  
The man’s follies, too, are largely invented. In that respect, they echo the 
tradition of ancient historiography on the ruler, which often exaggerates his faults 
to mythic and fantastical proportions,491 while retaining the same broad depiction 
of the man as debauched, psychotic, and incompetent. The Historia Augusta paints 
Commodus as a man so consumed by his depravity that he did not hesitate to sign 
compromising peace treaties with the peoples his father earlier had defeated, in 
order to devote himself more fully to his dark pleasures: “He abandoned the war 
which his father had almost finished and submitted to the enemy’s terms, and then 
he returned to Rome.”492  
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It is no accident that Mann draws so heavily on the tales and legends of the 
Historia Augusta, despite its dubious and greatly disputed record. The Fall of the 
Roman Empire is the product of fantasy. As with almost every film or imaginative 
text set in ancient and medieval Rome it has little to do with known historical 
realities.493 Its grand thematic pretentions should not make it immune from these 
observations. The Fall introduces a number of merely hypothetically and factually 
groundless details and a series of fictitious characters. The decline of the empire is 
shown primarily in moral terms. The Fall puts much greater emphasis on the 
dramatic and philosophical implications of its story - that of Commodus and his 
clash with the fictive hero Livius - than on historical authenticity or probability. The 
narrative is ostensibly about the fall of the Roman Empire and yet the Roman 
Empire here does not “fall”; it is not split apart, or defeated on the battlefield, its 
tyrant is removed and its external and internal threats are all dealt with by the end. 
Yet the closing scene makes it very clear that the fall of Rome, in 193 AD, regardless 
of any future events, has now become inevitable; not for material or military 
reasons, but due to the moral decay - that it has, it is suggested, “destroyed itself 
from within.”  
It should be clear that The Fall of the Roman Empire is not a work of history in 
any recognisable scholarly sense, nor a remotely accurate approximation of the 
events it describes, despite the many defences that have been offered in this 
respect. Rather, it combines fact and fiction to create a purportedly accurate feeling 
of history. The Fall interweaves the public - characters from history - with the 
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private - invented characters interacting with historical figures. Mann’s film is 
organised in a form closely resembling a historical novel, in which imaginary 
characters are mixed in with real ones to allow the author to shape his narrative in 
a specific way: thus in The Fall, Livius provides a binary counterpart to the vice-
ridden despot Commodus.   
This type of narrative device has its roots in Romantic literature, in particular 
the novels of Sir Walter Scott.494 Scott’s influence on historical literature and on 
other kinds of historical recreations, in print or on the screen, cannot be 
overestimated - particular in relation to Gibbon’s approach to history. Trevelyan in 
particular noted the thematic links between Scott and Gibbon:  
Gibbon’s cold, classical light was replaced by the rich mediaeval hues of Walter 
Scott’s stained glass... No doubt Scott exaggerated his theme, as all innovators are 
wont to do. But he did more than any professional historian to make mankind 
advance towards a true conception of history…  The great antiquarian and novelist 
showed historians that history must be living, many-coloured and romantic if it is to 
be a true mirror of the past.495  
 
He further argues for the essential value of Gibbon’s style in communicating 
history, for, “If Gibbon had taken as little trouble about writing as later historians, 
his volumes would have been as little read, and would have perished as quickly as 
theirs.”496 It is these “artistic” qualities of his history that explain much of his impact 
and appeal in our wider culture. Trevelyan referred to the “genius” of Gibbon as 
being his ability “to unite accuracy with art.”497 Bowersock acknowledges this 
significance by saying: “Gibbon shaped his truth as if it were fiction, preserving 
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thereby the animation of human history and the art of the novelist.”498 As discussed 
previously, the literary function of historiography is intimately connected with 
historical films as visual texts. Henryk Sienkiewicz’s nineteenth-century novel was 
the basis for Quo Vadis. Ben Hur was heavily based on the nineteenth-century 
novel. Such a connection with preceding literature and its traditions is highly 
evident in The Fall. 499   
While one can consider The Fall a piece of imaginative storytelling, and the 
representation of an earlier literary myth of decline, rather than history of a purer 
standard, this does not mean that the inferences from the historical record are 
entirely inaccurate, or irrelevant to the content. Sometimes a more scrupulous 
accuracy does appear to have actually been the goal - where, at least, this 
interpretation better coheres to the presented conception of decline. In this 
respect, notable in The Fall is the desire to create an entirely secular account of the 
decline of Rome. Christianity, in an era when most ancient epics such as Quo Vadis, 
The Robe and Ben Hur, possessed profoundly religious themes, is instead 
conspicuous by its absence. 500  
This also involves a departure from the line of its most important literary 
source, Gibbon. Derek Elley attempts to justify this by saying that “the film-makers 
found a suitable soulmate: Gibbon also placed little importance on Christianity, 
preferring a broader view of the reasons for the collapse of the Empire, and he too 
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was apt to let strict chronology fall victim to his overall plan.”501 He is rather 
mistaken in this respect - Gibbon ascribed a very considerable amount of blame to 
the faith, and Mann and Gibbon have little in common in this regard. Furthermore, 
that “strict chronology” of a fall is exactly what Mann depicts in this film. The doom 
of Rome is written by the closing credits - the empire “destroyed itself from within.” 
Furthermore, Gibbon never actually describes the decline and fall as being brought 
about by the reign of Commodus, and the developments in that period - only that it 
signalled an end to the fabled “Age of the Antonines,” and the beginning of a long, 
but not permanent period of strife. No deeper inference is present on the period; 
whereas the whole of chapter fifteen of the Decline and Fall is devoted to the 
impact of religious superstition on undermining the mental and moral foundations 
of Roman rule.       
Christianity and religion in general, is almost entirely exorcised from Mann’s 
film. Marcus mentions the Christians only once, as he meditates on death, where 
he expresses a mild aversion to their theatricality.502 The only other exception to 
their absense is a visual allusion in the chi-rho pendant worn by the Greek 
philosopher Timonides.503 Faith is much more prominent in The Fall’s unofficial 
remake, Gladiator - though even that film keeps its presence relatively subtle, in 
comparison to the Christian Roman epics of the 1940s and 1950s. Christianity even 
plays a much greater role in the novelisation of The Fall than the film, with 
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meditations by Marcus Aurelius and Timonides on Christian doctrine.504 In his novel 
Marius the Epicurean (1882) - a literary source of inspiration for the film - Walter 
Pater repeatedly reminded his readers of the spread of Christianity under the 
Antonines, especially during Marcus’ reign.505 This represents the “second” strand 
of Christianity I have discussed, in reference to representations of Rome and her fall 
- one is the triumphalist ideology (as present in Quo Vadis, Ben Hur, The Sign of the 
Pagan, and their associated literature) of eventual Christian supremacy; the other, 
typically secular narrative directly associates it with the decline of the empire, and 
owes much to Gibbon and the humanist tradition.     
But here the script presents the decline in purely Roman terms: not as the 
conflict between paganism and Christianity which most cinemagoers would have 
expected at the time.506 Mann himself criticized those films that “gave the 
impression that the Christian movement was the only thing the Roman Empire was 
about,” claiming instead that “it was a minor incident in the greatness of the Roman 
Empire,” and said that he and his writers “wanted to tell the Roman story and not 
the Christian story.” The other more latent purpose is that the inherently more 
positive and prominent presence of Christianity in the contemporary American epic 
would not satisfy his message; it is a film about decline and fall, not resurrection or 
rebirth. Contradicting himself a little, Mann concedes that Christianity is important 
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in the later empire, primarily in preserving the ongoing legacy of Rome; for in his 
words Durant, doing something “Gibbon couldn’t do,” treated Christianity as “the 
resurrection of the Roman empire, because out of it came the Papacy and Rome 
today is as alive as it was in those days.”507        
 In this respect, Mann does attempt to reinterpret one aspect of the 
historiography that otherwise deeply informs and defines the film. Gibbon was 
intensely critical of the role of Christianity in undermining the virtues and character 
of ancient Rome, and catalysing her eventual downfall, a factor he cited at length. 
By contrast, William Durant was less savage in his criticism of the faith, but, echoing 
Oswald Spengler, saw the decline of a civilization as a culmination of tension and 
strife between secular and spiritual intellectualism - the apex of the cycle of decline 
and fall.508 The triumph of such spirituality catalysed the downward motion of the 
cycle, and the slide into unreason and chaos. Finally, out of these ashes, civilization 
can be “born anew.” The process is described in these terms: 
… a certain tension between religion and society marks the higher stages of every 
civilization… The intellectual classes abandon the ancient theology and - after some 
hesitation - the moral code allied with it; literature and philosophy become 
anticlerical… In the end a society and its religion tend to fall together, like body and 
soul, in a harmonious death. Meanwhile among the oppressed another myth arises, 
gives new form to human hope, new courage to human effort, and after centuries 
of chaos builds another civilization.509 
 
On the theme of Christianity, it should be noted that Mann rejects the 
depiction of conflict, so common in the epic films of this era, between Rome the 
imperial oppressor, and a Christianity that represents moral values and liberty. For 
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this the film has drawn considerable academic praise, as a more authentic and 
accurate interpretation of events.510 Strictly speaking, this is a more “accurate” 
approach to the period, in that one very specific sense, and it adds to the veneer of 
historical authority in the project. Thematically, however, the effect of this 
revisionist approach to Christianity in the decline, and the moral evaluation of its 
causes, is barely altered at all. Mann’s film maintains a religiously moral outlook, 
just as earlier versions of this myth do. Its tone and content may be avowedly a-
theological, but such an undertone makes it an easy step for Ridley Scott’s 
Gladiator to introduce a more overtly spiritual subtext. 
 
 
The Fall and Contemporary Discourses of Empire  
It should be no surprise that, crafted in the context of American epic cinema, 
The Fall of the Roman Empire has a great deal to say about the world of 1964: 
whether in an overt and deliberate fashion, or buried in its latent insinuations. 
Mann’s own approach to this question reflects a desire to situate the events of the 
second century AD in a modern context, particularly in light of the Cold War. 
Despite its stated intention to accurately and meaningfully depict the essence of 
the downfall of Rome, it is an American film, made with modern American themes 
and concerns in mind.  The Fall focuses on themes of peaceful coexistence, and the 
social and political integration of new, initially hostile, ethnic groups into the 
empire’s boundaries. This message is embodied in his use of particular narrative 
tools. Typically the theme is stated right at the outset in a montage, or a speech, or 
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some images which lets us know that what we are about to witness are great public 
issues at stake. In an early scene, Marcus Aurelius states to his general Livius, his 
chosen successor and the protagonist of the film, “It is time we found a peaceful 
way to live with those you call barbarians.” In his speech to the assembled leaders 
of the senate, the emperor declares, “You do not resemble each other… Yet… you 
are the unity which is Rome. Wherever you live, whatever the colour of your skin, 
when peace is achieved, it will be to all… the supreme rights of Roman citizenship… 
No longer provinces, or colonies, but… a family of equal nations.”511 The historical 
parallels that layer the scene run backwards as well as forward. The speech of a 
white-haired senator supporting the proposal to grant citizenship to barbarians, 
emphasising the need for continued growth and change, very closely echoes that 
which the Roman historian Tacitus put in the mouth of Claudius before senators, 
who used the example of Sparta and Athens being ruined because they did not 
incorporate the conquered into the body politic.512 Arguments in modern American 
debates about and against large-scale immigration - a running issue in American 
society and social and political debate throughout the twentieth century - can echo 
that voiced here by Commodus and his allies.  
The past/present diorama in The Fall recalls the historical parallels between 
the classical past and American present set up by the religious epics of the 1950s. 
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Ben Hur (1959), Quo Vadis (1951) and The Robe (1953) had frequently been 
interpreted by the press as providers of moral and political lessons of the Cold War 
- both the threat posed to American and Western “freedoms”, and the likely 
positive outcome of the struggle of ideologies itself. The contemporary cultural and 
political resonance of The Fall, though particularly buried and implicit for a 
historical epic of the time, was picked up immediately by critics and the media upon 
the film’s release. The Motion Picture Herald plucked from this a message of the 
film that the Roman Empire fell because it lacked an essential feature of modern 
peace and stability: a United Nations.513 “Progressives” of the 1960s appeared 
anxious to prevent the dangerous posturing of rival superpowers from escalating 
into a nuclear holocaust and the worldwide collapse of civilization.514 Anthony 
Mann and Samuel Bronston (as producer) had recently made films on similar 
themes, as peoples and nations that had been rivals united to create a peaceful and 
prosperous world order: Mann and Bronston with El Cid (1961) and Bronston with 
director Nicholas Ray on 55 Days at Peking (1963).  Presenting the audience with 
the flip-side of this logic, at the very end of The Fall, the narrator intones Durant to 
tell us that civilizations, not empires, have to first destroy themselves from within 
before they can be taken down from the outside. Consequently, a less “liberal” and 
positive reading of the film’s use of historical analogies than that found in the 
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Herald would see the film not as an account of the inevitable victory of the United 
States, but a warning of the impending possibility of its decline and fall; not just as 
an international power, but in the very fabric of its culture and values.   
Ironically, the commercial machine overlooked and side-lined the film’s 
aspirations, and the attempted radical reinterpretation of the epic; instead 
representing it as a flawed blockbuster, a failed attempt to follow in the great 
tradition of Cecil B. DeMille and his successors. Notably, contemporary critics 
offered it unflattering regard, treating it as a muddled, inferior, but otherwise 
typical example of an overdone genre: the New York Herald Tribune, in particular, 
described the film as “all pomp and poppycock.”515 Numerous reviewers saw the 
film as a dilution and misappropriation of Gibbon’s work, an accusation that 
prompted the director to defensively reply, 
Now I guarantee you there is not one person that had read Gibbon... From Bosley 
Crowther on down or up. And for them to start to say: “This isn’t Gibbon” - well, 
this is a lot of crap! Because all we were trying to do was dramatize how an empire 
fell. Incest, buying an army, destroying the will of the people to speak through the 
Senate, all these things... were in the film... it had more truth than untruth.516  
 
The reference to the components of this overall “truth”: “incest, buying an 
army, destroying the will of the people,” fits the frame I have described for both the 
shape of this myth as a whole, and Mann’s portrayal of history through it.  “Truth” 
is suggested here to lie not so much in the wholly accurate depiction of events, or 
even an appropriate timeline (as events here are set 300 years before the “fall” of 
Rome in any historic sense), but in distilling the essential and meaningful qualities 
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of a story for the audience. Past events have been mined for a dramatic moral tale, 
which is justified as “good history” on these grounds. 
In light of its poor critical reception, The Fall of the Roman Empire was 
overlooked during the Academy awards, save for a sole nomination for Best Score 
by Dimitri Tiomkin. Yet the film had its defenders: the critic for the Daily Express in 
Britain called it “an epic to make one cheer rather than cringe” and the Evening 
Standard declared it “one of the best all-round epics I have ever seen.”517 After its 
critical and commercial failure, the film quickly became synonymous, ironically, 
with the decline of Hollywood’s long empire of Roman epics,518 though the causes 
of this trend are complicated, involving spiralling production costs, and a 
generational trend shift in consumer tastes - both of which challenged the studio 
system in general - amongst other reasons. As Elley says, “It is a convenient, though 
nonetheless true, fact that The Fall of the Roman Empire is synonymous with the 
Fall of the Historical Epic.”519 International epic filmmaking, however, continued, in 
varying forms.520 The revival of antiquity in epic cinema, however, did not come till 
the turn of the twenty-first century, in a cultural and political climate that renewed 
its relevance.     
                                                          
517
 The Daily Express (1
st
 June, 1964), and the Evening Standard (8
th
 June, 1964). 
518
 Says Derek Elley, “The Fall of the Roman Empire,” Films and Filming, XXII (1976), p. 18, “It is a 
convenient, though nonetheless true, fact that The Fall of the Roman Empire is synonymous with the 
Fall of the Historical Epic.” Martin Winkler makes the defence that “failure of the film at the box 
office is, however, not a sign of its artistic failure,” in Winkler (2009), p. 21. This is a reasonable 
observation, though the critical (at the time) and commercial failure of the movie means it failed to 
communicate its intended message to its audience.  He also describes it here as a “story of loss and 
defeat that stands apart from more common stories either of victory over evil empires and tyrants 
or of moral or spiritual vindication cannot have been appealing to the masses.”   
519
 Elley (1976), p. 18. 
520
 For studies on the decline of epic films see Maria Wyke, Projecting the Past: Ancient Rome, 
Cinema and History (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 183-192, Allen Barra, “The Incredible Shrinking 
Epic,” American Film, XIV (1989), pp. 40-43, p. 45, and Vivian Sobchack, “Surge and Splendor: A 
Phenomenology of the Hollywood Historical Epic,” Representations, XXIX (1990), pp. 24-49. 
201 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: DECADENCE, IMPERIALISM AND DECLINE FROM THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY   
 
Mass Culture and its Critics  
 The later industrialised world finds an especially appropriate significance in the 
decline and fall; configuring barbarism with the dehumanization of the mechanized 
and mass-produced world. Writing in The Promise of the Coming Dark Age (1976), 
Leften Stavrianos says that “the circumstances of the fall of Rome… are very 
relevant to the present world.”521 For critics of “late industrial capitalism,” the 
abundance of material production presupposed and required divisions of labour 
which intensified the divisions of societies and men against themselves. In the 
decadence of capitalism, as in the “slow poison” of Gibbon’s seemingly peaceful 
and productive second century AD, the fruits of human accomplishment ironically 
diminished their creators.522  
For some authors, this phase of industrial society represents the very end of 
the processes of decline that precede the fall. Robert Sinai, in The Decadence of the 
Modern World (1978), describes how, “We are living amidst the ruins of a 
civilization, with both its mental and material structures crumbling” - almost 
identically, John Lukacs in The Passing of the Modern Age (1970) refers earlier to 
how, “We live now amidst the ruins of a civilization: but most of these ruins are in 
our minds.” Sinai discusses the decline and fall of the ancient world only indirectly 
in his account of the problems of modern society. He pays most attention to “mass 
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culture” and “mass civilizations” as the principal causes of the disaster and terminal 
decay he predicts in the imminent future of the world. The reason for him, as 
suggested by cultural theorist Marshall McLuhan, is that “the old verbal culture is in 
decline and there is everywhere a general retreat from the word.”523 Sinai, in a 
1979 edition of literary magazine Encounter, suggests that visual mass media have 
followed mass literacy in sabotaging the high cultural elements of a civilization, 
developed and nurtured only through the leadership of creative elites. The 
consequence of this is that, “The high culture based on privilege and hierarchical 
order and sustained by great works of the past” has disappeared; bombarded and 
disoriented by “a central failure in the arts and in the graces of personal and social 
behaviour… modern man is suffused with fears of a new ‘Dark Age’ in which 
civilization itself as we know it may disappear…”524  
Such a decline can have a significant cultural component to its critique, and a 
natural target in mass cultural output. In The Culture of Narcissism (1979), 
Christopher Lasch quotes a surfboard enthusiast on the impact of the TV networks 
on his pursuit, “Television is destroying our sport. The TV producers are turning a 
sport and an art form into a circus.” One word here, circus, is enough to invoke the 
analogy of the corrupting processes of ancient Rome.525 The British author and 
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journalist Malcolm Muggerridge, concerned with the indoctrinating power of mass 
media, quotes Gibbon in conservative magazine The American Spectator, namely 
the words “it was artfully contrived by Augustus Caesar that in the enjoyment of 
plenty, the Romans should lose their memory of freedom,” and draws from it the 
observation that “in the case of the American dream… (it is as if) Augustus Caesar 
read the media and the advertisers who support them.”526 On more exclusively 
cultural grounds, Bernard James in The Death of Progress (1973), citing Toynbee’s 
distinction between external and internal barbarians, writes that:  
Where the external barbarian pounds at the gates of civilization with battering ram 
and war club, the internal barbarian insinuates values and habits that degrade 
civilized life from within. I interpret much of the so-called counter-culture we 
witness about us today as evidence of such internal barbarism. It takes the form of 
vandals scratching obscene graffiti on the walls of a synagogue or a courthouse; it is 
a mass of middle-class youth… knee deep in the rubbish of spent affluence; it is a 
faddish imitation of primitive dress and body paint.527 
 
For James, modern mass culture has produced a decline in society, standards, 
culture and manners - all of which produces a “decay in meaning.” The analogy with 
the undoing of ancient Rome, implicit above, becomes obvious when he describes 
the significance of this newer type of barbarian, who, in that they “betray gross and 
alien values,” are “evidence that something has gone out of modern Western 
civilization, that something is insinuating itself through every breach in Western 
ideals.” Their apparent newness betrays a familiar archetype: “They bring to mind 
images of goatskin-clad Visigoths stumbling among the ruins of ancient Rome, 
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draping themselves with loot, grinning as they urinate at the base of empty temples 
in the Forum. These symbols of Classical ideals had no meaning to such men.”528   
Contained within this criticism of “faddish” practices is a cherishing of the 
past - or rather an idealized vision of a distant one - at the expense of the present. 
Such a view is not confined to conservative authorship. It is mirrored in Daniel Bell’s 
Marxian-inflected The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (1976), which attempts 
to identify “the historic cultural crisis of all Western bourgeoisie society.” Aside 
from the familial criticism of hedonism, consumerism and industry, Bell searches for 
a positive and energizing force by which society may be revived, and accomplishes 
his goal through a parable of the fall of Rome, and the parallel rise of Christianity. 
The crisis Bell predicts is similar to those of the past in that it can only truly be 
resolved “over long historical time-frames.” This is because, “It took almost 300 
years for Christianity to become established in the Roman Empire, and as Gibbon 
remarked of the conversion of Constantine, Rome then passed into an intolerable 
phase of its history, a phase that lasted for 250 years.”529  
It is through the apparent wisdom of this precedent, therefore, that Bell seeks 
to reverse the perceived decline and fall of the modern world; through, he believes, 
a “great instauration,” or revival of the sacred. What Bell is looking for is some 
analogue to the rise of Christianity - a “religious answer” to the “shambles of 
modern culture,” elsewhere described by him as “demonic”. This is in contrast to 
the mere “cults” sprouting up everywhere in the modern world contemporary to 
Bell, sources of hope amidst the decay, but which lack “the superior strength of a 
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theology and organization” of early Christianity.530 Rome, therefore, was better 
able to manage and survive her own decline, because she maintained a religious 
and spiritual vitality that is conspicuously absent from the supposed chaos of 
modern culture. The superiority of the religious and spiritual values of the classical 
world is again argued for in Richard Sennett’s The Fall of Public Man: On the Social 
Psychology of Capitalism (1977) - a work which first rejects, then embraces, the 
comparative model of Roman decline. Sennett dismisses the idea that “moral 
rottenness is supposed to have sapped Rome’s power to rule in the west,” and that, 
as a consequent analogy, such rot “is said to have sapped the modern West’s power 
to rule the globe.” The dismissal, however, is qualified; partly because the Romans 
were always decadent, but also because this was balanced by their theistic spiritual 
values, they were still somehow less rotten than the secularized mass culture of 
modern life.531  
Eschatological and religious language, therefore, deeply informs these 
representations of decline and their corresponding imagery. That the age and 
culture of the late twentieth century are somehow apocalyptic in their character is 
almost a truism in public intellectual criticism. In the words of Walter Wagar, since 
the First World War “the serious literature of most Western countries” has been 
“drenched with apocalyptic imagery.”532 Patrick Brantlinger in Bread and Circuses 
(1983), reaffirms the “decadence and barbarism” of the modern world, whilst also 
offering a vision for “the dawn of a new faith,” for currently, “We only have faith 
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that we are declining and falling; we do not yet have faith in our ability to build a 
new civilization.” Instead, he suggests, “We, the newest barbarians, in the midst of 
this declining civilization, must learn to preserve what we are ravaging… we must 
learn to change it in ways which are radical, even utopian…” This analogy is 
conveyed through a comparative image of the fifth century, for, as Brantlinger 
quotes William Thompson, “A Roman senator cannot become a Frankish Christian 
without first dying and being reborn.”533 It is notable, then, for the spiritual 
qualities suggested in this change, couched as it is in the language of Christian 
rebirth. This highlights, in line with old theological precepts, the decadence - the 
opposite force of spirituality - and moral emptiness that needs to be overcome. 
These criticisms can therefore contain a spiritual dimension, just as they have 
been more narrowly secular or social in character - what stays in common in them, 
however, is the myth and usage of Roman decline. The cursory and repeated 
invocation of some form of a Dark Age in culture, society or politics, provides a 
narrative model for invoking the decline and fall to engage with the entire 
argument about the modern world. Reflecting on the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, the 
writer Jack Miles can muse on the comparison in this way, “When the barbarians 
sacked Rome in 410, the Romans thought it was the end of civilization. You smile - 
but what followed was the Dark Ages.”534 
Without needing to discuss the historicity of the decline and fall, the story of 
the fate of Rome can be summoned to buttress the account of the impending doom 
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of Western civilization, by enshrining its teleology with the sanction of precedent. 
No further details of this period are provided; the name, functioning as an 
archetype, is enough. Indeed the logic here is characteristic of virtually all such 
social theories and criticism that have been discussed - namely, that if the fall of 
empires can be prophesized, it must also be predetermined. The primary 
consequence of the Roman example, therefore, is that it means the steps in this 
process are known. The decline of civilization, such as that of the classical world, 
produces the ignorance and barbarism of the “medieval” Dark Age. In these 
representations, the classical and medieval function hand in hand.  
Such an idea proves a powerful notion when discussing societies and 
civilizations perceived to be at their peak, and painting it, as Gibbon did with the 
Antonines, as a paradox. Robert Sinai writes that, “Growing efficacy involves 
growing degeneration of life instincts,” has produced, in no uncertain terms, “the 
decline of man. Every progressive impulse must sooner or later become fatigued,” 
and “a culture may founder on real and tangible progress.”535 This paradox of the 
inherent decadence, and internal undoing, present in the arc of progress is painted 
in similar assertions by other contemporaneous writers. Hans Morgenthau, the 
historian of international relations, states that “it is one of the great ironies of 
contemporary history that the moral and material decline of the West has in good 
measure been accomplished through the moral and material triumphs of the West 
(emphasis added).”536 One is immediately reminded of Gibbon’s notion that 
“prosperity ripened the principle of decay.”537 Marya Mannes, the author and 
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cultural critic of American life, speculates that the “greatest technological leap 
known to man” may have produced “a night of the soul, a return to a new form of 
barbarism?”538  
The conceptual model of Rome present in these narratives, whether only 
hinted at (as with Mannes) or declared more explicitly (by Bernard James), is 
composed of the same ideas about civilization, decadence and decline. Gibbon, 
echoing Montesquieu, had declared that Rome fell, first and foremost, due to her 
“immoderate greatness.” Augustine, in the first iconic account of Rome’s decline, 
emphasizes in more theological terms, pride as both raising the empire to greatness 
and sowing the seeds of its downfall.539 Rousseau describes how, “The Roman 
Empire in its turn, having engulfed all the riches of the universe, fell prey to the 
people who knew not what riches were.”540 Luxury and prosperity undermines 
empires and societies. Such is a central premise of this myth; that it represents and 
describes not a single past event but an archetype of universal application and 
meaning. It is one usually devoid of many actual facts, but suffused in narrative. 
Such a narrative is easily fashioned out of this history. A book by George Brauer, 
published in 1967, was titled The Young Emperors: Rome, A.D. 193-244. It describes 
the early part of the third century, during which time a series of young rulers came 
to the throne, often with hereditary connections behind their claim. Reissued in 
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1995, the book was given a new title: The Decadent Emperors: Power and Depravity 
in Third-Century Rome.541 
A very detailed invocation of Roman history to describe the strains faced in 
the advanced industrial world is made by Joseph Tainter, the American 
anthropologist and historian, who in The Collapse of Complex Societies (1988) 
fashioned a theory of the inherent vulnerability of complex societies to successfully 
adapt to their problems. Tainter argues that societies become more complex in 
order to resolve their internal tensions. Such complexity requires a considerable 
and growing “energy” subsidy, and when society is confronted with a shortage or 
difficultly of access to such “energy”, it creates new layers of bureaucracy, 
infrastructure, and class hierarchy to cope with the challenge. Such a process adds 
so much strain to the system that it invariably leads to its downfall. The decline of 
Rome functions as a test-case for this idealisation of history, as he explained in a 
documentary interview on economic and energy crisis,  
In ancient societies that I studied, for example the Roman Empire, the great 
problem that they faced was when they would have to incur very high costs just to 
maintain the status quo. Invest very high amounts in solving problems that don't 
yield a net positive return, but instead simply allowed them to maintain what they 
already got. This decreases the net benefit of being a complex society.542 
 
The importance of this example is explored in some detail. As Roman 
agricultural output is supposed to have declined, per-capita energy availability 
dropped. The Romans “solved” this problem by conquering their neighbours to 
appropriate their energy surpluses in the form of raw material commodities and 
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labour. However, as the empire grew, the cost of maintaining the administration 
and bureaucracy of the empire, army and state spiralled faster than the benefits of 
expansion and conquest, resulting in the so-called “crisis of the third century.” 
Intense, authoritarian efforts to maintain cohesion by Diocletian and Constantine in 
the third and fourth century only led to an ever greater strain on the population. 
Consequently, the Western Empire, eroding in power and cohesion, crumbled in 
the wake of its powerful external foes - the East, also weakened but less 
threatened, succumbed only slowly and by piecemeal.543 
I have discussed how these approaches to universal and comparative notions 
of decline more explicitly examine the details of the later Roman Empire, in 
particular its political and economic configuration. Much of Tainter’s analysis sits in 
stark contradiction to the professional and academic history around the Late 
Antique Roman Empire - in particular, the size of the bureaucracy and the state of 
agriculture. This highlights the difference between a factual approach to the past, 
and the representation of it; which can be wildly divergent from this, and beholden 
to other narrative and ideological concerns. An illusion of professional and 
“academic” veracity is found in Tainter’s analysis, who devotes a chapter of his 
book to a summary of historic and historiographical notions of the fall of Rome, 
focusing on a divide between mystical, moral, and socio-economic theories of 
decline; and notes the value of all of them whilst emphasizing his own preference 
for the latter, a supposedly more grounded and modern, empirical study.544 Yet 
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while the tools of his analysis are decidedly secular and contemporary, the core 
thesis is unchanged - that the empire was worn away by slow, progressive internal 
decline, and that, most importantly, it is of the kind that can be extrapolated 
universally to explain the fates of other societies. Tainter does not confine his form 
of analysis to Rome, but speculates, in the same book, on Mayan civilization, Chaco 
culture, and the contemporary world; Roman decline and fall underpins the model 
that is applied to all of these.     
The only alternative thesis to explain the fall of Rome that is seriously 
considered by Tainter is that of the classical and Late Antique historian John Bagnell 
Bury, who argued (in Tainter’s words) “that there was no general explanation for 
the fall of Rome, that is resulted from a series of contingent events,” as a 
succession of weak emperors mismanaged the defences of the empire at the time 
of the significant barbarian irruptions into the empire of the “Visigoths”. Bury is one 
of the few professional historians of the period actually cited, and his argument is 
quickly dismissed, on these grounds: 
Chance concatenation arguments by definition provide no basis for generalization, 
and so fail to satisfy the need for a global understanding of a recurrent process. 
Explanation by reference to historical accident furthermore has logical failings. It is 
argued by some that all is chance concatenation of events. This argument goes too 
far but there is some validity to the notion that random factors influence all 
processes. To the extent that random factors occur with some statistical regularity 
over time, they cannot account for a phenomenon far more limited in its 
occurrence.545 
 
It is therefore seen as impossible to describe the fall of Rome through 
historical contingency, because that would be “random”, and random factors occur 
all the time. This is of course at odds with many of the dominant historical 
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explanations for the events and processes of the fifth century AD. It also makes 
little logical sense: just because some random things occur all the time, does not 
mean that the specific ones involved in a historical event such as the fall of Rome 
do.  Most importantly for Tainter, contingency is dismissed because it conflicts with 
the notion at the heart of this work, namely “the need for a global understanding of 
a recurrent process,” and is therefore rejected on principle. In his argument, the 
Roman Empire had been undergoing a catastrophic loss of complexity from the 
crises of the third century, and so the specific events or facts of its downfall are 
simply functions of this broader, inevitable trajectory. Crucially, the modern, 
globalized world is deemed to be subject to many of the same stresses and strains 
that brought these ancient societies to ruin.546 The thesis of spiralling complexity 
and its consequences is best accounted for in the story Rome, therefore, yet proves 
to have universal and modern implication.  
This discussion brings me onto the point of exactly what are the failures, or 
symptoms of decline, that the writers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
have seen as represented in Rome’s perceived fall that feature in their present 
horizons. It is here that I can attempt to contradict the contention of Glen 
Bowersock, who in 1996 in The Vanishing Paradigm of the Fall of Rome wrote that, 
“The fall of Rome is no longer needed, and like the writing on a faded papyrus, it no 
longer speaks to us.”547 Not only is the decline and fall a living myth, but it has 
acquired a particular modern relevance in the tradition of American political and 
historical thought that compares the rise and zenith of Rome and America 
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respectively as superpowers of their age.548 A long string of “crisis” books have 
appeared in the run-up to the twenty-first century, and especially with the end of 
the Cold War; as if to prepare in some way their readers for an approaching period 
of deep dislocation and uncertainty, and using the example of Rome as she fell from 
glory to ruin. Paul Kennedy, in an often quoted work, argued in The Rise and Fall of 
the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000 (1987) 
that Americans were poised to share the same fate as the British a century earlier, 
and, before that, the Romans: their decline as a world power. Kennedy argues that 
the strength of a Great Power can only be adequately measured relative to other 
powers, highlighting the usefulness of the analogy with even ancient societies such 
as Rome. The United States, according to Kennedy, was suffering from what he 
termed “imperial overstretch” - squeezed by its vast military commitments, and 
facing a rising tide of economic challengers, it was facing an inevitable and 
irreversible end to its dominance. The best it could hope for was a “managed 
erosion.” The very familiarity of these themes is highlighted by Kennedy in the key 
point that “too much of what happened then is happening again,” and that the 
future presents us with the approaching struggle of “the West against the rest.”549 
Such a position is reminiscent of Arnold Toynbee, who declared in 1962 that 
America “now stands for what Rome stood for,” namely the defence of imperial 
interests against the needs of the poor and the Third World.550 In a similar vein, T.S. 
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Eliot’s The Waste Land, described as owing something to the “imperial frontier 
myth,” is explained in these terms by William Vance in America’s Rome (1989), 
“Beneath T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land lie the history and mythology of imperial 
Rome, fragmented and transposed to our century in the dying British Empire.”551      
Such ideas of erosion, overstretch and decline have found a particular 
resonance in the media classes in America. American expansionism appeared to 
endanger the institutions and ethics that the Founding Fathers had sought so 
keenly to establish and safeguard. Critics of this apparent “American Empire” 
frequently looked to the decline of Rome as a vision, example and warning for the 
United States. In Arrogant Capital (1995), political analyst Kevin Philips used 
Kennedy to compare Washington to Late Imperial Rome and nineteenth-century 
London: the “arrogant” capital of a declining empire ruled by “abusive and 
entrenched elites.” The similarity of this analysis is evident is his usage of the same 
forms of decline - moral, cultural, political - to produce the fall of these respective 
superpowers. In his reasons for this deterioration, Philips cites “an expansion of 
luxury and moral permissiveness”, a lengthy period of “greed” - in his mind, 
personified by the Reagan era - and the “loss of old patriotism,” all judgements and 
ideas that lend themselves naturally to the decline and fall. These statements 
reiterate the same, core, universal themes.  
Through the use of somewhat circular logic, Philips cites as evidence 
contemporaries’ “complaints of moral decay” - this diagnosis of decline being cited 
as evidence of the decline itself. The connection to past history, and the iconic 
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examples of decline, are made obvious by pointing out the corruption and 
degeneration of Rome and Athens: “There is no point in mincing words… aging 
great-power capitals often become parasitic cultures,” and contemporary 
Washington “is beginning to resemble those wayward governmental centres of 
previous declining empires.”552 Such a picture is presented in very similar terms by 
cultural critic Cornel West in Race Matters (2001), who appropriates Kennedy’s 
“image of the eclipse of U.S. hegemony in the world” as evidence of a decline and 
decay in the culture and spirit of the nation. As he says, “cultural decay in a 
declining empire” had created “rootless, dangling people” and a “powerless 
citizenry that includes not just the poor but all of us.”553  
Typically in this frame, the mass media are presented as tools of our collective 
cultural suicide - both the zenith and nadir of progress. They are the forces of 
“bread and circuses” imperialism, a trend which invariably ends in barbarism, 
decadence and decline. In Backing into the Future: The Classical Tradition and Its 
Renewal (1994), the classicist and cultural critic Bernard Knox describes a fear that 
progressive cultural attitudes threaten to “abolish the cultural traditions on which 
the West’s sense of unity and identity is founded,” and that “it is only to be 
expected that in this age of cultural dilution, of plastic substitutes, of mindless 
television shows... the genuine article is no longer valued.”554 In the same year, the 
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Noble Prize-winning poet and writer Joseph Brodsky made this comparison 
between the approaching end of that golden age, and his own time, “Ave, Caesar. 
How do you feel now, among barbarians? We are your true Parthians, Marcomanni, 
and Quadi, because nobody came in your stead, and we inhabit the earth.” In 
considering the legacy of Aurelius, Brodsky concludes on the dark note that, “if 
Meditations is antiquity, it is we who are the ruins.”555  
Putting this outlook into a more strictly economic class context is Charles 
Murray’s The Bell Curve (1994), a widely publicized study that painted a picture of 
the future of American society fast becoming “two nations” - a detached elite 
isolated by their more sophisticated culture, wealth and values, and an underclass, 
impoverished in their reliance on “mass” culture and incapable of taking care of 
itself. Murray reaches the conclusion that “unchecked, these trends will lead the 
U.S toward something resembling a caste society,” and, referencing past visions of 
decline, adds that “like other apocalyptic visions, this one is pessimistic, perhaps 
too much so. On the other hand, there is much to be pessimistic about.”556  
 
 
Gladiator, Rome and America in 2000 AD 
Considerations of the place of America as an empire and civilization, at the 
turn of the twenty-first century, are not confined to the literary record. Ridley 
Scott’s Gladiator (Universal Pictures, 2000) is a film about the place of America as a 
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solo superpower; where the challenges and turmoil it must face come not from 
without but within. As such, both in the period it discusses - the last days of Marcus 
Aurelius, and the reign of his son - and its theme of imperial troubles, the decline 
and fall myth plays a prominent, though significantly re-envisaged, role in this story. 
Thirty-six years after its appearance, Mann’s The Fall of the Roman Empire provided 
the model for Gladiator - despite the significant contrasts between the two films - 
and in this way profoundly influenced the current revival of ancient Rome in cinema 
and television. Because Mann’s film is now an intermediary between Gibbon and 
Gladiator, the historian of the Roman Empire continues to exert an explicit 
influence in a significant part of recent modern culture since the turn of the twenty-
first century. The link between the two films, however, is poorly credited outside of 
the specific academic study of the former. As Winkler points out, “A noteworthy 
aspect of all the publicity that studio, star, writer, director, and others advanced to 
promote this new Roman spectacle, however, was the almost complete silence 
about an epic film that bears a strong resemblance to theirs. It is unlikely that 
Gladiator would have been possible without The Fall of the Roman Empire.”557 In 
the official literary companion to the film, Gladiator: The Making of the Ridley Scott 
Epic (2000), author Diana Landau offers only a single line on its significance: “Also in 
the category of interesting failures was Anthony Mann’s 1964 film The Fall of the 
Roman Empire, whose plot featured several of the main characters who later 
appeared in Gladiator.” The book provides a collection of illustrations of other 
Roman-themed films, and none of these are The Fall of the Roman Empire - a very 
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odd omission considering it is the only one which shares the same historical setting 
and time-frame.558 
The question must be raised of why a genre largely defunct for over thirty 
years was revived at all. DreamWorks' production head at the time, Walter Parkes, 
noted a trend in the box-office success of recent epic “historical” films such as Mel 
Gibson’s Braveheart (Twentieth Century Fox, 1995) and James Cameron's Titanic 
(Twentieth Century Fox, 1997) and saw an opportunity for the revival of the toga 
franchise. But its potential for commercial success is described as deeper than 
recent tastes, as “The Roman epic occupies a strange, special place in the heart of 
moviegoers. We love the good ones like Ben-Hur and Spartacus, but even the bad 
ones are guilty pleasures.”559 
Moreover, advances in computer technology allowed the creators of 
Gladiator to display Roman spectacle to a new scale, without being burdened with 
quite the enormous production costs of its predecessors from the 1960s and 
earlier. As New York Times Critic Herbert Muschamp put it,  
Why revive this genre of movie now? DreamWorks, the movie's producer, boasts of 
special effects made possible by computer imaging techniques. Rome can be built 
in a day. Just run some paintings by Cole, David and Alma-Tadema through the 
scanner, et voila! Better yet, feed.560 
 
Scott himself described his hopes for grandeur in the days before filming, “I 
hope to design the film in such a way that when people see it, they'll think, ‘Gee. 
Rome’s never been done like this before.’”561  
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But special effects and brazen self-consciousness alone cannot explain the 
success of Gladiator. An astonishing financial success that netted $450 million at 
the box office worldwide, on an (unexceptional) $103 million budget, Gladiator 
resurrected not only imperial Rome at the height of its power but also helped to 
revive interest in a film genre considered to have been dead and buried since the 
1960s.562 The New York Times specifically referred to this as the “Gladiator effect,” 
saying “in this case, it’s the movies - most recently Gladiator two years ago - that 
have created that interest in the ancients.”563    
Gladiator presents the audience with much of the imagery and iconography 
of Roman decadence, and draws heavily on the myth of the decline and fall; in 
particular, the depiction of Commodus in both Gibbon and Anthony Mann’s film. It 
is not, however, a representation of the decline and fall. Gladiator is a modern 
counterpoint to this myth; one which recognises the threat of moral and political 
corruption and decline, but not its eventual triumph. It openly challenges the 
Gibbonian narrative of the Roman path following the death of Marcus Aurelius, and 
provides a vision of a positive and redeeming alternative. This approach makes 
absolutely no sense as a historical commentary. Republican Rome was not restored 
with the death of Commodus - but its meaning is clear if the film is taken as a 
metaphor for contemporary America. Instead of describing the process by which 
Rome’s dissolution is set in motion, Gladiator adapts the myth of the decline and 
fall in order to express, examine and, finally, extinguish contemporary social and 
political concerns. The mythology of Rome, in these terms, is described by Peter 
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Bondanella as “not so much a relic to be venerated as it is a flexible and limitless 
source of self-expression, a common heritage which has met the needs of 
successive generations ... Something in the myth of Rome has helped us to 
understand our human condition, our world, and ourselves.”564 In this sense, apart 
from the film’s setting in the late second century, it has more in common with 
representations of Classical Antiquity in general, rather than the specific themes 
surrounding its “decline” in Late Antiquity.   
As such, while Gladiator quietly borrows much of the same material and 
narrative content as The Fall of the Roman Empire, it reveals a striking reversal of 
perspective, departing from the core theme of Mann’s film and indeed from the 
entire Gibbonian conception of the consequences of the end of the Age of the 
Antonines, and its consequences. The Romans depicted in Gladiator function as a 
stand-in for perceived American supremacy at the turn of the century, after the 
Cold War but before 9/11 and the Iraq came to pose a challenge to the supposition 
of global dominance.  In his review entitled “Throwing Our Anxieties to the Lions,” 
the film was described by Muschamp as “a meditation on the perplexity of the 
world's sole surviving superpower.” Reflecting on the film’s themes, Muschamp 
poses the question, “Where does America go from here?”565  
The plot of this film begins in AD 180, the last year of the rule of Marcus 
Aurelius, and shows the ascension and brief, tyrannical rule of his son Commodus. A 
fictional hero, suitably named Maximus (meaning, as is emphasised in the film, 
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“greatest”), a victorious general and the favourite of an aged Marcus Aurelius for 
the succession, is betrayed when Commodus murders his father and seizes the 
throne. His family murdered and reduced to slavery, Maximus is able to ascend in 
fame in the gladiatorial arena, first in the province of Zucchabar and then in Rome. 
His success at the Colosseum in a re-enactment of the Battle of Zama leads to 
Commodus coming down the personality congratulate Maximus, at which point he 
publically reveals his identity, and vows revenge.  
The gladiator is so popular with the crowd that Commodus is unable to order 
his death, and his attempt to have him killed in the arena by paying Tigris of Gaul, 
an undefeated former gladiator, also fails. A coup attempt is organised to oust 
Commodus by his opponents in the Senate, and his sister, Lucilla, to bring the 
emperor down by freeing Maximus and bringing him back to his army. However, 
the emperor catches wind of the plot, and orders Lucilla to reveal the details by 
threatening to execute her son. The plotters killed or arrested, Commodus arranges 
a personal gladiatorial duel with Maximus, but, before the fight begins, stabs him in 
the side, severely weakening him. Nevertheless, Maximus kills Commodus in single 
combat, though he is mortally wounded from his earlier injury. Before dying, he 
asks for the rule of the Senate to be restored, thereby putting Rome back on the 
right moral and political path.   
Gladiator poses the very question of the direction and purpose of American 
cultural and political dominance. It thereby introduces a new geopolitical context 
for a discussion of Rome’s power. The film’s prologue, set against a sepia-toned 
background and accompanied only by ghostly female backing vocals, informs us 
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that Rome is “at the height of its power.”566 It opens with the empire 
demonstrating its absolute supremacy in military might along the northern frontier. 
As Maximus tells the emperor, after his triumph, “There is no one left to fight, sire.” 
Yet within days of this statement, the empire is afflicted with crisis. Internal 
pressures almost sunder it from within, and leading very nearly to civil war.   
The supremacy of the Roman Empire is crucial to the film’s narrative. Victory 
over the Quadi and Marcomanni is here depicted as a defining and definitive 
affirmation of Roman power. There is no mention of geopolitical tensions on the 
eastern frontier or the Parthian threat. The Fall of the Roman Empire concluded 
with the line, “A great civilization is not conquered from without until it has 
destroyed itself from within.” Here, instead, there is no threat from “without”, nor 
any hint of one after the opening act - the dangerous is located within. The new 
emperor does not have to concern himself with strategic or military problems, but 
can devote himself to courting the favour of the Roman mob with sumptuous and 
bloody gladiatorial games. 
After its opening act, therefore, the narrative theme of Gladiator shifts to 
represent a conflict between two competing visions of the kind of superpower this 
newly unchallenged Rome - and, by analogy, post-Cold War America - can and 
should be. Rome, both as a city and a spiritual analogy for the empire at large, is 
fought over in an ideological battle between despotism and  tyranny, as epitomised 
by Commodus, and a just and noble republicanism, embodied by Maximus and a 
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senatorial conspiracy to oust the emperor. Ridley Scott presents the empire, or its 
more despotic aspects, as the oppressor of its inner, purer Republican self. The 
clash between Maximus, the senator Gracchus, and Commodus, is a battle for the 
soul of Rome, or a Rome as defined by their competing ideologies. The arena 
resembles the ugly side to Rome’s vision military might and power. As Commodus 
says, “I will give the people a vision of Rome, and they’ll love me for it.”    
Gladiator speculates on which of these opposing visions of rule will prevail; 
and it proves to be the positive and progressive one. Maximus slays Commodus and 
restores good government and the “dream of Rome.” By this innovative plot 
structure, Gladiator is able to cast the improbable restoration of a form of the 
Roman Republic upon the death of Commodus. It turns the Gibbonian idea of his 
accession marking the end of the Antonine high point of the empire, into an 
ahistorical fantasy in which the forces of good and freedom triumph over those of 
evil and tyranny. It underscores the notion that imperial power, with the right 
leadership structure and moral imperatives, can be a just and positive force in the 
world.   
The significance of this theme is underscored in the film’s ending. Gladiator 
still conforms to the basic pattern as Anthony Mann’s film. Maximus kills 
Commodus in the final duel, just as Livius did in The Fall. Stabbed in advance by 
Commodus, Maximus himself dies, and in death is reunited with his murdered 
family, who we see waiting for him in a final vision. But even at death’s door 
Maximus is able to save Rome. He orders the release of Graccus, the senator who 
will form or head the new senatorial government that Marcus Aurelius had 
intended for Rome to end the rule of the Caesars. Maximus’ last public 
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pronouncement is: “There was a dream that was Rome. It shall be realized. These 
are the wishes of Marcus Aurelius.” Lucilla pays homage to him as he is being 
carried out of the arena with the words, “He was a soldier of Rome. Honour him,” 
and confirms his crucial role in carrying out the regeneration of the empire: “Is 
Rome worth one good man’s life? We believed it once. Make us believe it again.” 
Her words are not addressed to anyone in particular, but function as a generalised 
message to the audience. There is hope for the future, as the film’s final words, 
spoken by Maximus’ friend and fellow gladiator Juba, tell us: “Now we are free.” 
The last view of Rome before the fade to black confirms this. In a panoramic long 
shot of the city the sun is breaking through the clouds. It is a new dawn in Rome, 
and we hear the swell of the choir - not heavenly, as at the close of Quo Vadis, but 
contemporary and “New Age.” In this ending, therefore, tyranny and corruption are 
shown to be a potential threat to society, but inherent only in individuals, not in 
society as a whole, or its institutional edifices. The threat, therefore, can be 
overcome through a noble and virtuous struggle, such as that of the hero Maximus. 
Once the villains are removed, and the right people are (re)instated, then the 
condition of society and the body politic will improve; without any necessity for 
radical changes in the structures of government or society. There has been 
corruption, decadence, and tyranny at the core of Roman society; as represented 
by the gladiatorial games, and the rarity of the noble vision of Maximus and 
Marcus. But there is no inevitable spiral into decline: no suggestion of a coming fall.    
It is clear that Gladiator is in no way an attempt to portray Roman history 
authentically. The only notable exception to this is the architecturally exacting 
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representation of the Colosseum.567 Otherwise, the imagery of the film is drawn 
from strictly imaginary sources. Scott reverts to idealistic and romantic art as 
sources for the depiction of the city and empire, notably those that appear in 
Thomas Cole’s set of paintings, The Course of Empire (1836). Indeed, Cole’s vision of 
the rise and fall of Rome was intended as an allegorical warning to the United 
States. Scott also refers to the impact of Jeon-Leon Gerome’s 1872 gladiatorial 
painting Police Verso.568 The film is openly and overtly aware of its own 
involvement in retelling and reinterpreting the story of Rome. The opening 
announcer in the first scene at the Colosseum proclaims, “On this day we reach 
back to hallowed antiquity to bring you a recreation of the second fall of mighty 
Carthage,” highlighting what the film is doing. Less obvious but just as deliberately, 
the film creates a fascistic comparison between the regime of Commodus and the 
Third Reich. The depiction of the new emperor’s entry to Rome is explicitly derived 
from one particular visual source, Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1935), an 
account of the 1934 Nazi party rally at Nuremburg. The aerial view of Rome by 
which Scott first provides a glimpse of the imperial city is a deliberate homage to 
the opening sequence of that film; namely an aerial shot of Hitler arriving by plane, 
to the massed crowds, eagerly waiting.569  
Gladiator offers a critique of imperialism and the Roman political system 
under the empire. At the same time, however, its final vision can be seen as quite a 
conservative one, born of its classical precedents. The desire to return Rome to the 
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control of the senate, out of the grasp of emperors, and their exploitation of the 
uglier instincts of the mob, reflects the Republican longings among the Roman 
senatorial class of the early empire.570 It is one of the primary themes of Robert 
Grave’s novel I Claudius.571 Indeed, the fictitious senatorial character of Gracchus is 
played by Derek Jacobi, who has the titular role in that series. Furthermore, there is 
no great indictment of Roman society or civilization at large - no suggestion, as 
came in The Fall of the Roman Empire, during their festival celebrating Commodus, 
that the social mores of the population as a whole are in decay. Instead, the 
dramatic tension in the film is a product of the fact that the new head of state is an 
irredeemable villain, who murdered his way to the purple. Indeed the difference 
between The Fall of the Roman Empire and Gladiator is reinforced by the two films’ 
portrayals of their Roman emperors, Marcus Aurelius and Commodus. In The Fall of 
the Roman Empire Marcus Aurelius is the central figure of the film’s first half; the 
dominant personality who determines how audiences are to respond to the world 
he rules, and departs from. By contrast, Gladiator focuses on Commodus, the villain 
who rapidly kills his father with his own hands. Marcus is murdered a quarter of the 
way into the film, after appearing in only four scenes. His brief presence is 
overshadowed by both Maximus and Commodus, and mostly serves as a dramatic 
foil to the latter. His role in the film’s events is largely passive and conversational, 
he makes no military or political decisions, and his inspiration is summarised at the 
end as an inspiring “dream of Rome,” rather than a specific reality or practical 
accomplishment. The film also never mentions the Meditations. It does, however, 
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imply an appreciation for learning that contrasts with his son. Returned to Rome as 
his father’s successor to the purple, Commodus is pestered by a senator who was 
justifiably worried about sanitation in Rome. He retorts that he will not follow his 
predecessor’s example, for: “My father spent all his time at study, reading books, 
learning his philosophy.” However, this appreciation of his learning is noted but not 
earmarked for praise. Shortly before his death, Marcus asks his general Maximus: 
“Will I be known as the philosopher, the warrior, the tyrant? Or will I be the 
emperor who gave Rome back her true self?” His philosophy is thereby associated 
with the lesser traits of imperial leadership: something unsatisfying when compared 
to his final vision of the restoration of Rome.  
That vision is instead explicitly invested in the newly invented person of 
Maximus. Dreamworks, in updating the visual and narrative portrayal of Rome, 
heralded Ridley Scott’s Gladiator as featuring a more modern kind of heroism to 
embody the new millennium. Posters with Russell Crowe in gladiatorial dress 
declared in the tagline that “A Hero will Rise… in May 2000 AD.”  As screenwriter 
David Franzoni put it, “this movie is about our culture, our society… Maximus is the 
hero we all wish ourselves to be; the guy who can rise above the mess that is 
modern society.” The significance of this is that it strengthens the connection 
between the story’s setting and the world of the audience, for, “The movie is about 
us. It's not just about ancient Rome, it's about America.”572 The kind of hero that 
Maximus is has therefore to be one who fits modern sympathies. As Jon Solomon 
observed, “Gladiator reveals another twenty-first century bias. Contemporary 
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Hollywood family values interject themselves into the ancient Roman zeitgeist.”573 
So, while we see him at the opening as a powerful and aggressive military 
commander, Scott soon after contrasts this by having Maximus express his desire to 
the old emperor to return to a peaceful farm life with his wife and child in Spain. 
This, of course, gives the implicit impression that the Roman army was a volunteer 
force recruited for a particular war or campaigns, rather than a permanent 
professional soldiery serving a fixed term.  
The film therefore explores as a principle theme the return to traditional 
ideals of home and family through Maximus - whose ideals manage to save the 
empire from Commodus and itself. Maximus, a farmer, is a rural working-class hero 
- an old and popular archetype of American nobility and virtue.574 The ethics of the 
simple farmer, and the virtue of his background and values, thereby contrast with 
the corruption and dangers of the metropolis. In this way, as Solomon states, Scott 
“superimposed both modern familial sensitivity and ancient Roman Republican 
virtues” onto the story.575 The old emperor, concerned with the legacy of his rule 
and the dangerous prospects of his son, has realised that the countryside is the true 
“Rome”, and the path to saving it - a vision that comes true when Maximus finally 
kills Commodus.     
Gladiator, in this way, also recalls the spectacles of corruption and 
debauchery in earlier Roman epics. While its picture of the moral decadence of 
Rome is confined to the “bread and circuses” depiction of the Colosseum, there is 
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the suggestion that tyranny goes hand in hand with sexual deviance. Commodus 
goes on to reveal his incestuous plans for a “pure” heir to his sister Lucilla, 
connecting transgressive desire with his despotic plans for a permanent, hereditary 
dynasty of rulers.576 Maximus, by contrast, is a man of personal religiosity and 
spirituality; a devoted father and husband who honours the old Roman gods, and 
whose spirituality leaves him untroubled by the possibility of death. As he says 
when encouraging his troops, “And if you find yourself alone, riding through green 
fields with the sun in your face, do not be troubled, for you are in Elysium, and you 
are already dead!” The loss of his family motivates Maximus through the film, and 
the image of him reunited with them, grants the film a kind of positive resolution in 
the arc of the protagonist, who is driven throughout by revenge but finally finds 
peace.  
The honour and purity of the early Maximus characterisation also highlights 
his disillusionment and fall from grace in the second act of the film. His skill and 
courage at battle, previously employed in the cause of Roman greatness, are 
trivialised as a means of bloodless entertainment in the arena. He displays his 
contempt for the crowd by scowling and spitting in their view, and, at the 
conclusion of one fight in the arena in Zucchabar, hurls his sword into the official 
viewing box for local dignitaries. In this phase of the film, he has scraped off the 
insignia of the legions - SPQR, “The Senate and people of Rome” - and is referred to 
by his captives as a deserter. While technically inaccurate as to his situation, this 
descriptor serves as an apt metaphor: now that Rome is under the grip of a new 
tyrant, Maximus has exercised the Roman part of his identity. When Commodus 
                                                          
576
 This also parallels the portrayal of the bisexual Crassus in Spartacus, for which see Alison Futrell, 
“Seeing Red: Spartacus as Domestic Economist,” in Joshel, Malamud, and McGuire, pp. 77-118. 
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first asks of his identity in the arena, he simply refers to himself as “gladiator”, 
confirming the extent to which this has subsumed his identity. Such a profound 
disillusionment with the Roman way is also found in Livius in The Fall - but, crucially, 
only at the end, when he is offered the purple and rejects it, suggests the 
assembled senators deserve to all hang, and walks off with Lucilla. Maximus, after 
the same duel in Gladiator, has had his faith not destroyed but rekindled, and 
speaks of Marcus’s “dream of Rome.” The theme of the final act of Mann’s film is 
suggested in Scott’s second act, and then discarded for an alternative and even 
more ahistorical vision.      
Gladiator presents an optimistic vision of the future but in this respect is 
earmarked by its date of release in May 2000. Subsequent interpretations of the 
film have dwelled as much on its critical elements of the body politic, in light of 
geopolitical developments. Under the subheading of “The Exhaustion of Empire,” 
Monica S. Cyrino compares the message of the film with the geopolitical 
developments that followed its release, specifically 9/11 and the “War on Terror,” 
and sees in it an important modern message:     
Washington's policy of brash unilateralism has heightened the general perception 
that America ignores or disdains international opinion and foreign allegiances. This 
leaves the United States in the precarious position of a lonely, self-righteous, and 
determinedly bellicose superpower. The 2003 State of the Union address was 
delivered on January 28 by a president indifferent to foreign opinion: “The course 
of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others.”  
 
Once such aggressive unilateralism is defined as a feature of the foreign policy 
of the administration, the comparison to Gladiator is made explicit: 
Like Commodus in Gladiator, who plans to dissolve the Roman senate so that the 
emperor can from now on act with sole power, President Bush has devalued the 
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United Nations' role in maintaining global accord and pledged that America will act 
alone, if necessary. It has begun to do so.577 
 
Here, in fact, the reception of Gladiator has much more in common with that 
of The Fall of the Roman Empire - a film with a very different direction and overall 
message, but in which common ground is found in their portrayal of Commodus 
and the threat he poses. Film historian and critic Richard Corliss begins a 
praiseworthy retrospective on Anthony Mann with these words: “Do you think old 
movies can’t speak to today’s concerns? See some of Anthony Mann’s films and 
think again. They speak for their time: they speak to ours.” He goes on to compare, 
via strong and unsubtle implication, the inept and blundering tyrant Commodus to 
the forty-third President, describing the former as “a weak man with a drunken past 
who says he was divinely chosen to make war against the Middle Eastern tribes,” 
and noting the line in the film, “You must also let them know they must forget the 
weakness of my father,” and describes Commodus’ desire to address “the military 
flabbiness of an earlier President - sorry, Emperor.”578  
This is a crucial comparison to make. While Ridley Scott’s film may not be a 
direct example of the decline and fall, it possesses enough of the content and ideas 
of that mythology, inherited from Gibbon, Durant and Mann, that such elements 
can be easily invoked where the priorities of the author and the political context of 
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their commentary calls for it. The myth has enough of a latent presence in the 




9/11 and Critics of Empire  
If Gladiator contains a more optimistic vision or prospect for the future of 
America, the geopolitical events of the subsequent years reflect a different kind of 
output: one that adheres much more closely to the decline and fall myth in its 
traditional form. The extensive pessimism and political and cultural concern 
documented earlier in this study finds a particular focus, in the years after 9/11, 
with the place and role of America as a global empire under threat, both without 
and within. Turning to the idea of “imperial overstretch,” one can find the 
comparison of Roman and American decline by the historian and columnist 
Chalmers Johnson, in The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the 
Republic (2004). The author makes this comparison of the rates of decline, “Roman 
imperial sorrows mounted up over hundreds of years. Ours are likely to arrive at 
the speed of FedEx.” Johnson is not a Roman or medieval historian by background, 
though he discusses such subjects at length. Rather, his last three works include 
detailed examinations of the supposed consequences of “American Empire,” with 
particularly attention paid to the Roman example in The Sorrows. He goes on in this 
work to describe these “sorrows” as derived from a form of “imperial overstretch” 
leading to “perpetual war,” the “loss of democracy and constitutional rights,” and 
“bankruptcy”. These ultimately stem from the militaristic path pursued by 
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America’s “imperial leaders,” and bear close analogy with the progressive and final 
fate of the Roman Empire.579  
Analogies of the Roman and American empires have become a regular part of 
contemporary political discourse. Notable recent studies of this trend include 
Charles S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006) and Harold James, The Roman 
Predicament: How the Rules of International Order Create the Politics of Empire 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). Once such analogies are brought into 
the discussion, the lessons of Roman failure serve their purpose. Patrick Buchanan, 
in State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America (2006), 
compares the policies of Rome and America in regard to the Eastern Emperor 
Valens’ admission of “a great horde of refugees” into the empire in 376 AD. Valens 
was killed in 378 by the Goths at the Battle of Adrianople, one of the worst field 
defeats in the history of the later empire. Buchanan concludes: “What Valens had 
done was the Christian thing to do, but it had never been the Roman thing to do.” 
To Buchanan, the lesson is obvious: religious differences aside, the Roman Way is 
also the American Way.580 
 The first chapter of Harold James’s book is entitled “The Model of Decline 
and Fall,” with the last, appropriately enough, “The Holy Roman Empire and the 
Roman Empire.” James willingly embraces the notion that “Roman decline” can 
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inform an understanding of the present climate. James begins as follows, echoing 
Mann from the 1960s: “Our predecessors have thought about problems similar to 
those of the modern globalizing world, and they in turn believed that they could 
understand their environment by thinking about their own predecessors. Faced 
with an economic dynamism both driven and divided by the assertion of political 
power, they saw the Roman Empire as a model for the dilemmas of future ages.”581 
Niall Ferguson reinforces this sentiment, describing in a review quoted on the back 
cover that, “In a glut of books about American empire, Harold James’s stands out 
for its subtlety and erudition. Few other scholars could so elegantly and 
persuasively relate Edward Gibbon’s account of the decline of Rome to the present 
predicament of the United States.” 
More self-consciously referential of the very tendency is Cullen Murphy’s Are 
We Rome? (2007), an overtly comparative study between Rome’s fate and the 
future of America by the editor-at-large of Vanity Fair. Murphy points out, quite 
legitimately, the place of Roman decadence in our cultural tradition, as reflected in 
some notable and popular linguistic anachronisms: such as the term “bread and 
circuses,” or the way waves of illegal immigrants are compared to “barbarian 
hordes.” However, he readily embraces and accepts the anachronistic nature of his 
own analysis - “President and Emperor, America and Rome - the comparison is by 
now so familiar, so natural, that you just can’t help yourself.”582 The argument is 
summarized by him in this fashion, 
Are we Rome? In a thousand specific ways, the answer is obviously no. In a handful 
of important ways, the answer is certainly yes… (while) America’s impact may be 
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unprecedented in its scope, but the phenomenon itself is one that Rome knew 
well…583 (Rome was) no stranger to dislocations caused by worldwide market 
forces, or to the riotous and unpredictable interplay of ethnicities, cultures and 
religions. And when it comes to the physical aspects of borders… the dynamics 
haven’t changed fundamentally in two millennia.584 
 
The differences between America and Rome, though discussed, are 
nevertheless dismissed as minor variations; secondary to the more “important” 
universal themes. Murphy notes that, “The Roman Empire was not thickly settled; 
at its height the total population was no more than that of modern France, perhaps 
50 or 60 million and skewed towards the East…” but argues that despite this: “you’ll 
find in EL Paso, on the American side, the same imperial tension between 
separation and integration, between sepsis and symbiosis.585 Similarly, while 
“Rome’s economy may have been primitive… for its time the empire was already a 
globalized place.” Most importantly, the comparison is worthy of attention because 
“In popular shorthand the long saga of Rome and the barbarians is typically held up 
as a case study in failure.”586  
Murphy sees a number of key parallels between these worlds: like Rome, 
America is a vast, multi-ethnic and cultural state, burdened with an expensive and 
overstretched military, and imbued with a messianic sense of its global mission, 
coupled with an ignorant disregard of alien cultures. It is beset with a decadent and 
deteriorating national character, with leaders in the grip of a messianic, moralizing 
religious belief. According to Murphy, the two states share the self-centred 
behaviour of ruling elites who see the world as revolving around their capitals. He 
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describes the U.S. as “dangerously overcommitted abroad and rusted out at home, 
like Rome in its last two centuries.”587 He also notes the privatization, or 
“feudalization” of public services, which leads in his eyes to much greater 
corruption, and quotes historian F. L. Ganshof’s definition of feudalism: “a dispersal 
of political authority amongst a hierarchy of persons who exercise in their own 
interest powers normally attributed to the state,” meaning that “public wealth and 
public spaces fell increasingly into private hands for private gains”: for Murphy, this 
is the perfect analogy for privatization.588 
The consequence of these trends is a decadent, myopic empire, one which 
displays a growing impossibility in managing its own sprawling affairs and powers, 
and whose primary difference with Rome appears to only be the accelerated rate of 
decline in the modern world. Indeed, he quotes the line by Chalmers Johnson about 
how Roman sorrows “are likely to arrive with the speed of FedEx.”589 Rome, despite 
any perceived differences by these authors, is forever constituted as “a world not 
unlike our own,” as was the type of decline suggested by Gibbon and his 
predecessors. It is ironic, therefore, that Murphy is dismissive of the man’s 
influence and legacy - offering a description of him as “a man of his times, blind to 
many things, and in this case this sort of sweeping historical assessment is out of 
fashion.”590 This is despite offering exactly the same qualitative type of assessment; 
an almost unmodified description of Rome, from which can be derived universal 
and contemporary themes. Like Gibbon, Murphy believes that Rome's global 
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dominion produced a largely bankrupt ruling class, an overly dominant yet 
overextended army, and an imperial throne that had become the plaything of 
madmen, tyrants and degenerates. He also thinks that these are lessons to be 
learnt by present generations, “To American eyes, Rome is the eagle in the 
mirror.”591 While overtly attempting to transcend the mindset of the British 
Enlightenment historians, and update his ideas for an American audience, Murphy 
demonstrates little fundamental novelty or difference in the actual content and 
themes of his work, even though this is an explicit, stated purpose of his approach.    
A significant contemporary work that offers up a supposedly revisionist 
approach is the British historian Adrian Goldsworthy’s bestselling The Fall of the 
West: The Death of the Roman Superpower (2009). The stated emphasis of the book 
is not, at least overtly, to draw on such history to better understand the present, 
but is more directly concerned with the issue of Rome’s fall itself. Goldsworthy 
proves critical of modern academic historiography. As he argues, “Studies of Late 
Antiquity stress the great strength of the fourth-century empire,” and that, while 
they are “correct” to do so insofar as “Rome in this period was overwhelmingly 
stronger than any other nation or people in the known world,” what they 
apparently fail to properly regard is that “it was not as stable as the empire of the 
second century, nor was it as powerful.” As he says, “by 400 the empire was weaker 
again, and by 500 it had vanished in the west and only the rump was left in the 
lands around the eastern Mediterranean. A longer perspective is necessary to 
explain these shifts.”592     
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When discussing the flourishing, extensive and informative academic field on 
the Late Roman Empire that has sprung up in the past generation, Goldsworthy says 
that, “The main reason I wanted to write this book was a dissatisfaction with quite a 
few of the conclusions and assumptions made in these works.” This is because, 
There is no generally accepted explanation for the fall of the Roman Empire in the 
west in the fifth century. “Fall” is not a fashionable word… many (scholars) talk 
instead of such things as “transformation”, accepting that there was change, but 
casting it in a gentler light. A few voices have been raised against this rosy portrait, 
but any suggestion of decline seems tantamount to heresy.593  
 
The challenge to the status quo is clearly stated. Such a momentous historical 
event as the fall of Rome requires a much clearer and more powerful explanation 
for Goldsworthy than simple transformation. He actually cites the cultural and 
psychological impact of its representation as a reason for this: saying that, “every 
successive generation has turned to the mystery of why Rome fell.”594 And yet, in 
the face of “sheer common sense,” the “historians of Late Antiquity” demonstrate 
an apparent psychological weakness: “It seems very hard for many people working 
on Late Antiquity to consider the possibility that anything was declining. Instead 
they prefer to see change and transformation.” Goldsworthy, by contrast, desires 
such a great historical event to be furnished with an appropriately meaningful 
narrative, for “the reasons for the collapse of Roman power deserve an 
explanation.”  
The explanation therefore offered to us is one that is very familiar. He says 
that though, “The Roman Empire did not fall quickly… to use this as proof that its 
institutions were essentially sound is deeply misguided.” Instead, the opposite 
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assertion can be made - that Rome is a body “made vulnerable by prolonged 
decay.”595 To fall, therefore, Rome first had to decline its long life evidence not of 
strength, but a slow deterioration. For Goldsworthy, this decline is most 
prominently represented in the civil wars he believes ate away at the vitality of the 
state. They are notable, not just for their “physical price”, but morally, for their 
impact on “attitudes and behaviour from the emperor down.” Rules became more 
paranoid and authoritarian, the bureaucracy expanded and became more 
inefficient and corrupt, and the senatorial class was sidelined from civil life.596 Such 
an approach is not so much a revision as a reversion to the arguments of Gibbon, 
Bury and Durant.    
With his very traditional approach to the fall of Rome in place, Goldsworthy 
turns to the inevitable comparison between Rome and the present day: “The 
imagery of ancient Rome has been invoked for its associations with the ultimate 
heights of power and civilization. It is never long before talk also turns to Rome’s 
fate.” The significance of this is that “Insiders to the modern great power usually 
see this as a humbling reminder that everything passes, and perhaps as a warning 
against complacency and corruption.” Just as the most natural comparison from 
Gibbon’s time to about a century ago would have been Britain, so it has turned 
inevitably to the United States of America. Yet Goldsworthy is insistent, in this 
regard, that no meaningful historical analogies are to be made between these two 
worlds, and that, contrary to the grain of writing on the subject, he will stand apart 
in this respect, stating that, “This not a book about modern America and its place in 
the world.”  
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The Fall of the West, self-described as a modern, academically subversive, 
revisionist approach to the period, betrays only an old-fashioned, anachronistic set 
of historiographical standards. Academically speaking, it is a reaction to modern 
revisionism itself - as in, the new perspectives on Late Antiquity found in the field 
since the 1960s - couched as being revisionism in its own right.597 Goldsworthy is 
able to see and acknowledge this tradition, but not escape it. He points out that “It 
has always been easy to learn lessons from history, but all too often this is simply 
the case of using the past to justify modern ideas. Any close look at the Roman 
Empire will soon reveal massive differences with any modern state, including the 
United States…. “(Rome is) an empire long vanished and from a world where the 
technology and culture were so very different from today. Understanding that 
world is the only way to understand Rome’s fall.” This means that,  
Filling the pages with constant references to the present day is unlikely to help 
achieve this. It is more than a little odd to read studies of the Roman period 
describing the “shock and awe” of the invasion of Britain in 43. It is even stranger 
when the discussion of the end of a Roman province provides the opportunity for 
criticism of Bush and Blair and the war in Iraq.598 
 
This is effectively a disclaimer for what follows, and despite the intended 
impression of authorial originality, the book falls into analysing comparative 
decline. Goldsworthy makes specific, comparative, and concerned judgments 
between past and present. As he says, “Britain has been a fairly depressing place in 
the last decade or so,” wrapped up in a culture of “corruption or blatant 
deceitfulness,” while “bureaucracy and regulation continue to grow apace” as “the 
basic efficiency of institutions declines.” As in the Roman example, the number of 
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“civil servants rises,” while “the size of the armed forces shrinks at the very time 
they are more heavily committed to serious campaigns,” buttressed by the “self-
righteous” yet “ineffectual” nature of government decrees.599 Such criticisms could 
be taken out of the pages of Gibbon or Bury. It is the traditional narrative of decline 
and fall, and the words “Britain” and “Rome” are effectively interchangeable in 
these descriptions. 
Another such traditional narrative of a Late Antique process, namely the 
adoption of Christianity, comes to the fore in Charles Freeman’s The Closing of the 
Western Mind - The Rise of Faith and the Fall of Reason (2003), in which the reader 
is treated to a self-described “radical and powerful reappraisal of the impact of 
Constantine’s adoption of Christianity on the later Roman world, and on the 
subsequent development both of Christianity and of Western civilization,” and the 
decline into superstition that followed, for “the closing of the Western mind is 
Rome's deliberate persecution of those whose God is the noble syllogism.” 
Freeman’s thesis is described thus: 
The first alliance of church and state in the fourth century, marked by the Roman 
emperor Constantine's conversion to Christianity, and how this decision irrevocably 
compromised the Roman empire's intellectual tradition of rationalism, paved the 
way toward a narrow religious orthodoxy, and aided the development of Christian 
anti-Semitism.600  
 
Aside from the comparative historical insignificance of the “anti-Semitism” 
within the transition described here, one notes in particular the use of the words “a 
radical and powerful appraisal.” The idea that Christianity fostered a decline in 
Western civilization is not remotely new, and is a central feature of Gibbon’s 
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analysis. Nevertheless, Freeman is praised in the Times Literary Supplement for 
having “added a new level of understanding” to these discourses, and enhancing 
our comprehension of the “darkness” produced, and “lessons” provided, by the 
“decline of the Roman Empire.”601     
 
 
Cinema and the Decline and Fall in the New Millennium  
Even as the cinematic classical epic has seen a revival in the twenty-first 
century, so the fall of Rome and its consequences have been a recurring subject in 
film. Antoine Faqua’s King Arthur (Touchstone Pictures, 2004) advertised itself as 
“The Untold True Story that Inspired the Legend.”602 Arthur locates the myth in the 
fall years of the Roman Empire, when our fragmentary medieval chronicles lay 
claim to the idea that the Romano-British resisted the Anglo-Saxon invaders with 
some success.603 It purports to achieve its claims to “truth” by alluding to modern-
day speculation that “Sarmatian” cavalry stationed in Britain may have been a 
forgotten inspiration for the Arthurian story, and provided the historical basis of the 
legend.604 The theory, while briefly popular in some academic circles, is not one 
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that is genuinely accepted to have any real factual basis.605 Nevertheless, it was the 
basis for the film’s recursive claim to a real “authenticity.”606 It consequently 
allowed the film to make claims about personal freedom, and its disappearance 
from a declining empire, as explained by the (again, unhistorical) execution of the 
“progressive” theologian, Pelagius, and drape these anachronistic assumptions with 
the false veil of authority.607  
Without delving too deeply into the extensive body of historiography 
surrounding the Arthurian myths, it should be noted that there are distinct “King 
Arthurs” we can identify - one an elusive, hypothesised historical figure from the 
late fifth/early sixth century AD, the other a legendary medieval hero whose 
exploits were embellished and invented by the myth-makers of a much later age.608 
King Arthur weaves an unsteady and contradictory compromise between these two 
traditions, the “history” - such that exists - and the “myth” (which in both content 
and cultural presence overwhelms the former). As the narrative drives us from the 
late-Roman historical context to the self-aggrandised speculation on “what 
happened,” it cannot help but morph into a New-Age inflected romanticisation of 
Britain’s lost “Celtic” past, complete in fact with Boudica-inspired Guinevere. It 
                                                          
605
 Richard Wadge, “A British or Sarmatian Tradition,” Folklore, XCVIII (1987), pp. 204-215. The 
Pelagian subplot in the film, the freethinking religious heretic whose execution inspired Arthur’s final 
disillusionment with Rome, has very little historical veracity. Pelagius was not executed by the 
Romans, but most likely died of old age.
 
See on this Charles G. Herbermann (ed.), Catholic 
Encyclopedia, XI (Robert Appleton Company: New York, 1911), p. 604.   
606
 The literature on Arthur is far too vast and complicated to explore in any detail here, but for good 
summaries that have been used here see Nicholas J. Higham, King Arthur, Myth-Making and History 
(London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 11-37 has a good summary of the debate on Arthur’s existence.  
607
 For the life of Pelagius see Herbermann, p. 604. 
608
 While much of the legend originates with the accounts of Geoffrey of Monmouth in his 
Monmouth in his Historia Regum Britanniae (History of the Kings of Britain) written c. 1138 AD, most 
modern Arthurian works are derivative of an adaption from the fifteenth century, written by Thomas 
Malory. See Geoffrey of Monmouth, “A History of the Kings of Britain,” in Joseph Black (ed.), The 
Broadview Anthology of British Literature: The Medieval Period (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2009), 
pp. 157-179, and on Malory, Eugène Vinaver (ed.), The Works of Sir Thomas Malory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
244 
 
removes some, not all, of the archetypal elements of the Arthurian story - there is 
no Merlin, no magical elements, and no Holy Grail, but there are still knights and a 
re-envisioned Round Table. The attempt to create and visualise a more authentic 
history morphs into an acquiescence to the literary tradition which fashioned such 
icons, rather than a historical correction of that tradition.  
Following a similar approach, Doug Lefler’s The Last Legion (The Weinstein 
Company, 2007) connects the last years of the Western Roman Empire with the 
legend of the missing “ninth legion” in Britain - its continuing independent 
existence once a popular idea amongst historians - and its own self-spun legend 
about a missing sword of Julius Caesar, now revealed to be Excalibur. The film’s 
tagline summarises this theme with “Before Arthur, there was Excalibur.” In this 
story, Romulus escapes the fall of the Western Empire, brought down by an alliance 
between Odoacer and the East, and goes on to sire Arthur.609 Such an imaginative 
connection of two unrelated stories is at least vaguely reminiscent of Virgil’s origin 
myth of the Romans in the Aeneid.   
Both these films, while dealing with the end of the empire, at least imply that 
something more positive may have followed its destruction. Elsewhere, the theme 
of civilization facing a Roman-style crisis and an uncertain future has remained at 
the fore. Both Neil Marshall’s Centurion (Pathe, 2010) and Kevin Macdonald’s The 
Eagle (Universal Pictures, 2011) use the story of the Ninth Legion’s supposed 
disappearance in Britain in the second century to deal with the theme of an empire 
weakening at the periphery and struggling to hold back the barbarians. But in 
director Alejandro Amenábar’s ambitious and expensive Agora (Newmarket, 2009), 
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we see the Roman Empire of the fourth and fifth centuries directly giving way to a 
new Christian order. While The Fall of the Roman Empire attempted to show how 
the seeds of Rome’s collapse were sown under Commodus, Agora attempts to 
actually show, through an individual story of the philosopher Hypatia, how and why 
classical civilization was actually brought down, as a parallel to the material and 
political decline of the empire.     
The film begins in Alexandria in 391 AD. The opening titles tell us that, “By the 
end of the fourth century AD, the Roman Empire was on the verge of collapse.” This 
reinforces the conviction offered in the trailer that the film displays “the last days of 
the Roman Empire… the fall of civilization.” Such is a familiar and easy reiteration of 
the decline and fall myth, and no further explanation for this fact is offered as to 
how or why. Nevertheless, it appears that something worthy of the old order 
survives, as “Alexandria, in the province of Egypt, still retained much of its 
splendour,” including “the greatest library on earth.” This library, we are told, had a 
dual significance in Late Roman society, and the Hellenic tradition, for it “was not 
only a cultural symbol, but also a religious one. A place where pagans worshipped 
their ancestral gods.” 
In is in this context that we are introduced to the story. The Greek 
philosopher Hypatia (played by Rachel Weisz) is a teacher at the Platonic school, 
and daughter of Theon, director of the Museum of Alexandria, where the elite of 
Roman society are educated. Hypatia is openly pursued by one of her pupils, 
Orestes, whose advances she spurs. She is also silently admired from afar by her 
slave, Davus, who assists her with her classes. This love “triangle” is set against a 
turbulent social and political landscape that threatens what survives of both the old 
246 
 
faith, and classical culture and learning in itself. Increasingly fevered debates 
between pagans and Christians about the righteousness of their respective beliefs 
spill out into open conflict. From the outset, it is established that Christians have to 
use aggressive, bullying tactics to advocate their cause. A pagan preacher is forced 
into a fire by a Christian preacher as he mocks the power of his gods to protect 
him.610  
When the Christians start defiling pagan statues and attacking its leaders, a 
large group of pagans, including Orestes and Theon, organise an ambush - staunchly 
opposed by Hypatia - to curb their rising influence. In the subsequent clash, 
however, they find themselves vastly outnumbered by an enormous Christian mob, 
and, with Theon mortally wounded, flee to the library of the Serapeum with 
Hypatia for shelter. A brief siege, barely contained by Roman soldiers, ends when 
the authorities declare that, though the pagans are pardoned for their deeds, the 
library will be opened to the Christians. Consequently, the pagans flee, Hypatia 
trying to remove as many of her beloved scrolls as possible. Davus, having joined 
the Christian forces, seizes Hypatia and attempts to rape her, but quickly breaks 
down and cries, offering his sword to her. Instead, she removes his slave collar and 
declares him free.      
We now pass an undetermined number of years forward (though we could 
estimate it to be the months prior to Hypatia’s death in 415). An intertitle informs 
the viewer that the majority of pagans have now converted to Christianity; 
including Orestes, who is now prefect of Alexandria, and maintains a close personal 
relationship with Hypatia. It also declares, “The Roman Empire finally split into two 
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parts. Many Christians saw this as a sign of the end of the world and decided to 
prepare themselves by living holier lives.” In Alexandria, this means that the 
Christian authorities have turned their attentions increasingly to the Jewish 
community, identified as the murderers of Christ, and other religious dissidents. 
Hypatia is now preoccupied with her scientific pursuits - namely an investigation 
into the motions of the sun, moon and five “wanderers” in the heavens. Such views 
prove increasingly unpopular with the Christians, who have banned her from 
teaching due to her heliocentric sympathies. The Jews suffer increasing violence 
and harassment, but their objections are largely ignored by the authorities. Cypril, a 
leader of the Christians, resents Hypatia’s influence over the prefect, attacking her 
both on the grounds of her faithlessness and her womanhood. A former pupil, 
Synesius, now bishop of Cyrene, comes to her defence, but says he cannot help her 
unless she embraces their faith. This she refuses to do when her former pupils beg 
her, citing that she must always doubt what she is told, and cannot believe blindly.  
While these forces mount against her, Hypatia makes an extraordinary 
discovery; she realises that the Earth orbits the sun in an ellipse, not a circular orbit, 
thereby creating a working heliocentric model of the world. But before she can 
deliver this discovery to the world, Cyril convinces a mob that she is a dangerous 
heretic and a witch. They capture her, strip her, and are about to flay her alive, but 
Davus convinces them to stone her instead. Once they go outside to collect rocks, 
he suffocates her beforehand to spare her the pain. We are told in the final titles 
before the credits that Cyril became venerated as one of the Doctors of the Church; 
and that, a thousand years later, Galileo proved Hypatia right.  
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Agora dramatizes the decline of Greco-Roman polytheism and the concurrent 
Christianisation of the Roman Empire. I have discussed how the idealisation of the 
“classical” is interwoven with the more negative image of the “medieval”, and this 
is a film which makes the comparison between these two sets of qualities stark and 
explicit. It associates the process of the decline and fall - highlighted as an inevitable 
fact in the opening titles - with a rising conflict between religion and science, and 
the disappearance of classical traditions of free and rational inquiry into the natural 
world. The historicity of this account of Late Antiquity and the impact of the rise of 
Christianity is suffused with anachronism. The film highlights a contrast between 
reason, as embodied in the sceptical and inquisitive natural philosophy of Hypatia, 
and religious superstition; represented in part by the more militant pagans, but 
especially in the fanaticism of the Christian mob and its leaders.  
In this way, the film has little to do with the turn of the fifth century AD, the 
end of paganism, or the fall of the Western Empire. Instead, it uses the decline and 
fall myth to tell a story of the downfall of the classical traditions of science, 
philosophy and reason, and their replacement with a more “medieval” flavour of 
Christian conviction. At the same time, it highlights the eventual triumph of the 
former, from the Renaissance, with Hypatia playing a tragic but noble role as 
visionary precursor to a future age of heliocentric enlightenment.    
In respect to its account of the end of the classical world, then, the film has 
much in common with the Gibbonian tradition. Gibbon described her fate in these 
terms: “the great and justified reputation of this paragon was the cause of her 
downfall… Hypatia was not a Christian, and Cyril, who was jealous of the way in 
which the female philosopher was courted… took advantage of that fact to bring 
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about her downfall.” The problem in Gibbon’s account was that the city was riven 
by faction, in particular a bitter rivalry between the “proud and violent Archbishop 
Cyril, the patriarch, and the prefect who commanded the city.” Consequently, a 
rumour was spread by the latter that she was the sole obstacle in the way of 
reconciliation between prefect and archbishop. The result was this apparent 
atrocity:  
… on a fatal day, in the holy season of lent, Hypatia was torn from her chariot, 
stripped naked, dragged to the church, and inhumanly butchered by the hands of 
Peter the Reader and a troop of savage and merciless fanatics: her flesh was 
scraped from her bones with sharp oyster-shells, and her quivering limbs were 
delivered to the flames.611 
 
It should be noted that in this description, even Gibbon does not ascribe her 
death as primarily driven by the bigotries of Christian dogma - but, rather, that such 
provided a convenient excuse for her removal due to age-old civic factional 
rivalries. Despite his own Enlightenment predisposition, his avowed contempt for 
Christianity, and his obvious disdain for Cyril and the mob, he does not go as far as 
to cast her death as symptomatic of an ideological war between science and 
fundamentalism. Agora, however, has no such problem. Nor does it skirt away from 
easy modern analogies, Amenábar himself stating that the material had given him 
“the chance to make a film about today.”612 Elsewhere, he identifies his target as 
not explicitly “Christians but… those who set off bombs and kill in the name of God, 
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that is, against religious fanatics.”613 The mention of “bombs” makes clear the 
contemporary context of religious terrorism that informs the director’s perception 
of the dangers of blind faith to the “civilized” world; whether in Hypatia’s time or 
the present.   
 Agora is a story about the final stages of the decline and fall of the Roman 
Empire, in a cultural and intellectual rather than material sense. The film attempts 
to both narrate and comprehend the end of Antiquity, but skirts over any military 
or political issues, stating simply that in 391 AD it was “on the verge of collapse.” 
Instead, it offers an alternative example of the decline and fall: positioning the 
brutal murder of Hypatia by religious zealots as a symbol of the demise of the 
classical world. The scenes depicted in the film are intended to represent a turning 
point in the history of civilization for the worse; one, it is implied, only corrected 
with the discoveries of Galileo and the Renaissance. In this way, therefore, the 
“medieval” represents the consequence of the collapse of Greco-Roman culture 
and intellectual life at the turn of the fifth century, and the rise of a fanatical, 
intolerant form of Christianity. We see this change literally and physically occur with 
the destruction in the Serapeum. While the building was indeed destroyed and 
levelled to the ground in 391 AD, this account is almost entirely fictional. There was 
no remaining “Great Library” in the sense of the iconic vast, priceless collection.614  
In this version, the Christians leave the building intact, and, aside from toppling a 
few statues, concentrate on collecting all the scrolls from the library and burning 
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them in a giant pyre in the courtyard, to cries of jubilation at their destruction. 
Consequently, while this scene is indeed based on a historical event, Amenábar 
weaves a new version in which the Christian mob was focused on destroying 
ancient knowledge and learning. In this, he at least appears to have been partly 
inspired by Carl Sagan’s iconic television series Cosmos: A Personal Voyage (PBS: 
1980), which loosely recounts the death of Hypatia in the thirteenth and final 
episode, with Sagan stating that the Christians “came to burn down the great 
library of Alexandria…. (and) there was no one to stop them.”  
It is in the context of these historical liberties that Hypatia is cast as a prophet 
of a future scientific revolution. She has the wisdom to embrace the heliocentric 
model, even though she cannot refute its objections. As well as her invented final 
“breakthrough” in this field her other achievements are inflated in the film’s 
publicity. Antonio Mampaso, an astrophysicist and one of Agora's scientific 
consultants, offered this defence of her scientific credibility, “We know that Hypatia 
lived in Alexandria in the fourth and fifth centuries… only three primary sources 
mention Hypatia of Alexandria, apart from other secondary ones.” He says that 
although “no works of Hypatia were preserved,” it is possible to hypothesise from 
the secondary sources - notably a letter by Synesius dated to 402 that credits the 
design of an “astrolabe of silver” to her - that her father, Theon, designed the first 
astrolabe, and that she both contributed directly to this invention, and came close 
to achieving it on her own.615 He also claims that she invented the hydrometer. 
However, there is ample evidence that the astrolabe was in use at least five 
                                                          
615
 Antonio Mampaso, “The best legacy of Hypatia is its own history,” interview with Enrique 
Sacristan (28
th




hundred years earlier.616 The claim about the hydrometer is widely repeated, but 
the evidence for it is limited to this letter Synesius sent Hypatia, requesting the 
construction of one.617   
The historical liberties extend further in the account presented of her beliefs. 
The film strongly hints she is an atheist, a suggestion without any historical support, 
and which flatly contradicts the fact that she was head of the Platonist school in 
Alexandria, which followed the teachings of Plotinus; a thinker who encouraged 
logic and mathematics in place of empirical inquiry, and whose goal was a mystical 
union with the divine. Her death did not lead to the end of the teaching of Hellenic 
philosophy, and its portrayal here completely ignores the influence of such 
philosophy, and Neo-Platonism in general, on Christianity.618 Instead, she mouths 
post-Enlightenment platitudes of phrase: the line, “What if we dared to look at the 
world just as it is,” precedes her great scientific discovery in the final act, and she 
resists the well-meant pressure to convert from her Christian supporters, saying, 
“You do not question what you believe. Or cannot. I must.” In response to the 
accusation that she does not believe in anything, she replies, “I believe in 
philosophy.” This belief system ascribed to her has no basis in the historical record.   
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Over and over, elements are presented that cast Hypatia as a freethinking 
visionary in conflict with a rising tide of superstition. The destruction of the library, 
Cyril condemning her as a woman, her agnosticism or atheism, the heliocentric 
discovery - all these emphasise a clash between reason, and the forces of 
superstition her views threatened. The interweaving of these narrative elements 
serves to link a celebration of the virtues of the classical tradition of “reason” with 
the negative, pejorative associations of the oncoming medieval and Christian world, 
with the Roman Empire “on the verge of collapse.” The repeated symbolic shot of a 
revolving planet earth, half in light and half in darkness, buttresses this motif.  
  Agora positions itself as a film about reason as opposed to faith, and 
philosophy instead of violence. It is also a film deeply imbued with the 
characteristics of the decline and fall. In particular, it offers a simplistic rendering of 
Gibbon- and not Mann or Scott - in blaming religious superstition, in particular that 
of Christianity, for the loss of classical learning and wisdom, and the implicit arrival 
of a long Dark Age ushered in by Hypatia’s death.      
It should be noted that the film flopped internationally, grossing only $38 
million on a $75 million budget. This may, however, have been the result of it only 
earning a very limited release in the United States, and the difficulty of finding a 
distributor due to its budget and length.619 Furthermore, as a Spanish produced 
film, it was that country’s highest grossing release of 2009.620 More notable than its 
earnings was the heated response it drew from many religious critics. In particular, 
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it was openly attacked by the Religious Anti-Defamatory Observatory,621 claiming 
the film was “reinforcing false clichés about the Catholic Church,” and by an 
American Catholic bishop.622 It was suggested in one review for the Los Angeles 
Times, however, that the film did not condemn specific Christian or Catholic 
religious dogma, but fundamentalism or religious ignorance in general.623  
 
 
Rome, Civilization and the Modern Age 
The warnings of these contemporary authors and commentators about the 
possible, pending or imminent decline of the West strongly echo the bleak 
prognosticators of the first decades of the twentieth century. These very writers 
had helped coin the term “Western” to describe a faltering European civilization 
they believed was rapidly fading away, predominantly through its own internal 
degeneration. In doing so, they are reiterating Roman ruin and decline as the 
pivotal and iconic precedent. Crucially my purpose, these texts display two essential 
common traits. They claim to provide special, authoritative insight into the 
problems of the present day. However, while the specifics of the content and 
examples - such as the emphasis on Washington politics, mass culture, or a cosmic 
cyclical process - may vary, the principle and judgments evoked are almost precisely 
the same. There is little topicality or novelty in these declarations of decadence and 
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decline; in their moral, cultural, and spiritual causes, and in the representation of 
their process, with reference to Rome. The constant, universal myth of Rome’s fall 
thereby serves its function as a prime precedent and analogy. It is as I argue a 
mythology in its own right, whether invoked solely and specifically, or in the 
broader purview of negative classicism. Such analyses of culture, mass culture, 
intellectual standards, and morals suggest that the present as a recreation of the 
past, with the same ruinous repetitions. 
Binding together these comparisons is this universal and constant theme: that 
the modern world has entered a stage of its history that is intimately comparable to 
the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. What a social scientist, or author or 
filmmaker or journalist offers as analysis of modern society, or mass culture, proves 
in fact to contain at its heart something else; a version of the same persistent, 
pervasive mythology that frames its subject in the context of the rise and fall of 
empires and civilizations that supposedly bookend the cycle of human affairs. This 
is the universal principle underlying our stated cultural myth of the decline and fall, 
buried as it is within texts that carry the impression of genuine new analysis, but 
instead are better regarded as versions of the same act of mythologizing. In this 
process, the distinction between “high” and “mass” culture breaks down - it serves 
little relevance as a contrast between meaning and approach.  
However, it must be noted that the degree to which this fall - placed in 
secular, spiritual or more religious terms - is directly invoked varies. It is the central 
idea of Gibbon and Mann’s version of The Fall (and the ideal case study for Tainter), 
one piece of a larger puzzle for Spengler, Toynbee, Kennedy - and only of incidental 
attention to many other pieces of work cited here. The intention of the inference, 
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however, is always the same. In many cases, a passing allusion to Roman decline, or 
decadence, or the fall, or the “barbarians,” the danger of the “masses,” “mass 
culture,” “bread and circuses,” or such related notions, is meant to trigger a chain 
of associations pointing towards a secular implosion or reckoning: one comparable 
to the proven precedent of Rome’s fall. Such analogies run into substantial 
problems. There was no equivalent in the ancient world for the mass media and its 
paraphernalia - network TV, centralized media, radio, television, cinema, or even of 
mass literacy or a universal education system necessary to generate these 
processes. The mythology of negative classicism, however, tends to lump all these 
novel and unprecedented features of modern life into one category, with the 
maxim of “bread and circuses” the prime social and cultural marker; a means of 
equating the death of the ancient world with the doom of the modern.  
It is also vital to observe here that in these accounts of history, both 
contemporary and modern, the comparative approach of the author is vital; with an 
analysis of the past, or allusion to it, deployed for the purpose of making subjective 
value judgments about the present. The value of the past is therefore directly 
informed by its relevance to the interpretation of the present. Such literary works 
and approaches deeply informed the representations of the decline and fall found 
in literature and cinema. Despite disagreement on the content and nature of these 
processes, all sides in these debates could and can draw upon an explicit language 
of decline; and, beneath this, a common latent set of assumptions and ideologies. 
Randolph Stern makes a point along these lines about Renaissance humanism, 
“Something like the decline of Rome was indispensable to the humanists’ sense of 
their identity and cultural role. When it had occurred - with the subversion of the 
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Roman Republic, as in Bruni, or with Biondo’s barbarians - was an open question. 
But if there had been no decline, if Roman culture had passed directly and 
continuously to the moderns, there would have been little point in calling it back to 
life.” Such was crucial to the concept of Renaissance, which sought back to a very 
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In this thesis I set out to answer the question: What, within our time-frame of the 
late nineteenth century to the present day, does the representation of the decline 
and fall of Rome tell us about the societies that produced these cultural texts? 
Exploring the ranging answers to this meant probing a second, and somewhat 
deeper, query; are these representations of decline transient and unique to their 
specific period, or do they possess universal qualities? Answering both these 
questions has required invoking two key conceptual models; a particular 
interpretation of the notion of myth, as the term is defined by Lévi-Strauss, and the 
metahistorical formulation of an integrated regime of representation found in 
Hayden White. Drawing on both of these ideas has been essential to coming to 
grips with the pervasive cultural presence of the decline and fall of Rome.625 In an 
academic context, the word myth is clearly and demonstrably the most appropriate 
term to describe this, and I have demonstrated how the myth-model of Lévi-Strauss 
is a potent means to understand the peculiarities of this type of historical 
transmission.  
There is, however, an important sense in which our usage of the term 
deviates from the Straussian example. The myths outlined in that model describe, 
above all, their role as providing order and comfort in a chaotic universe.626 What, 
then, about myths such as these, stories of the decline and decay and collapse of 
society? Do myths have to “affirm” or “confirm”? In these terms, the decline and 
fall functions as a powerful counter-myth, both to teleologies of progress, and the 
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high and venerating ideals embodied in so much of the reception of the classical 
world. It is a critique or caveat of the social order, rather than an affirmation; 
structurally similar to the Straussian ideal of what myth constitutes, but embodying 
a whole other set of social and cultural tendencies that I have explored.   
This brings me to a defining feature of this myth; that it maintains an 
atypically constant form. Acknowledging this fact reveals that both questions posed 
at the start of this conclusion are not indeed really separate, and must be answered 
together. The way in which the different authors and directors - from Gibbon to 
Amenábar - use the decline and fall reveals the overriding priorities of the universal 
components of this myth. It is one which can be given innumerable different 
causes, and related to an endless variety of later societies, states and cultures; but 
for the myth to serve its function, the essential characteristics of the story have to 
remain the same. In the literary and cinematic examples cited throughout this 
thesis, whether nineteenth-century or twenty-first, the story takes the same 
essential form. Rome fell because Rome first declined; she declined, because she 
was corrupted from within; and the forces that tainted her - however individually 
defined - are those that every society or civilization must hold in check, if they are 
to be spared the Roman example.  
Without the utter clarity of this narrative, the story of Rome has no 
mythological meaning; and no comparative value for the authors who seek a tale 
about the present as much as the past. It would be only a specialist historical 
concern; with perhaps some wider, but largely symbolic significance as the “end of 
an era.” But this is a myth far too grand in scope to be such a footnote; one which 
deploys a historical vision of human nature as a whole; and one which, while 
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couched in universal moral and theological precepts, which draws specifically on an 
idealized version of Late Roman history for its moral and intellectual force. The 
sweeping, comparative purpose of this invocation is what gives it a coherent 
meaning and visible identity, across the broad time-frame of this study, and 
embodied in its varying textual forms.  
The fall of Rome, the causes of its decline, and the universal relevance of the 
story, have occupied a unique place in the Western mind. As a society, we have 
shared a common obsession with this fall. It has been valued and exploited as an 
archetype for every perceived decline, from the political to theological; and hence 
as a symbol for the multifarious fears held about society, culture and civilization as 
a whole. There is a constant representation of Rome in this regard as “a world not 
unlike our own,” engulfing the myth of Roman decline in a continuum with the 
current world of the author, and ancient history with perceptions of the present 
day. The decline and fall is a myth where an explored aspect of their contemporary 
world is a recreation of the Roman Empire, in some aspect or form, and so the same 
set of standards for judging it apply. 
An outline of this framework, and the manifestation of its recurring tropes 
and features, has been the basis for my description of this integrated regime of 
representation and its operation. The decline and fall proves to be a compelling 
enough narrative, bound up with a profound moral purpose, that it has featured 
substantially, in both overt and latent ways, not only in academic historiographies 
since Gibbon, but also in the popular culture of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. I have demonstrated how intimately the two have often been 
interlinked. In this manner, therefore, Gibbon provides the framework for the 
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history of Durant; who shapes the historical representation of Anthony Mann; who 
in turn provides the cinematic precedent for Gladiator. Similarly, the literary and 
moral concepts of decline present in Augustine are repeated in twentieth-century 
criticism of modern empire, and the “bread and circuses” metaphor of Juvenal 
occurs as a prime example of the problems of modern mass culture and the 
industrialized world: features of society that would have been utterly alien to that 
poet of the ancient past. 
Such, then, is the mythology at work here. It is constructed out of real history, 
and owes much of the description of the collapse of the Western Roman Empire to 
the accounts of its contemporaries and later historians; but it has very little 
remaining relationship with any “real” history anymore, instead drawing on a 
separate tradition of tropes and ideas for representing negative classicism, and the 
decline from the “high” classical to the medieval.  
 From this, then, one can comprehend how the concept of the decline and fall 
can only be properly understood as a spatiotemporal construct, rather than a 
historical event - even when most of its popular and intellectual representations 
characterize and classify it as such, and indeed depend on the authority of so-called 
“history” to make their own point. In particular, I have highlighted the presence of 
the decline and fall as an ongoing cultural force by revealing how far and how much 
this subject has functioned as a metaphor for the concerns authors in Britain, 
Europe and America have with the possibility of a similar decline, as they confront 
the perceived instability and pitfalls of the society to which they belong. These 
have, in the time-frame of this thesis, been particularly centered on the threats and 
challenges to Western civilization from without and within; whether pre-
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Enlightenment superstition for Gibbon, spiritual decay for Toynbee and Spengler, 
the Cold War and the rise of television for those critics from the 1940s, late 
industrial decay and cultural collapse from the 1970s, or American foreign policy 
and its consequences in the new millennium.  
Such criticisms have embraced a range of beliefs and ideologies. They all, 
however, demonstrate a form of negative classicism; imagining a decline and fall 
that coheres to an actual or potential trend unfolding in their own time. In this way 
the fall of Rome is deemed a story that possesses universal significance; and one 
that can be related to the modern world as a moral tale. Occupying an arc of 
representational forms from Gibbon to Gladiator, it can pervade all levels of public 
consciousness, from the scholarly to the popular. It appeals to both Marxists and 
conservatives, Christian authors and atheists, because its purpose and role is more 
expansive than such specific ideologies. This vision of the end of Roman civilization, 
an idea persisting despite the intellectual onslaught of modern academic 
historiography, presents a uniquely powerful and pliable counters to a theory of 
progress; an eternally invoked warning of how and why such apparent progress can 
go wrong. I can lead this observation into an insight that the whole idea of cultural, 
political or societal decay, specifically when tied to the Roman example, has 
comparison so deeply embedded in its meaning, origin, and continued usage, that 
the process has become fundamental to the very idea of the decline and fall of 
Rome. Virtually every social and cultural author and commentator who discusses 
the theme falls into a comparison with their own period, whether unconsciously or 
through explicit intent.  
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Furthermore, I have demonstrated how the very concept of the decline and 
fall is deeply theological in character, in its precepts and archetypes, whether 
wrapped up in a secular narrative or not. It is an idea and a description of history 
built on spiritual and religious notions of decadence and moral decline, and 
continues to bear the weight of their sanction. Yet, this detachment from a strictly 
providential theology, and its secularization by Gibbon, is critical to the formation 
of the myth; and a crucial reason for why these same ideas and judgments can 
maintain their relevance in the diverse array of history, literature, film and other 
cultural commentaries of the twentieth century onwards. Modern authors can 
transmit these ideas within a wholly secular context. Myth does not require religion 
in its function.    
The exposure of the process of decline and fall carries the conviction of 
probing in depth and truth. This may explain why observers of historical 
deterioration have appeared so often in the mantles either of prophecy or of social 
science. With either analytical categories or evocative, artful demonstrations, these 
prophets believe themselves equipped to seek out the design and underlying 
meanings in history, and expose the worrisome deviations from a cultural or moral 
standard. For this approach, the fall of Rome proves to be an ideal candidate as the 
test-case for how society or civilization can apparently go wrong. The distillation of 
its history into a mythic formula lends itself to being transposed to other time-
frames, where such values are deemed relevant; what Rome is thought to 
represent historically is also felt to be as authentically experienced elsewhere, 
whether it be Napoleon’s Paris or London at the zenith of the British Empire or 
America as a sole superpower in the twenty-first century. By this means, the 
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subjective experience and consideration of the past can be rendered as 
components of an “objective” system. 
This historical idealisation of the decline and fall of Rome seeks to make itself 
synonymous with the order of history itself. Its end, in this sense, is not a fixed 
historical event, but an idea through time, a process of engagement between past 
and present. Within this definition of empire, an event such as the Sack of Rome by 
Alaric in 410 AD, or the deposition of Romulus Augustulus in 476 AD, marks not the 
demise of empire, but opens up the discursive opportunity to speak of Rome as an 
episode within the cyclical flux of empire and civilization as a whole. Rome, from 
being identified with that empire or point in time, becomes an archetype of rupture 
or discontinuity, of negative classicism and the slew of attached concepts of 
decline. Walter Rehm commented that the subject of Rome’s decay was an 
especially insistent one: “when an age was itself stirred and disquieted by a sense 
of decadence, when it desired to obtain certainty about the historical position it 
occupies in its life.”627 In this thesis it became very clear that there is virtually no 
period where such assumptions about the contemporary world have not been 
made, across authors and genres and media, and where a common and continuous 
mythology about the imagined fall of Roman civilization was not present or 
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